Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN226
2007-03-01 15:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: NO VISIBLE PROGRESS IN OUAGADOUGOU

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC IV 
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VZCZCXRO1927
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0226/01 0601542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011542Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2648
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1535
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000226 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: NO VISIBLE PROGRESS IN OUAGADOUGOU
"DIRECT DIALOGUE" BETWEEN GBAGBO AND SORO

REF: ABIDJAN 141

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000226

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: NO VISIBLE PROGRESS IN OUAGADOUGOU
"DIRECT DIALOGUE" BETWEEN GBAGBO AND SORO

REF: ABIDJAN 141

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. There are no signs of significant progress
in the Gbagbo-proposed "direct talks" with rebel New Forces
(FN) leader Soro that President Compaore of Burkina Faso is
trying to mediate. There has been no face-to-face meeting
between the two principals and even their representatives are
communicating largely through Burkina Faso mediators. Almost
no information is leaking out publicly, but sources close to
the talks tell us that a total impasse remains over the issue
of identification, though on the other hand
military-to-military talks are reportedly going well. A
rift may be emerging within one of the two main opposition
parties that could have important implications both for the
course of these negotiations and for President Gbagbo,s
reelection prospects. The local press speculated that Gbagbo
was trying to woo Soro by offering the position of Prime
Minister, but now believes Soro rejected the offer. French
Cooperation Minister Girardin was in Ouagadougou February 28,
reportedly hoping to press the Ivoirians to sign an agreement
before the March 2 International Working Group (IWG) meeting.
A sudden breakthrough cannot be ruled out, but we continue
to believe the two sides are too far apart on identification.
We also continue to doubt whether any agreement the
Ivoirians might sign will really be fully implemented.
Girardin,s visit to Ouagadougou is a clumsy move that could
backfire. End Summary.


2. (C) Almost four weeks after President Gbagbo,s proposed
"direct dialogue" was launched in Ouagadougou between his
representatives and those of the rebel New Forces (FN)
(reftel),there are few signs of progress. Almost no
information has leaked out in the press about the state of
play in the negotiations. The Burkina Faso mediators have
reportedly created a "pre-accord" -- a document synthesizing
the proposals made by each of the two sides, but nothing has
leaked out about its contents.


3. (C) Indeed, the talks could hardly be called "direct."

There has still been no face-to-face meeting between Gbagbo
and FN leader Soro. Hrair Belian, deputy to UN High
Representative for Elections (HRE) Gerard Stoudmann, told us
February 21 that even Gbagbo and Soro,s lieutenants,
Presidential Spokesman Desire Tagro and FN Deputy Secretary
General Dacouri are not meeting face-to-face. Rather, each
side presents its proposals through the Burkina Faso
mediators, who shuttle between them. Belian told us there
has been no progress whatsoever on the key issue of
identification. He said that at one point Tagro presented a
compromise under which those on the 2000 electoral list would
be considered already identified and those not on the list
would have the opportunity to do so under the current
identification procedures (procedures which so far the FN
have steadfastly rejected). However, Belian said Tagro later
rejected his own proposal. (Some local papers are reporting
that this proposal came not from the Gbagbo camp but from one
of the two principal opposition leaders, former President
Bedie or former Prime Minister Ouattara.) Belian did say
that the military-to-military talks about integrating the two
armies are proceeding well.


4. (C) Belian also told us that Burkina Faso President
Compaore is closely following these talks, is personally
engaged, and has shown an impressively detailed understanding
of the underlying issues.


5. (C) Meanwhile, back in Abidjan, Ouattara,s RDR (Rally of
Republicans) party is growing increasingly concerned about a
power struggle within Bedie,s PDCI (Democratic Party of Cote
d,Ivoire). Former PDCI members now aligned with Gbagbo,s
FPI (Ivoirian Popular Front),led by Laurent Fologo, one of
Gbagbo,s closest associates, are joining forces with
anti-Bedie elements within the party, led by former Interior
Minister Emile Constant Bombe. Bedie was apparently
concerned enough about the strength of this opposition that
he had his Secretary General Djedje Mady announce this week
that PDCI would not hold a convention to formally select its
2007 candidate for president. The party did hold such a
convention to select Bedie in 2005, and they were planning
another such convention this year but now it is canceled.
Representatives of both the Fologo faction and the Bombe
faction promptly denounced this move.


6. (C) What the RDR is concerned about is that if this
dissident group succeeds in wresting control of the party
from Bedie, they would likely form an electoral alliance with
the FPI. It should be recalled that it was Bedie himself who
started the virulently anti-Northern (and anti-Ouattara)
"Ivoirite" campaign in the late 1990s, which the FPI has now

ABIDJAN 00000226 002 OF 002


embraced as its own. Such a political realignment could help
Gbagbo in two ways. One, it could help him try to push the
identification issue out of the picture. The FPI contends
that most of the undocumented people are foreigners from the
North seeking to fraudulently obtain Ivoirian citizenship,
and the Bombe faction in the PDCI might well agree. As
Interior Minister under Bedie in the late 1990,s, Bombe was
one of the most vocal proponents of "Ivoirite." Second the
support of even part of the PDCI electorate could improve
Gbagbo,s chances of winning the elections. Right now, if
all of the opposition party electorates unite behind a single
candidate, Gbagbo would have little chance of winning.


7. (C) Much of the speculation in the local press about the
Ouagadougou talks has centered on power-sharing -- that
Gbagbo is trying to persuade Soro to take the post of Prime
Minister, or even Vice President. There were some reports
that in exchange Gbagbo wanted Soro,s agreement that Gbagbo
would stay in power another two full years. When Ouattara
led an RDR/PDCI delegation to Ouagadougou last week, the
pro-Gbagbo press scoffed that they only wanted to make sure
they got their share of the spoils. The pro-opposition press
countered that, rather, Ouattara wanted to make sure Soro
remained focused on the issue of identification, and did not
get sidetracked by talk about power-sharing. In any case,
most recently the press seems to have become convinced that
Soro has rejected any offer of the post of Prime Minister.


8. (C) While the Burkina Faso mediators are reportedly
energetic and closely engaged, the Ivoirians seem to be
taking a leisurely approach, with no sense of urgency even
though as every day goes by the chances of holding elections
this year grow slimmer. This week the French brought their
own energies to bear, as Cooperation Minister Girardin
visited Ouagadougou February 28, on her way to Abidjan for
the March 2 IWG meeting. A UK diplomat told us that the
French were determined to press the Ivoirians into signing an
agreement before the IWG.


9. (C) Comment. A sudden breakthrough cannot be ruled out,
though we continue to believe that identification is too
important to both sides for either of them to concede enough
to make a deal. However, as we have said before, there are
many headstones in the graveyard of failed Ivoirian peace
agreements. Even if they do sign something, and especially
if they do so under French or African coercion, the past
suggests we should not be too optimistic that they will keep
to it. Girardin,s visit to Ouagadougou is a rather clumsy
move that could well backfire and only further complicate
these negotiations. End Comment.

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