Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN242
2007-03-06 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

PEACE ACCORD IN OUAGADOUGOU - OBSERVERS, POLITICAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON IV 
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VZCZCXRO6713
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0242/01 0651057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061057Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2674
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000242 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON IV
SUBJECT: PEACE ACCORD IN OUAGADOUGOU - OBSERVERS, POLITICAL
CLASS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC

REF: A. OUAGADOUGOU 186


B. ABIDJAN 226

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000242

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON IV
SUBJECT: PEACE ACCORD IN OUAGADOUGOU - OBSERVERS, POLITICAL
CLASS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC

REF: A. OUAGADOUGOU 186


B. ABIDJAN 226

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Confounding the expectations of many, (reftel b),
President Compaore brokered an ambitious peace accord over
the evening of Saturday, March 3rd. Signed by both President
Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles leader Soro in Ouaga, the
agreement is both detailed and vague: attempting to overcome
the hurdles of the many past agreements, Ouaga (or Ouaga I as
some more skeptical observers have named it) attempts to
spell out in comprehensive detail how difficult questions
such as identification, voter registration and the phasing
out of the Zone of Confidence will be carried out. At the
same time, the accord is silent on the future of Prime
Minister Banny, exceptionally vague on the structure and
leadership of a transitional government that will carry the
country through the roughly ten months until envisioned
elections, and breathtakingly ambitious on the timeline and
questions, such as identification and voter registration,
where a window of three months is blocked out for the several
million (perhaps as many as 3.5) unregistered Ivorian
citizens. More analysis will follow as Post gauges the
reactions of the political class and other relevant parties
in the conflict, but this agreement does represent
substantial compromise on both sides, which has pleased (and
relieved) many.


2. (C) The agreement describes how identification,
elections, the security forces, restoration of civil
authority, the end of the Zone of Confidence and
international observation will work. One of the central
planks, section I's three-month audience foraine process
represents a compromise made by both sides. The brevity of
the process means that only a fraction (realistically less
than 1/2, perhaps l/3) of eligible citizens will be
registered during the allotted time. However, Gbagbo gave
substantial ground on the form of the audience
foraine/identification/voter registration question: new
registrants will simultaneously obtain a supplemental birth

certificate and official recognition of citizenship through
the audience foraine process, skipping the nationality
determination in the courts for which the President's camp
had fought so long. Newly registered citizens would be added
by the Independent Electoral Commission (whose control is not
addressed by the Accord) to an updated 2000 elections list.
Section III creates a Central Integrated Command headed by
one military chief each from the FANCI and FAFN, and staffed
by equal numbers of officers from each group. DDR is
supposed to proceed two weeks from the formation of a new
transitional government, along with the dismantling of the
militias. The accord asks for the arms embargo to be lifted
to allow the new military structure to maintain order in the
Zone of Confidence, which would be phased out through gradual
removal of impartial forces control. Intriguingly, the Ouaga
Agreement calls for additional African troops to bolster the
impartial forces, possibly opening the door for an early exit
of French Licorne troops. The timeline adopted gives all of
these elements 10 months.


3. (C) In a March 3 evening meeting between Soro and
Ambassador Hooks, Soro said he is very cautiously optimistic.
Soro said that he would accept the Prime Ministership - if
he could be guaranteed all the powers necessary to carry out
the accord, most notably control of the audience
foraine/identification and voter registration machinery, the
new joint military command structure, the state's fiscal
resources and the authority to name senior officials, among
others. The accord calls for the formation of a new
transitional government within five weeks of its signature:
meeting, or even coming close to this first deadline will be
the first real test of the durability of this agreement.


4. (C) EmbOff attended a March 5th luncheon planned before
the Ouaga Accord's weekend signature, which was hosted by IMF
Country Director James Bond and attended by UNSYG Acting
Representative Abou Moussa, French Ambassador Janier, EU
Country Representative Michel Arrion, the Canadian and
Chinese Ambassadors, and senior representatives from the
World Food Program, UNDP and other key international
agencies. The international community was cautiously
optimistic, and looked forward to being able to restart
multilateral lending (septel),aid reintegration of
administrative cadres and assisting in the conduct of
elections. French Ambassador Janier was notably silent on
the question of Licorne's future, given French Cooperation
Minister (and Minister with the Ivorian dossier) Brigitte
Girardin's widely reported comments that "a withdrawal of the
international community can be contemplated now." Abou
Moussa acknowledged the agreement was flawed in its silence
over the transitional government, Banny's future and the

ABIDJAN 00000242 002 OF 002


precise mechanism of international engagement (IWG and/or the
new structure mentioned in the Ouaga Accord) and said ONUCI
would point out such weaknesses and possibly make suggestions
as the agreement is presented for ratification first to the
AU and later the UNSC (probably during the already-planned
March 12 meeting). There were no obvious donors willing to
pledge to contribute to the $100 million identification
program or new development assistance packages to reverse the
impoverishment, particularly in the North, caused by the 4
year-long separation of the country. On new elections
funding, Arrion said flatly the EU was tapped out. IMF and
World Bank officials appeared eager to turn the Ouaga Accord
into a vehicle for a rapid reengagement (septel).


5. (C) Comment. The Ouagadougou Accord represents
significant progress. Ivorian political leaders appear to
have taken greater ownership of the crisis and realized real
compromise is necessary to break the stalemate. However, the
significant details that remain to be defined are daunting,
and the very tight timeline can create unrealizable high
expectations that could provoke discord down the road. End
Comment.
Hooks