WHO TRIED TO KILL SORO? THE SPECULATION IS WELL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000719

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO IV
SUBJECT: WHO TRIED TO KILL SORO? THE SPECULATION IS WELL
UNDERWAY

REF: A. ABIDJAN 705


B. ABIDJAN 691

Classified By: EMassinga, Acting PolEconChief, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Since the June 29 attack on Prime Minister
Soro, the rumor mill has gone into overdrive. The facts
remain scarce, adding fuel to the unending speculation. The
suspects are numerous, ranging from the most obvious
(disaffected members of the Forces Nouvelles) to the absurd
(ONUCI and French),the unlikely (RDR) to the possible (the
Presidential camp). Possible motives, like the Ivorian
political scene itself, are manifold and intricate.
Regardless of the true authors, the clear winner to date has
been President Gbagbo, as his one-time "equal" (Soro) is now
saddled with a fractured and bickering military and political
structure. End Summary.


2. (C) Since the events of June 29 in Forces Nouvelles-held
Bouake (reftel A),speculation throughout Cote d,Ivoire
regarding the true authors and motives of the attack has
moved into high gear. Abetted by the lack of hard
information on the attackers and the assault itself, the
rumor mill and conspiracy theorists are having a field day.
The ongoing theorizing and growing public finger-pointing is
largely irresponsible and is already weakening the Prime
Minister and the Forces Nouvelles as a whole. Had the attack
succeeded (which it very nearly did),the results could
potentially have led to a reignition of overt conflict.

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The Facts (Or Lack Thereof)
--------------


4. (SBU) What is known is that at 10:30am, the Fokker 100,
lent by the Presidency to the Prime Minister for the latter
to preside over the investiture of magistrates destined to
oversee the audiences foraines (mobile identification courts)
in Bouake, had landed and was taxiing when it came under
attack by concealed assailants. Press reports, based on
information coming from Licorne and ONUCI officials based at
the Bouake airport, said three RPG rounds were fired, but at
least one failed to explode. Widely-seen photos of the
aircraft after the attack showed one large RPG-sized hole in
the middle of the central cabin, and gruesome interior photos
showed that the blast killed one passenger instantly, while
the other four dead and more than a dozen injured were
presumably hit by associated flying shrapnel.


5. (SBU) The rest of the events surrounding the attack
remains shrouded in uncertainties. Multiple reports indicate
small arms fire accompanied the RPG barrage, but apparently
no heavy machine-gun fire was used, as might be expected in
an attempt to destroy a 100-seat jet aircraft. Forces
Nouvelles Minister of Tourism (and reputed #3 in the group)
said in his post-attack press conference that signs that the
assailants had dug foxholes and encamped at least overnight
were found, indicating some level of preparation. However,
the plane was not attacked while on its final approach, when
it would presumably be more vulnerable to a catastrophic hit,
and no surface-to-air weapons were employed.


6. (SBU) The pilot managed to direct the plane to
ONUCI-protected facilities, according to press reports and
many eyewitnesses on the plane, but why the attackers failed
to continue fire is unclear; there is no evidence that either
ONUCI or nearby Licorne troops on site engaged with the
attackers. Forces Nouvelles Deputy Force Commander Wattao
publicly claimed to have saved the day by arriving on the
scene with loyal units, even carrying the PM on his back to a
waiting vehicle (according to his own accounts). ONUCI
forces remain publicly circumspect about their role during
the attack, but did report protecting the PM during his
extraction from the scene and during the rest of the day in
Bouake. Konate said just subsequent to the attack that
"several soldiers" were arrested and "some materiel was
recovered at the scene," but it was unclear if the arrestees
were taken into custody at the airport or during sweeps
conducted in Bouake later in the day. On July 2, Le Jour, a
daily journal that leans against the President's FPI,
reported that Saint-Clair Kone, a "member of the Forces
Nouvelles Army Command" was arrested in connection with the
attack on the PM, but no further details were offered. Soro,
unhurt, made a statement on June 30 and called for an

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international investigation, promising to speak at greater
length in the coming days, and remaining in Bouake until July

2.

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Suspects -- The Forces Nouvelles
--------------


7. (C) The most obvious set of suspects come from the
Forces Nouvelles itself. On the day following the attack,
state-owned newspaper Fraternite Matin ran a quasi-news story
pointing the finger (without any proof or justification) at
I.B. Coulibaly, the erstwhile leader of the rebellion which
evolved into the Forces Nouvelles, and currently exiled in
Benin (although he has made noises about returning in the
post-Ouaga political framework). Indeed on June 29, the very
day of the attack, I.B. Coulibaly was the subject of an
extensive report in L,Inter, a generally pro-opposition
independent paper which argued a successful peace process
depended on Soro coming to terms with the man he edged out to
lead the FNs. Separately, Embassy sources indicate that
ComZone "Big" (a.k.a. ComZone "Osama Bin Laden" in Touba) was
sacked for unknown reasons two weeks ago and "reassigned" to
Bouake. ComZones Cherif Ousmane of Bouake and Kone Zakaria
of Seguela were slammed by some in the press for accusing PM
Soro of betraying the movement and being disloyal to the FNs,
all supposedly at the behest of I.B. Coulibaly (however, both
had already stoutly and publicly rejected such accusations
before the attack). All in all, several princes of the
Forces Nouvelles, long subjects of speculation concerning
their disposition towards the Ouaga Accord and Soro,s
acceptance of the Prime Ministership, have more than enough
motive to be prime suspects.


