Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN880
2007-08-21 16:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES NOUVELLES,

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5982
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0880/01 2331655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211655Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3412
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0118
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABIDJAN 000880 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W PLUMB, INR/AA GRAVES
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR TO THE AU
USUN FOR A. MORRIS
USAID FOR C. GARRETT, S. SWIFT
USAID/WARP FOR MCKOWN, RICHARDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO IV
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES NOUVELLES,
RDR IN THEIR NORTHERN HEARTLANDS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Vicki Huddleston, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABIDJAN 000880

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W PLUMB, INR/AA GRAVES
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR TO THE AU
USUN FOR A. MORRIS
USAID FOR C. GARRETT, S. SWIFT
USAID/WARP FOR MCKOWN, RICHARDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO IV
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES NOUVELLES,
RDR IN THEIR NORTHERN HEARTLANDS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Vicki Huddleston, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. An Embassy team composed of Charge Vicki
Huddleston and Econ Chief Ervin Massinga to the Bouake and
Korhogo regions, both under Forces Nouvelles (FN) control,
and spoke to United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
(ONUCI),non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
Rassamblement des Republicains (RDR) leaders about the
political situation. ONUCI's regional political director
Gamaliel Ndaruzaniye was blunt in saying DDR is at a
standstill, and that the best that can be hoped for before
elections is some genre of "voluntary disarmament."
Ndaruzaniye said that Soro has succeeded in consolidating his
position within the Forces Nouvelles, and that the consensus
within the FN is that I.B. Coulibaly loyalists, probably
collaborating with elements within the Presidency, were the
authors of the attack. An expatriate Korhogo-region NGO
leader, Father Roche, commented on the backing, structure and
raison d'etre of the Forces Nouvelles, remarking on the
legitimate identification grievances of its rank and file
while also exploring the ethnic divisions within the group
itself. RDR leaders in Korhogo complained about the 2000
election list, which they believe to be fraudulent, and their
belief that the President is making efforts to undermine them
and the North as a whole, but were confident that the party
would win in any free and fair elections. End Summary.


2. (C) The Embassy team visited the Center, Center-North
and Northwest parts of Cote d'Ivoire from August 11th through
the 16th, visiting the regional political/economic hubs of
Bouake, Korhogo and Odienne. The group also visited the key
"Greater West" region of Man, Duekeue and Guiglo which
straddled the former "Zone of Confidence" now dubbed the
"Green Line," an uneasy boundary separating North and South;

this latter portion of the trip will be reported via septel.
During the Bouake/Korhogo portion of the trip, the Charge and
Emboffs spoke to well-placed sources with ONUCI, NGOs and the
RDR, who collectively provided a useful examination of the
state of both the Forces Nouvelles and the RDR.

--------------
ONUCI's Bouake Political Director Describes Soro, Forces
Nouvelles
--------------


3. (C) ONUCI's Eastern-region Political Director Gamaliel
Ndaruzaniye met with the Embassy team at ONUCI's Bouake HQ.
Offering his typically frank assessments, Ndaruzaniye
(strictly protect) touched on DDR, identification and the
state of play both within the Forces Nouvelles and between
the Forces Nouvelles and the President. Ndaruzaniye said DDR
is frustrated by the question of ranks; the armed forces'
(Forces Armees Nationales de Cote d'Ivoire - FANCI) officer
ranks are loath to accept integration of their contemporaries
in the Forces Nouvelles who have been promoted faster than
they, and the question about what will happen to former
non-commissioned officers who have become high-ranking FN
officers (many of whom are Zone Commanders, or "ComZones")
has not been definitively settled. The issue of standing up
the Integrated Command Center and integrating the two armed
forces has been slowed. Ndaruzaniye believes that if
integration is to succeed there will have to be a disbanding
of the militias in the West, to be preceeded by success in
truly integrating the "Mixed Brigades" which are counted on
to bring and keep order in the former Zone of Confidence
(septel).


