END OF JUNE ASSESSMENT OF OUAGA ACCORD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000691

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO USTR C. HAMILTON
USAID FOR C. GARRETT, S. SWIFT
TREASURY FOR D. PETERS
COMMERCE FOR RIVERO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: END OF JUNE ASSESSMENT OF OUAGA ACCORD
IMPLEMENTATION - WHAT IS MOVING, WHAT IS NOT

REF: A. ABIDJAN 689


B. ABIDJAN 633

C. ABIDJAN 615

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Implementation of the Ouaga Accord has
not moved substantially since the Yamoussoukro CPC (reftel
B). The Integrated Command Center is not functioning, the
question of military ranks continues to bedevil efforts to
begin integrating the militaries and the process of DDR,
while the public ceremonies held to date to destroy arms are
more show than substance. Redeployment of the civil
administration is not moving, affecting the launch of the
identification process, itself hobbled by continued failure
to name a contractor to produce the voter cards and database.
Funding remains a serious problem, with Ivorian leaders from
all parties slowly coming to grips with the fact that new
international assistance will be limited. Despite the
failings of the past several weeks, however, the overall mood
in the country remains positive. End Summary.

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Military Affairs - Integrated Command Center, Ranks
Imbroglio, DDR, Militia Disarmament, ZoC Phaseout
--------------


2. (C) One of the biggest weaknesses of the transition
process to date has been the Integrated Command Center.
Designed to lead the way on military affairs by providing
increasingly "Ivorianized" protection of the former Zone of
Confidence through the expansion of "mixed" brigades (FANCI
and Forces Nouvelles) and collaborating with ONUCI on
securing DDR sites and disarmament, the ICC is functioning
essentially in name only. While the FANCI,s designated head
of the ICC is in place at the Yamoussoukro facility, General
Bakayoko of the FAFN refuses to name the deputy commander
until the question of ranks (see para three) is solved.
Until the question of ranks is settled, realistically the ICC
will continue to exist in theory. The few mixed brigades
that have been created so far are too few to be able to
patrol the former ZoC, and thus ONUCI and LICORNE remain
indispensable for providing security in those regions,
particularly in the West.


3. (C) The question of ranks continues to gum the works of
the overall peace process. Now in the hands of Ouaga
facilitator Burkina Faso President B. Compaore, Both Defense
Minister N'Guessan (FPI) and Minister of Tourism (and
effective number three in the Forces Nouvelles) Konate have
confirmed to the Ambassador and other Emboffs that the number
of officer-rank personnel involved subject to the dispute is
minuscule: 15, according to N'Guessan in a conversation with
the Ambassador held the week of June 18. The compromise
brokered at the recent CPC conclave at Yamoussoukro (refel B)
allowed officers to rise to the highest rank attained by any
of their peers who entered service at the same time. This
clever solution, however, has not sat well with much of the
FANCI officer corps, although the reasons, as well as the
identity and political importance of the officers who are the
subject of the dispute, remain unclear. The 15 FAFN officers
are apparently not the so-called ComZones, who will be
allowed to quietly retire with their ranks intact, along with
benefiting from a side agreement understood to allow them to
keep whatever goods and property they have "acquired" during
their tenures.


4. (C) Real DDR and militia disarmament continue to be
delayed. Instead, the country continues to be treated to
what is effectively political theater for the masses in the
form of very public arms destruction ceremonies. The next
one is scheduled for the Forces Nouvelles stronghold Bouake
on July 5 (postponed from June 30),where a "Flame of Peace"
is supposed to destroy the first tranche of weapons from the
former rebels. What is troubling is how this ceremony, as
with the last ceremony "disarming" militias in Guiglo (reftel
C),remains outside of regularized DDR channels. The
disarmed soldiers here will not be channeled into a proper
integration and reinsertion program to be established under
the well-understood guidelines governing DDR. While the
President and Prime Minister are scheduled to attend the July
5 event, the results cannot be expected to go beyond
symbolism. As for the real DDR process, as specified in the
Ouaga Accord, that won't start until 1) the question of ranks

ABIDJAN 00000691 002 OF 003


is solved, and 2) funds are made available, most likely
through the World Bank's post-conflict facility (Reftel A).

