COTE D'IVOIRE: REASSESSING THE UNOCI MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000544

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL UN IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: REASSESSING THE UNOCI MISSION

REF: ABIDJAN 521

Classified By: PolOff Laura Taylor-Kale, Reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The evolving political and security climate
in Cote d'Ivoire in light of the Ouagadougou Political Accord
(OPA) and the increasing demands on the United Nations
Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) mission pose the question:
what should UNOCI's role be in this fragile security
environment? Although the government is falling behind the
OPA timetable, the political process is moving quickly and
the government will need UNOCI to help maintain security,
particularly in the troubled western region of the country,
during the concurrent identification, voter registration and
DDR processes in addition to technical, logistical and
elections support. Licorne's drawdown to possibly half of
its original force levels creates an added burden on UNOCI to
backfill for the loss. As the High Representative for
Elections (HRE) closes his shop and the future of the
International Working Group (IWG) is uncertain, UNOCI will be
the sole vehicle through which the international community
can engage on elections planning and identification. Given
the increasing demands on UNOCI, the reduced Licorne presence
and the fragile security climate, Post does not recommend a
reduction of the UNOCI mission and does not think an increase
is necessary at this time. END SUMMARY


2. (C) The evolving political and security climate in Cote
d'Ivoire in light of the OPA and the increasing demands on
the UNOCI peacekeeping mission pose the question: what
should UNOCI's role be given the ambitious steps required by
the OPA in this more stable, but still fragile security
atmosphere? The Secretary General's 13th Progress Report on
UNOCI, the basis for the May 18 UNSC discussion and
subsequent PRST, poses the same question. PM Soro's new
government is only now solidifying as new ministers assume
their posts and fill key offices and has just begun to
implement core provisions of the OPA (disarmament of militias
and military units, military restructuring and integration,
audiences foraines (public identification hearings) and
elections planning). Although the government is intent on
holding elections by the end of 2008, the 10 months timeframe
is clealy unrealistic and Soro has acknowledged that his
administration is already behind schedule accordin to the
timetable laid out in the OPA (reftel).


3. (C) The government has asked for and needs UNCI's
logistical and technical support in redeploing its civil
administration, crucial for the relaunch of the audiences
foraines and voter registation. The government is also
asking for tens o millions of dollars to support these
projects, lthough advisors close to Soro recognize the
intrnational community will be reluctant to foot the ill as
drawn up and is making efforts to reduce te request.
Furthermore, with the possible elimintion of the IWG, UNOCI
will be the sole vehicle hrough which the international
community can engge on elections planning and
identification. Th recent compromise between Gbagbo and
Soro on the participation of UNOCI in the elections process
as already diminished UNOCI's role (reftel). As te HRE
office closes shop in the coming weeks, th increased
political demands on UNOCI to providetechnical assistance
will bring greater pressure on its resources. At the same
time, the direct ifluence of most of the international
community (erhaps outside of Burkina President Compaore and
the indirect role of international financial assistance) is
beginning to wane.


4. (C) In addition to technical assistance and monitoring,
UNOCI will play an important role in maintaining security of
identification, voter registration, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programs and, eventually,
elections. The government recognizes it needs UNOCI's
military and police presence and active engagement in each of
these initiatives that are key to the process of national
reconciliation and peace building. UNOCI security assistance
will be particularly important in troubled areas of the West
where militias are still active (despite the May 20 public
"dismantling" of the Resistance Forces of the Great West,
where some 1,000 mainly older weapons in apparently poor
condition were rendered). The current security climate is
stable overall but the continued violence in the West, the
drawdown of Licorne troops and the additional
responsibilities that UNOCI has been asked to take add
further pressure to the UNOCI mission.


5. (C) Licorne's drawdown in particular has serious
implications for UNOCI since Licorne plays an important role
in backing UNOCI's peacekeeping presence. Licorne's troops
are more effective and have better logistical and aviation
support than UNOCI peacekeepers. Currently, Licorne has

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approximately 3,000 troops, three-fourths of original force
levels. Licorne General Lecerf intends to reduce the French
footprint in the coming months and may draw down to 2,000
troops by September. While Licorne can still cover the
entire country with their two remaining battalions, there
will be inevitably less support for UNOCI.


6. (C) COMMENT: Even if UNOCI's role is not expanded, its
military, police and political responsibilities will grow.
Given the fragile security climate and these increasing
demands, Post does not think an increase is necessary but
neither do we recommend a reduction of UNOCI force levels at
this time. Indeed, PM Soro and his inner circle have told us
in no uncertain terms that a reduction in UNOCI force levels
at this time would be "catastrophic."


7. (C) No one can predict precisely how many troops will be
needed to complete the difficult tasks ahead. UNOCI assets
can and should be strategically redeployed to fit the
evolving mission profile, perhaps deploying its six
battalions to more effectively cover the volatile West and
populous Abidjan neighborhoods in recognition that the
security situation in the East is comparatively stable; the
UNSYG's report calls precisely for such a redeployment.
However, it would be unwise to assume at this juncture that a
reduction of the UNOCI mission will serve the needs of the
peace process to which the USG, the Ivoirian people and the
international community have invested so heavily. This is
particularly true given that once troop numbers are reduced,
it would take months to ratchet those levels back up, should
they be required. The UNSYG has pledged in his report to
reexamine the question of troop levels in the September
report. We concur that this would be an opportune time to
revisit this question.


8. (C) UNOCI's operations are far from perfect and can be
improved. Internal financial controls are weak, coordination
of efforts among the various UN organizations here (UNDP,
UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.) is underwhelming. UNOCI's engagement
with the public is lacking. Each of these problems is
well-known to the UN's senior leadership here, as well as the
whole of the international community and the Ivoirian
political class, and should be addressed. The UNSC can
demand that UNOCI implement management and programmatic
improvements urgently, prior to the September review. END
COMMENT
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