4. (C) According to well-placed World Bank, EU, ONUCI/DDR
and UNDP officials encountered during an informal gathering
in early August, "integration" of the militaries will likely
be achieved by some voluntary demobilization of Forces
Nouvelles fighters who don't expect to be integrated into the
combined armed forces. Some to-be-determined percentage of
the Forces Nouvelles standing units will then simply be
declared to be FANCI at some point after the next elections
(Note: on August 15, Forces Nouvelles ComZone for Bouake
Cherif Ouismane presided over a ceremony in Ferkessedougou
launching voluntary demobilization. End Note). On
identification, Ndaruzaniye said very little is happening,
and that the key step, nominating and putting sub-prefects in
place, remained to be done. Comment: The process is very
much a GOCI and FN one with the international community
observing, encouraging and criticizing. The eventual

ABIDJAN 00000880 002 OF 004


outcomes related to military integration, disarmament and
identification are unlikely to fully satisfy the
international community because the parties are seeking
political solutions. The real test will be whether the
political solutions are sustainable over the long term. End
Comment.

--------------
Relations Between Gbagbo and Soro
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the relations between Prime Minister
Soro and President Gbagbo, Ndaruzaniye said forthrightly that
ONUCI will go forward with a UNSC-blessed investigation into
the attack, and that both parties had ample reason to see the
probe go forward - "Soro wants it to happen because he
suspects the President was behind the attack, and the
President wants it to clear his name." (Note: on August 17,
ONUCI announced publicly that its investigation team had
arrived in Cote d'Ivoire and its mission was underway. End
Note).


6. (C) Ndaruzaniye sought to discount oft-heard speculation
in Abidjan political circles that Soro has been seriously
weakened by the June 29 attack on his life and the subsequent
fear that the plot came from within. Arguing that Soro
maintains the loyalty of top Forces Nouvelles commanders, he
said that the tight, flawless execution of the logistics
around the Flame of Peace, carried out by the top leadership
in a closely-controlled fashion, belies the notion that Soro
has lost control over or is fearful of his senior
lieutenants. Ndaruzaniye said the ceremony itself and the
concomitant "peace dividend" of bank reopenings and boosted
commercial activity help solidify Soro's standing with the
population in the North. Speaking of the plot itself,
Ndaruzaniye pointed to I.B. Coulibaly without hesitation as
the man most suspected by the Forces Nouvelles, but
immediately asked "who is it that encouraged I.B. to do it?"
The ONUCI Political Director drew parallels between the
attack on Soro and the events of February and June 2004,
recalling the still-unexplained death of Comzone "Adams" and
later the death of Comzone "Kass" during an anti-Soro
uprising allegedly masterminded by Coulibaly, which resulted
in the imposition of sanctions on ComZone "Fofie" of the
Korhogo region for his role in the deaths of over 60
Coulibaly supporters. (Note: The ONUCI Political Director's
speculation is largely in keeping with the conclusions
offered by the French Embassy's deputy political counselor
Sebastian Minot and Licorne's political analyst Col. Vidaud
during an early August gathering with Emboffs. End Note)

--------------
Korhogo Civil Society Leader Discusses Origins, Current State
of Forces Nouvelles, Their Relations with the RDR
--------------


7. (C) During a visit to a Self Help project in a rural
community just south of Korhogo, the Embassy team met with
French citizen Father Bernard Roche, leader of a small civil
society and development group and 35-year resident of the
area. Father Roche described the history behind the Forces
Nouvelles' origins and examined the group's internal ethnic
and religious differences. In describing the role of I.B.
Coulibaly, Father Roche said I.B. was, and remains, very
popular with certain segments of the Forces Nouvelles,
particularly those from the Dioula group. Many of the Forces
Nouvelles chiefs are Dioula, according to Father Roche, as is
Coulibaly himself. Their Dioula affiliation, as well as the
Christian orientation of many of their number, contrast with
the Senefo and Muslim origins of most of the Forces Nouvelles
rank and file (Although according to Roche Soro himself is
Christian). As evidence of I.B.'s former popularity, Father
Roche recalled Forces Nouvelles' ire that led to Roche's 2003
detention by a local commander as he attempted to return to
his posting from vacation in France. The commander and his
troop saw Roche as a representative of the French and France
when Coulibaly was under arrest and facing prosecution for
leading the 2002 rebellion.


8. (C) Addressing the origins of the Forces Nouvelles,
Father Roche was clear in saying the question of identity
motivated the youth of his district and the North in general
to take up arms. In his small area encompassing two larger

ABIDJAN 00000880 003 OF 004


villages, he said more than 50 young men were under arms,
mostly against the wishes of village chiefs. Touching on the
conditions that lead to the region's alienation, Father Roche
said that the treatment of the northern people by the
then-RDR-leaning gendarmerie was deplorable and often
rapacious, creating animosity towards the central government
(especially its armed forces). As evidence of this, Father
Roche said that when the Forces Nouvelles took control of the
region, they "eliminated" the most egregious offenders within
the gendarmerie, but let go unharmed many who had not preyed
upon the population.

