Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN43
2007-01-12 11:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: U.S. POLICY FOR BREAKING THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON EFIN ASEC IV 
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VZCZCXRO6688
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0043/01 0121159
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121159Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2440
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1504
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0391
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000043 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA FOR BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: U.S. POLICY FOR BREAKING THE
POLITICAL STALEMATE

REF: HOOKS/CARTER EMAIL 09/14/06

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA FOR BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: U.S. POLICY FOR BREAKING THE
POLITICAL STALEMATE

REF: HOOKS/CARTER EMAIL 09/14/06

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The continuing political stalemate in Cote
d,Ivoire, as the clock winds down on any chance of elections
this year, poses the question: what can the United States do
to re-energize the peace process? We do not believe the
United States should try to take the lead -- among other
things this might only give an excuse to the French to cut
and run, and to the Ivoirian political actors to avoid taking
ownership of their own crisis. Rather, we should try to play
a catalytic role through a two-track strategy. On the
diplomatic front, we should enhance our collaboration with
the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). As a first step, we should consult
closely with the AU and ECOWAS and offer to host in
collaboration with them a meeting in Washington with key
Ivoirian political players. We strongly urge a senior-level
visit to Cote d,Ivoire soon, at least at the level of
Assistant Secretary. We should also encourage the French,
frankly and at senior levels, to lower their profile and stop
making it look like they are focusing solely on getting rid
of President Gbagbo. On a second track, we should enhance
our own efforts to support the gradual institutional
reintegration of the country, perhaps starting by encouraging
the return of the banking sector to the North. Continuing to
expand the outreach of U.S. programs into the North would
also contribute significantly to this process. To
successfully play this kind of catalytic role, we must be
prepared with the will and the means for a long-term
endeavor. End Summary.


2. (C) The continuing political stalemate in Cote d,Ivoire,
as the clock winds down on any possibility of holding the
already twice postponed elections this year, poses the
question: what can the United States do to re-energize the

peace process?


3. (C) The Ivoirian peace process is at a stalemate.
Neither the President nor the political opposition nor the
rebel FN (Forces Nouvelles) are capable of decisively moving
the center of gravity in their favor, or of decisively
marginalizing the other parties. However, the international
community is equally incapable of decisively affecting the
political dynamic to bring the country out of its crisis.
Until something (as yet undetermined) creates greater
political will to compromise among the principal players, the
situation is (unfortunately) not yet ripe for resolution.


4. (C) However, this does not mean that we could or should
simply wait on the sidelines until the political class here
"gets its act together." The stakes for Cote d'Ivoire, the
region and the U.S. are too high. While we do not believe
the United States should try to take the lead in mediating
the conflict (as most Ivoirian political leaders seem to
wish),our interests do compel us to remain engaged and to
seek to play a catalytic role in ending the crisis. The key
is to recognize that we must be prepared for such a catalytic
role to be a long-term endeavor.


5. (C) We propose a two-track approach. The first track
would be to engage more closely with the AU and ECOWAS to
advance the peace process here. On the second track, we
could increase our own efforts to gradually reintegrate the
country's institutions, thus facilitating functional if not
political reconciliation and reunification.

Track One: the Diplomatic Front
--------------


6. (C) Although, or even precisely because, the
international community's efforts to steer Cote d'Ivoire
towards peaceful reconciliation are not bearing fruit, the
United States must continue to engage on this level. We
should be careful not to appear to be trying to take the
lead. For one thing, this could give the French the
opportunity they seem to be looking for to cut and run. For
another, one of the key reasons why this crisis is so
protracted and intractable is the lack of maturity among the
Ivoirian political elite and their chronic unwillingness to
take ownership of their own future. An African-led approach
is best, engaging directly with the Ivoirian parties.
However, we should do all we can to encourage more robust
African mediation.


