OUAGA ACCORD AT 90 DAYS - ASSESSING ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: OUAGA ACCORD AT 90 DAYS - ASSESSING ITS
IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. ABIDJAN 580


B. ABIDJAN 558

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Since the signature of the Ouaga Accord
on March 4, Cote d'Ivoire has seen both successes and
shortcomings in its implementation. At the 90 day mark,
several key tasks remain undone, while a number of others
have been accomplished (even if incompletely). The overall
report card is a C plus/B minus, with good marks for initial
efforts, middling marks for some intermediate steps, and
demerits for weak performance in disarmament of militias and
tardiness in the DDR and identification processes. The
outgoing UNSYG's High Representative for Elections is
particularly skeptical about identification. Many observers
sense a government somewhat adrift, without a PM firmly in
charge and the President enjoying the discomfiture of his
opponents. End Summary.


2. (C) Since the signature of the Ouaga Accord on March 4,
there have been substantial advances, although
simultaneously, significant delays mar progress and undermine
the transition's credibility. Most decision-makers are
taking advantage of this 90-day mark since the OPA's
signature to offer their own assessments. The Presidency has
issued its own (heavily slanted) matrix showing block after
block of completed tasks, while the Prime Minister's key
advisors tell us that the situation is far more advanced and
on track than the daily background noise of the newspapers
and media would have one believe (reftel A). Meanwhile, the
departing High Representative for Elections Gerard Stoudmann
remains pessimistic that the present transition period will
be run effectively, and fears the Presidency will eviscerate
the identification process, the cornerstone to the OPA's
promise to end the conflict by decisively addressing the core
problem: determination of who is an Ivorian.


3. (C) In fact, the reality is more mixed. There has been
some real progress in OPA implementation but also significant
delays, particularly in such key, interlocking areas as the
Audiences Foraines, standing up the Integrated Command and
DDR. There has also been a palpable drift in governmental
administration while the fundamental questions slowly grind
forward. For example, the President has remained publicly
silent about the continued presence of Posts Director General
Zehi (who, despite a mid-May Supreme Court order that he
vacate his post forthwith, continues to preside over a
nearly-broken organization) and thuggish student union
FESCI's latest outrages (reftel B),reinforcing a perception
of stagnation. In addition, questions persist over the
motivations of Prime Minister Soro, thought by many to have
accepted payoffs to sign the accord.

===============
The Report Card
===============


4. (C) The overall grade for OPA implementation is a B
minus/C plus.


5. (SBU) Initial moves were surprisingly swift. Forces
Nouvelles SG Soro was appointed PM on March 29, 25 days after
the OPA was signed, less than the five weeks provided by the
OPA. Soro presented his new government on April 9, again
meeting the deadline. The process of eliminating the Zone of
Confidence began 10 days after the formation of the Soro
government, as did the establishment of the Integrated
Command Center (ICC),located at Yamoussoukro. Under the
rubric of "establishing an institutional framework for
implementation" (four weeks after the OPA signature),the
Presidency issued an amnesty decree on April 12.


6. (SBU) Other actions in April and early June have
continued provide momentum to the process. Disarmament of
militias began on April 19 with the showy, ceremonial
Disarmament of the Movement of the Resistance of the Greater
West, and June 5 saw two decrees finally naming prefects and
magistrates crucial to the redeployment of administration and
justice in the North, both of which are essential for the
upcoming audiences foraines, which will document the 2-4
million unregistered residents in Cote d'Ivoire.


7. (C) Each of these moves has been flawed. The gradual
elimination of the Zone of Confidence has created security
problems and in many cases has been more symbolic than
substantive, as FANCI and FAFN checkpoints remain in place,
slowing the movement of people and goods. The ICC is not
truly functioning, and questions concerning the integration
of the officer corps of the two armed forces bedevil efforts
to fuse them. Many were outraged at the quick adoption of

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amnesty for crimes committed in the context of "politics"
since August 2002. And the first post-OPA militia
disarmament was widely recognized as a joke: militia leaders
have apparently absconded with the money, while relatively
few weapons were turned over for destruction and most of
these were decrepit.


