Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN803
2007-08-01 07:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

SORO, FORCES NOUVELLES STAY TIGHT-LIPPED ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0803/01 2130747
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010747Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3319
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0108
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1604
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000803 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ADDIS ABABA FOR US REP TO AU
PRETORIA FOR EXTERNAL POL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: SORO, FORCES NOUVELLES STAY TIGHT-LIPPED ON
AUTHORS OF ATTACK

REF: A. ABIDJAN 764


B. ABIDJAN 755

C. ABIDJAN 732

D. ABIDJAN 719

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000803

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ADDIS ABABA FOR US REP TO AU
PRETORIA FOR EXTERNAL POL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: SORO, FORCES NOUVELLES STAY TIGHT-LIPPED ON
AUTHORS OF ATTACK

REF: A. ABIDJAN 764


B. ABIDJAN 755

C. ABIDJAN 732

D. ABIDJAN 719

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Emboff traveled to Forces Nouvelles
stronghold Bouake to meet with key aides to Prime Minister
Soro concerning the investigation into who attacked Soro on
June 29 (reftel D, C). Soro aide Cisse Sindou said the PM
will not comment on who the authors of the attack were until
an international investigation is conducted, and his top
lieutenants on the civilian and military side appeared to
fall in line behind this directive. Several interlocutors
outside of the Soro camp expressed unease that the peace
process is stalled, largely due to mistrust between Soro and
Gbagbo stemming from the attack, despite the pomp and
circumstance surrounding the July 30 "Flame of Peace"
ceremony. End Summary.


2. (C) Emboff traveled July 25-26 to Bouake, stronghold of
the Forces Nouvelles and de facto seat of Prime Minister Soro
since the June 29 attack on his life (reftel C, D),to meet
with senior aides to the PM concerning the investigation into
who was behind the attempt. Senior Forces Nouvelles
ministers and key advisors to the Prime Minister had become
increasingly unavailable and unwilling to talk in Abidjan.
The preparations for the July 30 "Flame of Peace" ceremony
added to the general unavailability of key Soro aides.

--------------
The Scene
--------------


3. (C) Emboff took a UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI)
flight. In Abidjan, the presidential Fokker 100 that had
transported Soro when he and his entourage were attacked was
in plain view, parked in front of the ONUCI hanger. The
damage to the plane was easy to see and one large hole with
burn marks around it and another, smaller hole without such
marks were both covered with plastic sheeting. There was
no/no additional damage, either from rocket or from automatic
weapon fire visible from the outside.


4. (C) Security at the Bouake airport is heavily
reinforced. For Emboff's ONUCI flight, a platoon of armed

ONUCI troops held strategic positions around the airfield and
in a guard tower overlooking the ONUCI terminal. The brush
had been recently pushed at least 100 meters back from the
runway, taxiways and terminal by ONUCI equipment still in
place.

--------------
Forces Nouvelles Carefully Addresses Rumors, Exhibits Tight
Message Discipline
--------------


5. (C) Emboff was greeted by Forces Nouvelles Deputy
Director of Cabinet Cisse Sindou at the group's civilian HQ.
According to Sindou (an 18-year resident of the U.S. whose
wife and children still reside in the NYC area),he has been
active in the FNs since its inception and has taken on the
role of chief interlocutor between the PM's office and the
various governmental arms of the redeployment of civil
administration and the FNs. Sindou told Emboff that the FNs
and Soro were continuing to work diligently to put into place
a durable peace process through deployment of administration,
despite the unfortunate June 29 attack. Sindou said that
neither the FNs nor the PM would dignify rumors concerning
the authors of the attack, preferring to see a proper
international investigation, whatever the length of time
needed.


6. (S) Emboff asked about a specific report in the press
(which has also been the subject of several sensitive
reports) that indicates the Burkina intelligence service had
helped determine that elements close to the Presidency had
conspired with I.B. Coulibaly to assassinate the PM. Sindou
demurred at commentary, saying vaguely that others at a
higher level would have to comment. Emboff asked about the
150 Burkinabe troops pledged by President Compaore for ONUCI
(Note: top aides to senior ONUCI officials had been dismayed
at the potential for such a deployment, fearing the "signal
of mistrust it would give." End Note). Upbeat, Sindou said
the troop deployment would occur as soon as the Burkina

ABIDJAN 00000803 002 OF 003


legislature ratified the plan.


7. (C) Emboff had been scheduled to meet with FNs military
Chief of Staff Bakayoko. Pleading extreme scheduling
conflicts and the demands to work around the clock with PM
Soro and his top aides de camp on the "Flame of Peace"
ceremony preparations, Bakoyoko said he could not find the
time to meet. Zone Commander "Big" called Emboff personally
later in the day, apologizing for his superior's
unavailability, but promising profusely to meet once the
ceremony had passed. (Comment: The interaction of the FNs
top leadership with Emboff during the Bouake trip appeared
closely choreographed. Both Bakayoko and ComZone Big were
well aware of the visit, but the former allowed he would have
little to say since the designated spokesman Sindou had
already met with Emboff. Emboff called Minister Sidiki
Konate (FNs #3) and the PMs spokesman Alain Lobognon, both of
whom were in Bouake (along with #2 Dacoury Tabley); both
declined to meet, despite being frequent interlocutors in
Abidjan before the June 29. End Comment.)