7. (C) President Compaore, as ECOWAS chairman, President
Sassou as the current AU Chair, and the new AU Chair who will

ABIDJAN 00000043 002 OF 003


replace Sassou merit special attention. We should look for
opportunities to approach them at senior levels, to encourage
more pro-active African mediation and to underscore U.S.
readiness to support their efforts. In particular, the
appointment of the new AU Chair will offer an opportunity to
invigorate the participation of the AU. We should seek ways
to strengthen the role of the AU and to encourage it to take
ownership of the process. For example, the AU can act as a
clearinghouse for sanctions or other resolutions pertaining
to Cote d'Ivoire before they are presented in the UNSC. In
addition, one tangible way to show our support would be to
offer to host a meeting in Washington, in collaboration with
the AU and ECOWAS, with representatives of key neighboring
countries and Ivoirian political actors. This would be a
highly useful follow-up to the meeting President Sassou plans
to host January 15 with similar participants. The level at
which participants would be invited, and the level at which
the meeting would be hosted in Washington, would remain to be
worked out.


8. (C) Greater attention to Cote d,Ivoire by senior U.S.
officials would also pay significant dividends. We urge
Washington to consider a visit to Cote d,Ivoire soon, by a
senior official at the level of at least Assistant Secretary.
Such a visit would demonstrate the strength of U.S.
commitment, and would also provide an excellent opportunity
to drive home the message that the United States does not
favor any side in this crisis, but we do believe it is
essential and urgent for the Ivoirians to take their future
in their own hands, and we stand ready to do all we can to
support regional efforts to help them do this.


9. (C) We should also engage with the French, frankly and at
a senior level, to urge them to lower their profile and take
a more nuanced approach. French interests here are not
served by seeming to focus solely on getting rid of Gbagbo.
We should be prepared for the French to counter by accusing
the United States of seeking to undermine everything they try
to do to resolve the crisis here, and to warn that if the
crisis is not resolved soon, they will withdraw their forces.

Track Two: Long-Term Gradual Reintegration
--------------


10. (C) Cote d'Ivoire is slowly, haltingly reintegrating at
an institutional if not political level. Efforts to
reintroduce national administration to the North have yielded
some fruit, especially but not only in the health and
education sectors. NGOs and international humanitarian
agencies are contributing significantly to this process. So
are we, as we expand PEPFAR, OFDA, public diplomacy and our
other programs into the North. We propose that the United
States expand its efforts to support the institutional
reintegration process. With greater focus on this long-term
approach, patience, and modest (but critical) new resources,
this second track can help stitch this country together, in
spite of its shortsighted leaders. Over time, perhaps years,
the country's leaders will eventually be forced to recognize
the emerging reality on the ground.


11. (C) One sector which would make a major contribution to
the institutional reintegration of the country and the
economic revival of the North is banking. Both the FN and
the political opposition are calling for banks to return to
the North. Sources in the banking industry tell us they are
considering doing so, though they would need to work out
security arrangements with the FN. We should encourage,
perhaps even publicly, the dialogue between the banks and the
FN on this issue.


12. (C) We should also continue expanding our own outreach
into the North. The Embassy is respected throughout the
country for the breadth and scope of its outreach, and we
want to build on that. Besides continuing to expand our
PEPFAR and OFDA outreach, we plan to hold America Days,
offering Embassy cultural and information programs in cities
throughout Cote d'Ivoire. We might also consider
establishing an American Corner in the Northern capital of
Bouake, as we have done elsewhere in the country. We would
also urge an increase in our ESF funding, to increase U.S.
support for democracy and human rights throughout Cote
d,Ivoire. The reverse, zeroing out ESF funding as we have
seen in preliminary FY 08 budget figures, would fundamentally
undermine the strength of our commitment here.

Comment
--------------


ABIDJAN 00000043 003 OF 003



13. (C) Cote d'Ivoire's political problems are some of the
most deeply rooted in Africa, despite the absence of open
conflict at the moment. We do not believe the United States
should try to take the leading role here, but if the means
and will are available we could play a more active role to
help break the cycle of drift the country finds itself in.
The key is to bear in mind that this needs to be a sustained,
long-term effort. End Comment.
Hooks