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Redeployment of Administration
--------------


5. (C) After the June 5 decree announcing the nomination of
prefects to the former rebel zones, along with a companion
decree assigning magistrates to the North, actual deployment
of state officials remains slow. The ONUCI Political Affairs
Director in Bouake told Emboff that the recent public
ceremony installing the prefect there was "just for show;"
the prefect returned to Abidjan within days and has not
returned. Other prefects in the North have not taken up
their posts, nor have magistrates. Contacts in the Prime
Minister's office inform us that a decree naming sub-prefects
will be issued "shortly," theoretically facilitating the
overall deployment of the essential organs of state control
throughout the country. The delay, however, is serious; the
audiences foraines process cannot begin without the prefects,
sub-prefects and magistrates being in place.

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Identification
--------------


6. (C) The Prime Minister and President, along with Ouaga
Accord facilitator Compaore, all said that as of mid-June the
audiences foraines would relaunch by "the end of June." This
clearly is not going to happen. While we do believe all
sides have the political will to begin the identification
process (particularly the PM),whether the process can start
in July is an open question. Perhaps we will see pilot
programs put into operation first, allowing the machinery to
be put in place and gather momentum.


7. (C) One essential prerequisite is the choice of the
"technical operator," the contractor selected to produce the
voter identification cards. Sources in the Prime Minister's
office and the Presidency indicate that French company Sagem
remains the top choice, despite some initial grumbling over
the excessive (more than USD 100 million) price tag. Sources
in the PM's office indicate negotiations with Sagem to reduce
its asking price are ongoing.

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Funding
--------------


8. (C) Funding for the whole post-conflict package (DDR,
identification, the ill-defined "civil service" program
designed to absorb former combatants who are not integrated
into the new blended armed forces) and some urgent rebuilding
of crumbling basic infrastructure remains another open
question. The recently published budget has a massive
funding gap of USD 589 million that it expects WB, IMF and
new bilateral assistance to cover. The government, through
both the PM and various ministries, regularly put out appeals
to the international community to contribute additional
funding streams for various programs addressing different
post-conflict needs. A PM-organized donor roundtable
(bilateral plus the IFIs) was scheduled for June 27th, but
has been postponed until July 2, ostensibly due to the
Quadafi visit. Most donor countries, including the EU,
indicate, both in private and in the near-constant round of
Abidjan donors meetings, reluctance to devote new resources
in Cote d'Ivoire.


9. (C) Most donors appear more willing to address the
post-conflict funding gap through multilateral means, i.e.,
through the IFIs. The recently concluded accord reached
between WB and IMF staff and Cote d'Ivoire sets the stage for
the IFIs boards to begin this process (reftel A). However,
the ramping-up of IFI funding will take until mid-2008 and
into 2009, leaving it unclear how the government will address
some of the big ticket items, such as the civil service
program, among the most obvious on the list.

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Mood - Calmer, Less Tense
--------------


10. (C) While a number of crucial elements of the Ouaga

ABIDJAN 00000691 003 OF 003


Accord remain undone, the improvement in the mood and
ambiance in the country is undeniable. The climate in
Abidjan is more relaxed. Major supermarkets are reopening in
former rebel-held territory, and Western Union is setting up
shop in Northern zones that haven't seen financial
institutions in four years. The Ouaga Accord has
unmistakably contributed to a palpable improvement in the
overall situation.



11. (C) Comment. Our previous overall grade of B-/C for
the implementation of the Ouaga Accord (reftel C) must slip
to a C/C because of the weak progress seen since the last
assessment. It is time for the Ivorian political class to
get to work. End Comment.
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