NEW FORCES LEADER SORO TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000333

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC IV
SUBJECT: NEW FORCES LEADER SORO TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER;
ANNOUNCEMENT EXPECTED TODAY

REF: A. A) ABIDJAN 281

B. B) MARCH 27 UNCLASS BRENCICK-MASSINGA EMAILS

Classified By: PolOff Laura Taylor-Kale, Reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 26 the ex-rebel movement New Forces
(NF) announced that it has reached a deal with President
Gbagbo's representatives in which NF leader Guillaume Soro
will become Prime Minister. Some press reports and NF
sources indicate that Gbagbo will issue a decree to this
effect today, March 27, but it is not clear that this will
happen and there has been no official announcement so far by
the Presidency. According to UN High Representative for
Elections (HRE) Gerard Stoudman, Burkinabe president Compaore
will submit the agreement to name Soro PM to the African
Union and the UN Security Council for ratification. Some
sources suggest that Soro will come to Abidjan immediately to
take up his new duties while others aver that he will take
his time to allow current PM Banny a graceful exit. No firm
word yet on the composition of Soro's government. Banny has
not resigned, but in a speech made the same evening as the NF
announcement he hinted that he is ready to leave. A source
in Stoudman's office speculates that Gbagbo and Soro may have
reached a private deal giving Soro broad powers as PM in
exchange for his support for a Gbagbo re-election bid. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) In a statement on its website, the NF announced late
evening on March 26 that it had reached agreement with
President Gbagbo's negotiating team in Ouagadougou to name NF
Secretary General Guillaume Soro as the next Prime Minister.

SIPDIS
This announcement had been expected for some time, but there
has so far been no official announcement by the Presidency.
Embassy officers spoke to Alain Lobognon, the NF Director for
Communications, who is currently in Ouagadougou, on the
morning of March 27. Lobognon confirmed that the negotiating
parties signed the agreement on March 26 and added that
President Gbagbo will sign the decree appointing Soro as PM
today, March 27, in time for it to be broadcast on the 8:00
pm evening news. However, it is not clear that this will
happen. Lobognon emphasized that the NF negotiating party
will remain in Ouagadougou until the UN Security Council
formally endorses the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) and the
nomination of Soro as Prime Minister. Lobognon commented
that it had not been the NF's intention to accept the post of
PM but that Gbagbo had been pressing them since December to
do so. In the end, the NF concluded that this action is the
"best way to reestablish the peace."


3. (SBU) Banny has been evasive about his remaining tenure as
PM. However, just a few hours before the NF announced the
agreement to appoint Soro PM, Banny made a speech to
supporters in Yamoussoukro, hinting that he is ready to
leave. Banny stated that "every mission has an end" and that
"sometimes sacrifices have to be made," for the good of the
nation. Banny did not announce his resignation but did
invoke the international community, noting that he was
serving the nation by appointment of the UNSC. HRE Stoudman
told us Banny is ready to resign but wants some kind of
statement to that effect from the UNSC. Stoudman thought a
statement from the UNSC president (PRST) might meet this
requirement.


4. (C) Econ Counselor spoke to a senior official in the
Office of HRE Stoudman on March 26, who noted that the
agreement to name Soro PM was inevitable, and that ONUCI and
the HRE have been in close contact with all Ivorian parties
since the March 4 signing of the OPA. The official added
that the HRE believes that Soro and Gbagbo had come to a
private arrangement that justifies their taking the risks
associated with this deal (The HRE rep alluded to the risk of
a "Savimbi Outcome" for Soro and the possible loss of
executive and financial authority in the midst of a tough
electoral campaign for Gbagbo). Under the terms of their
private arrangement, Soro would de facto break ties with the
political opposition (which has of late appeared visionless
and shown signs of fracturing) and Soro would support
Gbagbo's re-election bid in the northern, NF-held
territories. In exchange, the FPI would agree to a longer,
more thorough identification process than the one currently
envisioned in the three-month period outlined in the OPA, and
possibly grant other, unidentified concessions. (Note: Soro
just turned 35, and is unable to run for President until he
is 40, according to Article 35 of the Constitution. End
Note)


5. (C) HRE Stoudman told us in the afternoon of March 27
that Gbagbo will invoke Article 53 of the constitution to
give Soro broad powers. However, the exact nature of those
powers had not yet been agreed upon as of last weekend and
the HRE speculated that the issue may remain a stumbling

ABIDJAN 00000333 002 OF 002


block to an agreement. On the other hand, the Soro and
Gbagbo camps have reached agreement on the composition of a
new government and Stoudman expects the government to be
announced by the end of this week or early next week.
Stoudman said that once Gbagbo has issued the decree naming
Soro PM, Compaore will submit the agreement to the AU and
then the UNSC for their approval. After that, the UN will
send a technical assistance team, probably headed up by the
deputy head of DPKO, to Cote d'Ivoire. The team will draft a
report for the SYG to present to the UNSC, which should be
ready by mid-May or so. That report will be the basis for
another UNSC resolution reviewing ONUCI's mission here and
prolonging its mandate.


6. (C) French DCM here told us that, despite UNSC 1721, he
is under the impression that the UNSC will be asked to merely
"ratify" (enteriner),rather than debate and approve, the
appointment of Soro as Prime Minister. French DCM added that
he has heard varying reports as to when Soro intends to come
to Abidjan. Some say he will come to the capital immediately
while others aver that he will delay his return in order to
give the UNSC time to ratify his appointment and Banny an
opportunity to exit gracefully.


7. (C) Also on March 27 Emboffs met with Navigue Konate, the
president of the FPI youth wing and number two on President
Gbagbo's negotiating team in Ouaga. Konate dismissed the
unarmed opposition as ineffective and counterproductive to
the reintegration of the country, and conceded the
President's camp has its work cut out for it in bringing the
militias, Young Patriots, and FESCI to heel in a
post-conflict environment. In recounting the negotiation
process, he acknowledged that President Compaore's team
played a critical role in forging the eventual compromise.


8. (C) A senior official in the opposition Democratic Party
of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) told Poloff on March 27 he was
largely pessimistic about the prospects of elections in 2008,
commenting that once Soro becomes part of the government,
neither he nor Gbagbo will have an incentive to proceed to
elections: Gbagbo will not want to lose and Soro will have
the access to power and money that he needs to realize his
own presidential ambitions once he is of age. However, the
PDCI official added that Soro and Gbagbo remain mortal
enemies and that Soro will be protected by Burkinabe soldiers
is evidence that he fears for his security in Abidjan. In
order to assure success of the peace process, he argued for
close monitoring of the new government by the international
community.


9. (C) Comment: Despite the numerous unanswered questions
about Soro's powers, the identification/voter registration
process, and possible secret agreements between Soro and
Gbagbo and unhappiness among many in the political opposition
for being marginalized by the Ouaga talks, the apparent
nomination of Soro to the Prime Minister's office (on
schedule according to the OPA) represents another tangible
advance in the peace process. END COMMENT
Hooks