--------------
The Mayor of Bouake Weighs In
--------------


8. (C) The Mayor of Bouake, Fanny Ibrahima, met with Emboff
for dinner on July 25. Ibrahima was at the center of a
beehive of activity, taking friendly calls from the
newly-installed (but not yet resident) prefect and having
just come from an evening countdown meeting for the "Flame of
Peace" ceremony presided over by Soro and attended by top
aides. Clearly unwilling to discuss sensitive topics at
Emboff's hotel, he and Emboff met at the Mayor's house for
breakfast the following morning. Ibrahima chose not to
comment on the rumors mentioned in para 6, but pointedly did
not/not contradict them. Offering insights into the Forces
Nouvelles' inner workings, Ibrahima was dismissive of Konate,
saying he'd embarrassed himself in the immediate aftermath of
the June 29 attack, and implying strongly that Sindou has
effectively taken his place. Responding to questions
concerning Tabley's near disappearance from the public scene,
Ibrahima confirmed the War Victims and Solidarity Minister
has been sidelined, partially over his reported unhappiness
at Soro's decision to take the Prime Ministership, partially
over a personal dispute with Soro involving the affections of
a woman in Ouagadougou.

--------------
Contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ONUCI Express
Misgivings
--------------


9. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Ambassador Tanoh
Boutchoue, Director of the Office of International
Organizations and UN Affairs, asked to meet with Emboff the
evening of his return from Bouake, citing the urgent need to
exchange several routine pending demarches. Meeting at
Emboff's home, Boutchoue made it clear he strongly suspects
the Presidential camp in the Soro attack, specifically
hard-liner William Atteby (a close ally of First Lady Simone
Gbagbo and who was quoted saying "the attempted assassination
pales in comparison to the war crimes of Soro and his
confederates"). Boutchoue was plainly worried that a
Presidential hand in the attack would deal a fatal blow to
the peace process, and sought to enlist the aid of the U.S.
in preventing that. (Note: it was unclear if Boutchoue was
freelancing or acting under orders from FM Bakayoko. Both
Boutchoue and Bakayoko are members of the opposition PDCI.
End Note).


10. (C) ONUCI's DDR head Jean Luc Stalon called Emboff on
the evening of the 26th to express his own disappointment
with the pace of the peace process. Speaking frankly, he
said the pace of DDR and other key processes had slowed to a
crawl, mostly due to mistrust ONUCI sees between the Soro and
Gbagbo camps subsequent to the attack on Soro. While still
in Bouake, Emboff spoke to ONUCI's Acting Sector East
Commander Col. Adams from the Ghana Battalion. Puzzled over
the odd combination of amateurishness and cunning in the Soro
attack, Col. Adams remarked at the inability of the
assailants to hit the aircraft with small arms fire, despite
it being no more than 80 meters away as it made a slow,
vulnerable turn towards the ONUCI hangar. Adams noted the
long-standing discord within the FNs military wing, which had
been roiled by the March 4 Ouaga Accord, and pointed to the
July 10 attack on ComZone Zakaria's Bouake residence as

ABIDJAN 00000803 003 OF 003


evidence such tensions persist. Turning to the alternate
theory of President's camp involvement in the attack, Adams
said that "informed opinion" in Bouake before the attack had
either Gbagbo or Soro moving to eliminate the other within
short order, so the June 29 attack came as no surprise.



11. (C) Comment. The organization of both the Forces
Nouvelles' engagement with Emboff and Soro's equally tight
control over all of his lieutenants during the preparation
for the "Flame of Peace" ceremony tends to indicate they are
very cautious with their public and even private messages
related to the ultra-sensitive topic of who tried to kill
their leader. That same organization, in addition to the
fact Soro has remained in Bouake for essentially the past
month, tends to undercut the theory that the attack was an
inside job, although Soro could merely be attempting to keep
his enemies where he can see them. No one in his circle has
pointed a public or private finger in the direction of the
President. However, they seem to be taking prudent steps,
such as bringing in a company of Compaore's paratroopers
(though this is not yet a certainty),while at the same time
pushing forward with the element of the peace process they
care most deeply about, identification (the arms destruction
in the "Flame of Peace" was symbolic, according to Soro's
team, and does not signify a renewed focus or even a new
breakthrough on the thorny questions hindering DDR progress).
Going forward, it remains to be seen if the suspicions
within the Soro camp that the Presidency had a role to play
in the June 29 plot will poison the atmosphere to the point
that the peace process will grind to a halt. End Comment.
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