8. (C) However, last week's decrees naming magistrates and
prefects represents a real breakthrough. The PM brokered a
deal sidestepping the vexing question of how to pay for the
over 200 audiences foraines-related magistrate positions
created at the tail-end of the Banny government by appointing
just over 60. And by naming a compromise slate of prefects
and subprefects, PM Soro puts meat on the bones of his
contention that the government is truly a co-equal
cohabitation. According to a member of Soro's inner circle,
a disagreement between the President and PM over bonuses for
prefects and magistrates deploying to the North was
apparently resolved in Soro's favor (no bonuses will be paid).


9. (C) Substantial holes remain, most glaringly DDR and
identification. DDR was supposed to have begun through
regroupment and stockage of weapons under the supervision of
the impartial forces (no timeline was provided, but
implicitly the process should have begun). To date, we have
seen no action related to DDR. The government's head of the
DDR coordination body was removed during the week of June 4,
and he explained his dismissal as making room for the proper
exercise of authority by the ICC; however, this (re)begs the
question of when and how the ICC will really function.
Delays in identification are perhaps even more serious.
Scheduled by the OPA to begin 2 weeks after the formation of
a new government, the audiences foraines are now slated to
begin in mid-June. However, many observers believe that this
cannot take place until the magistrates are all installed in
their appointed places. Once started, identification will
also undoubtedly last longer than the three months provided
for in the OPA.

===================================
The Perspective of the Outgoing HRE
===================================


10. (C) UNSYG High Representative for Elections Stoudmann
has been told by UN HQ in NY not to return to Abidjan, and
his staff is quietly planning to depart by June 19. While
the HRE believes the OPA has brought peace back to Cote
d'Ivoire for the immediate future, the office's senior staff
remains apprehensive. They see Soro as hopelessly bought,
and uninterested in carrying forward a genuine identification
process, potentially opening the door to a resumption of
hostilities in the future. HRE senior staff continue to
complain that Interior Minister Tagro (FPI stalwart) is
gradually taking authority for developing the elections plan
from the CIE, without resistance from the PM. Finally, HRE
staff sees UN HQ as weak in the face of Gbagbo's pressure,
too willing to accept the President's semi-public attacks on
Stoudmann (of which the President virtually boasts in
meetings with the Ambassador) and too willing to accept a
weak certification mandate for ONUCI.

===================================
How the Prime Minister's Men See It
===================================


11. (C) Unsurprisingly, the PM and his senior men play up
their role in bringing OPA to fruition. Recent discussions
with both Tourism Minister and Forces Nouvelles #3 Sidiki
Konate and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister Alain
Lobognon (reftel A) saw both men go to some lengths to
underscore the government's adherence to OPA timelines and
emphasize the power balance within the government. However,
despite the positive step of issuing decrees on magistrates
and prefects, the failure to move more quickly on
identification and DDR, the FESCI fiasco (reftel B) and
ceding overall control of the macroeconomics portfolio to the
Gbagbo camp all underscore the difficulties Soro and Co.
continue to face.

===================================
Gbagbo, Smiling Like a Cheshire Cat
===================================


12. (C) The President, meanwhile, remains serenely above
the fray, taking pleasure in the discomfiture of his rivals.
The President has managed to pit the unarmed opposition
(RHDP) against the PM, as the former accuses the latter of
weakness in the face of the President's efforts to undermine
the international community's role in Cote d'Ivoire's
transition. The argument has laid bare underlying fissures
among the opposition and the FN, and has cost the President

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little to nothing. In the midst of the bickering amongst his
rivals, the President has enjoyed seeing his protege Ble
Goude take his "Caravan of Peace" to former FN stronghold
Bouake, basked in the reflected glory of the national soccer
team's triumph (in Bouake) in an African Cup qualifier and is
preparing to receive OPA mediator Compaore in the first
meeting of the Permanent Framework and Consultation Committee
(made up of the President, PM, Ouattara and Bedie) today.
All of these enhance the prestige of the Presidency as having
delivered peace to Cote d'Ivoire.


Comment. The OPA is substantially different from the
numerous previous accords which failed to bring an end to the
crisis. This agreement, in contrast, was conceived by the
principal actors themselves, who see value in being seen as
adhering to it. While implementation is not perfect, there
is more substance than its critics (including the HRE) would
concede. At the same time, the main events, DDR and
identification, are seriously behind schedule. For the OPA
to be a real success, both processes will have to begin
shortly and in earnest. End Comment.
VALLE