8. (C) While suspicion should rightly be directed here, not
all the facts comport with the theory. First, some observers
close to the opposition (notably the RDR) look at the
relative amateurishness and lack of sophistication of the
attack in arguing against the notion that veteran, effective
commanders such as Cherif Ousmane (who blunted a major FANCI
offensive in 2004 and also tracked down and killed feared
Liberian mercenary Sam Bokarie) and Kone Zakaria were the
authors. Perhaps more tellingly, such observers believe that
if one or a cabal of ComZones were plotting to eliminate Soro
for selling out to the President, why not wait until July 5
for the planned "Flame of Peace" disarmament ceremony, where
both Soro and Gbagbo were scheduled to appear together?

--------------
Suspects -- The RDR
--------------


9. (C) The RHDP alliance of the PDCI and RDR has undergone
a series of strains with its former Forces Nouvelles allies
in the past months since the Ouaga Accord,s signature. The
RDR has in particular found itself at odds with the PM,s
camp, seeing several prominent stalwarts break ranks and join
the FPI in the midst of RDR-FNs bickering. Thus, it comes as
no surprise to hear some accusations of RDR complicity in the
attack. (Note: Post attaches little credibility to such
speculation. While nothing can be ruled out in the Ivorian
political maze, neither the RDR nor its leader Alassane
Ouattara strike us as possessing either the ruthless cadres
or savoir faire to attempt such an audacious effort. End
Note)

--------------
Suspects -- The French, ONUCI
--------------


10. (C) Newspapers close to the President,s FPI have been
quick to point the finger at ONUCI and the French Licorne
force. Using specious logic, weak circumstantial evidence
and stretching the intemperate, ill-considered allusion to
the "suspicious presence and inaction of French troops" at
the Bouake airport made by Sidiki Konate just after the
incident, Notre Voie and Le Courrier d,Abidjan directly
accused France of being behind the attack, and the latter
alleges that "the Forces Nouvelles" themselves suspect France
and Cherif Ousmane are the masterminds. From within the FNs,
Wattao made repeated, lurid claims of ONUCI complicity in the
attack ("I have proof") while also slamming Licorne, only two
weeks after being seen angrily complaining about the French's
"interference" in 2002-03. (Note: These patently absurd

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statements, combined with his cartoonish claims to have saved
the PM, make Wattao look foolish. However, his very public
comments show obvious discord within the most senior ranks of
the FNs, and worryingly demonstrate some measure of FNs
hostility towards the impartial forces, a development that
cannot help but delight the hardline factions in the
President,s camp. End Note)

--------------
Suspects -- The President,s Camp
--------------


12. (C) President Gbagbo made the right statements in his
address to the nation: "we cannot turn back from peace
process... This has been a terrible crime against the Ivorian
people." Ble Goude, the President,s de facto emissary to
the North, has been lavish in his praise of the Forces
Nouvelles, handling of the situation and the group,s
support among the people of the region. Defense Minister
N,Guessan was sent to Bouake to "lend support to the PM."
Despite these adept moves, the President himself let slip
that had the PM been injured or held by his attackers, he
might have been compelled to send the army to "free" Soro.
The slip of the tongue only fueled the suspicion of Gbagbo,s
opponents that he, or perhaps Simone Gbagbo, formulated the
June 29 attack to either kill or "scare" the PM.



13. (C) Comment. The facts are simply too scarce to
support any of the rumors or suspicions running rampant in
Abidjan. However, regardless of whether he or someone from
his entourage was the author, it is plainly evident to most
observers that Gbagbo has been able to profit handsomely from
the attack. The Forces Nouvelles have been fractured by the
event, and are pointing fingers at one another while key
leaders also foolishly accuse the international community.
Soro remains for the time being in Bouake and its extended
environs, perhaps indicating some level of reluctance to
return back to the President,s home turf. On July 2, Soro
attempted to regain his footing by speaking to audiences in
the northern city of Ferkessedogou on the vital importance of
continuing the peace process, as well as noting in a public
meeting with Acting SRSG Abou Moussa that controversies over
security at the Bouake airport should be handled directly,
not through the media (implicitly telling Wattao and others
in the FNs to keep quiet).


14. (C) Comment Continued. The balance of power with
Gbagbo that Soro claimed was his strength has shifted more in
the President,s favor. Furthermore, the incident will
impede the return of civil servants and especially
magistrates and prefects, already reluctant to return to the
North due to their concerns over security, despite the very
recent restart of "redeployment bonuses" (reftel B). In a
July 3 meeting with the diplomatic corps and senior UN
representatives, we will see what steps the PM intends to
take to more fully recover from the political fallout over
the attack on his life. End Comment.
HOOKS