COTE D'IVOIRE'S GOVERNMENT DRIFTS AFTER ATTACK ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000764

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE'S GOVERNMENT DRIFTS AFTER ATTACK ON
SORO; WAITING FOR NEWS FROM NEW YORK

REF: A. ABIDJAN 755

B. ABIDJAN 732

C. ABIDJAN 719

Classified By: Acting PolEconChief EMassinga, Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Since the March 29 attack on the aircraft
carrying Prime Minister Soro, the peace process
implementation has been at a near-standstill. Soro and his
small team appear knocked off stride (although he could be
"playing possum" and proceeding cautiously while recovering
his footing). The notion of bringing Burkinabe troops to
Abidjan to protect Soro appears to be definitively squashed.
The Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (loyal to President Gbagbo)
have seized on the controversy around control and security at
airports to marginalize ONUCI and LICORNE's role at the
Abidjan airport, a symbolic, if incremental, victory in the
incessant Gbagbo-international community chessmatch.
Meanwhile, the government has issued a request for an
international investigation of the Soro attack, despite the
low likelihood such a probe will produce concrete results.
Redeployment of prefects and magistrates is moving ahead, but
very slowly, pushing off the date in which the identification
courts can realistically start their work. End Summary.

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Soro - Shell-shocked or Proceeding Cautiously?
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2. (C) The topic du jour among the chattering classes is
the state of mind of PM Soro. As reported in (reftel B),
Soro was keen to discuss the events of June 29 at length with
all of his interlocutors for many days after the attack. The
PM describes it in minute detail, and has made it the sole
topic of all of his governmental actions, scheduling an
extraordinary Council of Government (presided over by
President Gbagbo) on July 11, after discussing it in a
closed-door meeting with Burkina Faso President and Ouaga
Accord facilitator Compaore in Ouagadougou last week before
his return to Abidjan. Many are questioning whether Soro has
been unhinged in the attack and knocked off balance, unable
to drive the peace process forward or counterweigh President
Gbagbo (Note: Emboffs have seen the unpublished, but widely
circulated, gruesome photos of plane's interior. It would be
understandable if Soro were deeply affected by the attack,
even if being seen as dwelling on it would be politically
damaging. End Note)


3. (C) Reinforcing the sense that the PM has been seriously
bruised by the attack in Bouake is seeing his key advisors in
clear disarray. Emboffs have been unable to get in contact
with Soro's inner circle, highlighting just how small that
circle was even before June 29. Tourism Minister and Forces
Nouvelles spokesman Sidiki Konate and PM Special Advisor
Lobognon are unavailable: Lobognon recently got out of
hospital and is recuperating, while Konate carries the load
of acing as the PM's chief operative alone, and is seemingly
overwhelmed by press and the crush of business. Dacoury
Tabley, Minister of War Victims and Solidarity, reputed
Forces Nouvelles number 2 civilian leader and chief
negotiator of the Ouaga Accord, has been on absolute radio
silence since the Bouake incident. The PM's bench is thinner
than ever, while that of the President remains comparatively
deep.


4. (C) Another interpretation, however, is that the PM is
proceeding deliberately and cautiously in the wake of the
Bouake attack. He remained outside of Abidjan for 10 days, a
move that cannot help but suggest at least some mistrust of
the President or his entourage. He has forced the Gbagbo to
address (or at least pay lip service) to his concerns through
the latter's grudging acceptance of a request to the United
Nations for a international investigator (retel A). If Soro
were to harbor mistrust towards Gbagbo and also suffer from
exacerbated personnel weaknesses, perhaps his slow,
deliberate pace suits the circumstances.

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Burkina Troops to Protect Soro?
--------------


5. (C) During Soro's trip to Ouagadougou after the attack,

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it was very widely speculated that he would return with a
contingent of Burkinabe paratroop commandos to bolster his
security retinue. Even well-placed ONUCI sources the day of
his arrival were unsure if he would bring a contingent of
"blue berets." Since then, such speculation has continued,
but has apparently been put definitively to rest by Konate,
who said on July 12 that protection offered by Ivorian armed
forces is more than sufficient.

