Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN141
2007-02-07 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS;

Tags:  IV PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0636
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0141/01 0381441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071441Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2562
INFO RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0276
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1524
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: IV PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS;
EXPECTATIONS HIGH

REF: ABIDJAN 128

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, reasons 1.5 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: IV PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS;
EXPECTATIONS HIGH

REF: ABIDJAN 128

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, reasons 1.5 (b, d)


1. Summary. Direct talks between the President's
representatives and their New Forces counterparts kicked off
in Ouagadougou on February 5. No substantive negotiations
were held, but despite this, participants and observers were
upbeat. Apparently an agenda for the much-anticipated direct
Gbagbo/Soro talks (scheduled for sometime in the week of Feb
12) was established. President Compaore told UN High
Representative for Elections Gerard Stoudmann that he plans
to proceed with a realistic negotiating strategy twinning a
genuine identification process with a modified disarmament
plan that would proceed through an elections campaign and end
with actual weapons collection after the vote takes place.
Compaore, summit participants and international observers
were upbeat. While we remain somewhat more cautious than our
colleagues in the international community, perhaps at this
juncture there is sufficient will (or perhaps the parties
have exhausted their options sufficiently) for real progress
to be possible. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On February 5 in Ouagadougou, President Blaise
Compaore, new ECOWAS Mediator of the Ivorian crisis and two
Burkinabe ministers (MFA Ouedrago and Security Minister
Bassole) convened representatives of President Gbagbo and
Forces Nouvelles leader Soro for the second round of
prepatory talks before the leaders themselves are to meet
directly. Gbagbo and Soro, who had been scheduled to lead
their respective delegations but not engage directly, chose
(not unexpectedly) to skip this session entirely. President
Gbagbo attended a dinner on behalf of Koffi Annan in Accra
over the weekend while Soro remained in Bouake.


3. (SBU) Gbagbo's team was led by advisor Desire Tagro and
aided by FPI Youth Wing leader Navigue Konate, along with
Ambassador to the U.N. Alcide Djedje. The FN side was
captained by Minister of Solidarity and War Victims Louis
Dacoury-Tabley (and effectively FN Number 2) along with
Spokesman Sidiki Konate, Deputy Communications Director Alain
Lobognon, and Justice Minister Mamadou Kone. Parties
reportedly presented prepared positions, most of which were

available in the February 6th edition of state-owned (and
Gbagbo-controlled) Fraternite Matin; Tagro supposedly
pointedly asked "those who had taken up arms" to clearly
state their grievances, not-so implicitly accusing the NF of
unjustifiably taking the country through its prolonged crisis.


4. (C) Contacted directly by Emboffs while he remained in
Ouagadougou, the FN's Lobognon laughed off Tagro's commentary
and was upbeat with regards to the overall meeting. He said
the meeting went well and set the stage for upcoming meetings
between Soro and Gbagbo. Asked about the substance of the
meetings, Lobognon indicated that the main outcome was to fix
an agenda for direct Gbagbo/Soro talks. The date for these
talks was not fixed, but is likely to be during the week of
February 12.


5. (C) UN High Representative for Elections Gerard Stoudmann
attended the meeting on the margins, and met with President
Compaore and all the delegations. Contacted upon their
return from Ouaga, a well-placed source in Stoudmann's office
indicated that many concerns had been alleviated in talks
with Compaore. Specifically, Compaore believes the threat of
snap elections, mentioned by President Gbagbo repeatedly in
the immediate wake of the adoption of UNSCR 1721, is
effectively off the table. The FPI is no longer mentioning
this possibility and Stoudmann believes it to be a dead
letter.


6. (C) Compaore, apparently well-versed in the subject, told
Stoudmann that he will be intensively engaged in the Ivorian
dossier over the coming weeks, and that he will base his
mediation strategy on a two-pronged approach. The first will
be a Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration process
that will produce actual disarmament only after elections;
preregroupment and cantonment would take place before, but
actual collection of weapons would wait until after the vote.
The second major element would be a serious, genuine
identification effort aimed at registering between 1 and 1.5
million new citizens in a 7-8 month timeframe (which,
coincidentally, matches the timeframe presented by PM Banny
in his weekend interviews with major newspapers).
Stoudmann's staff reported the atmosphere in Ouaga to be
positive, and that Compaore was on "our wavelength."
Stoudmann and his team are to return to Ouaga on Feb 7th at
Compaore's request.


7. (C) Comment. These direct talks, long in coming since

ABIDJAN 00000141 002 OF 002


they were announced in December, have generated a
considerable amount of excitement and enthusiasm among both
the international community and the Ivorian political class.
The international community, even seasoned and effective
interlocutors such as Stoudmann, might be expecting too much
from these talks, perhaps because other options seem to be
going nowhere. While we believe hopes for a rapid, painless
breakthrough to be somewhat unrealistic, there do appear to
be elements in place that could lead to genuine progress. We
suspect these talks will take longer and engender more uneven
results than observers want to believe, particularly given
the track record of poor implementation of agreements.
However, the two major parties may at last be recognizing
they cannot wish the other out of existence and that they
will have to forge a compromise solution to end the crisis.
End Comment.
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