--------------
RDR in Korhogo Distrusts President but Confident in Itself;
Clearly the Most Organized Party in the North
--------------


9. (C) Charge and Emboffs met with Korhogo Mayor and the top
officials from the regional Conseil General, all of whom are
RDR, elected in the 2000 and 2001 municipal and regional
elections (Note: In Korhogo, as well as neighboring
Ferkessedougou and northwestern anchor Odienne, the only
political party with real headquarters with signs of activity
and upkeep is the RDR. End Note). The Mayor and his allies
expressed serious doubts as to the sincerity of the President
to genuinely address the underlying cause of the division of
the country, i.e., the identification question. Noting the
attack on Soro took place on the eve of the planned early
July launch of the audiences foraines, the Mayor implied the
attack was timed to frustrate the will of the Northern
people. According to the Mayor, without a thorough effort to
identify and register the people, the war would resume.


10. (C) The Korhogo Mayor continued by saying that Prime
Minister Soro did the right thing by continuing to implement
the Ouaga Peace Accords after the attack on his plane. The
recent nomination of magistrates in the North was a welcome
advance in that domain, but their demand for certain
"conditions" to be met before they actually take up residence
and their duties are slowing the efforts of the PM.
Similarly, the prefects, named with great public fanfare and
"installed" in grand public ceremonies, continue to reside
largely in Abidjan, and will remain there until "security"
and other "conditions" are improved. While a top civil
servant in the Prime Minister's Redeployment of
Administration Office told Emboff in early August that the
recent funding of redeployment bonuses to government workers
had led to a breakthrough in actually deploying government
cadres, the Mayor, the Conseil General, and a prominent NGO
leader all told the Charge that little to no redeployment of
teachers, medical workers or others has taken place.

--------------
Elections Preparations
--------------


11. (C) Turning to elections, the Mayor complained bitterly
that the Presidency was gradually taking control of the
process, shunting to the side the National Statistical
Institute (INS in French) which the opposition tends to trust
more than the FPI-led Ministry of Interior and the
PDCI-affiliated President of Independent Electoral Commission
(the CEI in French, which many international and local civil
society leaders see as having questionable administrative
abilities). The Mayor said the old electoral list for the
region had disappeared, and that the 2000 list (which the CEI
has just recently decided to use as a baseline) is riddled
with problems and fraud. Addressing the DDR question, the
Mayor said that the continued existence of large, pro-FPI
militias in the West would prevent real disarmament.
Accusing the President of attempting to strangle
RDR-controlled municipalities in the North, the Mayor
observed that since 2002, salaries and budgets for
mayoralties and conseils generals have been cut off.


12. (C) Despite this, however, the Mayor averred that the
RDR would win the region handily. Pointing to the nationwide
2000 mayoral elections and the 2001 conseil general
elections, both of which took place using the "flawed" 2000
electoral list and after the 2000 Presidential elections, the
RDR won an absolute majority of votes in both, and large
majorities in the North. Using these results as a baseline,
the Mayor and his allies in the Conseil General were

ABIDJAN 00000880 004 OF 004


confident that the RDR would prevail in any election.



13. (C) Comment. The most pressing issue for true
reunification of the North of Cote d'Ivoire with the South is
elections in which the population feels it has been fairly
represented. Fair representation in turn depends upon an
electoral list that incorporates Northern populations that
consider themselves Ivorian.

Comment Con't: As for the attack on Soro, it is clear that
the consensus opinion in the North increasingly centers on
some combination of I.B. Coulibaly, elements within the
Presidency, and residual I.B. allies as the authors of the
June 29th attack on Soro. Since that incident, it is also
clear that PM Soro has solidified his position within the
Forces Nouvelles, and that the group is stronger and more
unified than many Abidjan-based observers would believe. A
similar observation applies to the RDR and its leader,
Alassane Ouattara: while his missteps and political
maladroitness are justifiably grist for constant commentary,
he and his party do retain a solid block of support in the
North, even if they suffer some high-profile defections. The
party and Ouattara cannot be discounted in posing a serious
threat to President Gbagbo's chances of reelection a free and
fair process. The Forces Nouvelles and the RDR may not
cooperate hand in glove in their Northern strongholds, and it
remains to be seen how their relationship will develop during
the electoral campaign. But each seems to be in better shape
than many in Abidjan would believe. End Comment.
HUDDLESTON