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ONUCI and FANCI Dispute Control over Abidjan Airport
--------------


6. (C) On July 9, General Mangou of the FANCI issued seven
orders as part of efforts to "reinforce security" at the
Abidjan airport. The demands included exclusive ASECNA (the
regional air control consortium) control over and a ban on
armed personnel in the radar tower, the dismantling of
LICORNE's Milan surface-to-air system at the airport,
prohibition of "impartial forces" armored vehicles from
patrolling the perimeter and the dismantling an impartial
forces bunker and another structure on the airport grounds
itself. The moves caused some grumblings, as part of the
mission of the impartial forces at the airport (as well as
their presence at the Yamoussoukro and Bouake airports as
well) is to monitor and interdict illicit arms shipments as
well as ensure the integrity of ONUCI's ability to move
freely. Post understands the SAM positions have been
removed, but that armor remains around the perimeter
(France's 43rd battalion HQ is next door to the airport).
DATT sources indicate ONUCI, LICORNE and FANCI senior
officials continue to meet to work out the practical
implications of Mangou's decrees.


7. (C) The controversy over the control of the Abidjan
airport serves two purposes for the President. First and
foremost, it allows him to take yet another incremental, but
important step, in marginalizing the role and powers of the
impartial forces. Second, it allows him to make the subtle
point that ONUCI and LICORNE failed to ensure airport
security in the Bouake incident, despite the evident
confusion over who exactly was in charge.

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International Investigation of the Attack
--------------


8. (C) In a July 10 meeting with Presidential diplomatic
advisor Ottra Toure, Emboff was told that the President had
"no objections" to an international inquiry into the attack
on Soro. President Gbagbo reiterated that stance directly in
a meeting with Ambassador Hooks, and the Foreign Minister
Bakayoko formally handed the request to ONUCI Deputy
Carpentier on July 12 for transmittal to the UNSC. Note:
While President Gbagbo may feign exasperation with the notion
of a special international investigator, it appears he knows,
and the PM should know, that such an investigation is
unlikely to result in accusations hard enough to lead to
indictments. Not only does the President's outward show of
eagerness to accept a UN role in investigating the matter
make the deputy Forces Nouvelles military commander Wattao
look foolish, but it also serves, to a certain extent, to
inoculate the President from suspicion.

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Progress Slow on Pushing Peace Process Forward
--------------


9. (C) The June 29 attack unquestionably slowed the
implementation of the peace process. DDR is stalled until at
least July 30, when the rescheduled "Flame of Peace" will see
Soro and Gbagbo hosting Presidents Compaore and Mbeki. The
mobile identification courts cannot start until magistrates
and prefets are put into place in the North; while this week
we did see the prefect in Korhogo (third largest city in Cote
d'Ivoire) assigned to his post, the overall process remains
painfully slow. Magistrates openly complained about the need
to be compensated for the "moral shock" caused by the Soro
attack before they will take up their Northern posts.


10. (C) Meanwhile, the UNSC is expected to take up the
French draft of ONUCI's mandate renewal on July 16.

ABIDJAN 00000764 003 OF 003


Political actors and observers are waiting for its results,
along with some sense of how the request for an international
investigation will be handled, as well as for the
long-awaited naming of a new Special Representative from the
Secretary General.

SIPDIS



11. (C) Comment. The attack on PM Soro continues to
dominate the scene here, both through the resulting paralysis
in the PM's camp and manner in which the President has been
able to exploit the opportunities presented. Observers here
look for news from NYC, the July 30 "Flame of Peace," as well
as upcoming decisions by the World Bank and IMF on
post-conflict financing to breath new life into the stalled
process. End Comment.
HOOKS