Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN1157
2007-11-16 16:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S TRIP TO COTE D'IVOIRE

Tags:  PGOV PREL OVIP IV 
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VZCZCXRO8510
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1157/01 3201609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161609Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3742
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001157 

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DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
AF/AS FRAZER
PASS TO AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL OVIP IV
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S TRIP TO COTE D'IVOIRE

Classified By: AMB WNESBITT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001157

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SIPDIS

DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
AF/AS FRAZER
PASS TO AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL OVIP IV
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S TRIP TO COTE D'IVOIRE

Classified By: AMB WNESBITT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d)


1. ( C ) Summary: The Deputy Secretary and AF Assistant
Secretary Jendayi Frazer were well-received by government and

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opposition leaders as well as UN officials during their
November 10-11 visit to Abidjan. In all of his meetings, the
Deputy explained that the purpose of his visit was to better
understand the political situation in Cote d'Ivoire and to
encourage Ivorian efforts to resolve the crisis. He
consistently underscored the importance of the government
implementing the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)
without delay. He acknowledged the progress that has been
made so far, and stressed that the holding of elections would
allow for broader bilateral engagement by the USG. End
Summary.


2. ( U ) The Deputy met first with Prime Minister Guillaume
Soro, next with opposition leaders, and then with President
Laurent Gbagbo. Representatives from civil society shared
their views of the political situation during a working
lunch. A discussion with UNOCI representatives ended the
day's meetings. Implementation of the OPA, and the
government's commitment to doing so, was a key topic in every
meeting. The need to simultaneously deal with election
preparation and DDR issues became clearer throughout the day.


OPA Implementation and Election Preparations
--------------


3. ( C) The Prime Minister and President echoed each other in
their comments regarding the implementation of the
Ouagadougou Political Agreement. Soro and Gbagbo each
stressed their commitment to the OPA but said they could not
move more quickly without additional financial resources.
Both urged the international donor community to be more
forthcoming with needed financial assistance. (Note: the
World Bank and other donors have funds that can be disbursed,
but the government must meet certain conditions. Septel will
address this issue in detail.) The Prime Minister described
the actions his government has taken to implement the OPA
since coming to power in April but acknowledged that work was

behind schedule; only 25 of 111 planned mobile courts
(audiences foraines) are operating. Soro stressed that
progress is being made, noting that under his tenure Cote
d'Ivoire is making debt payments for the first time since

2002. He cited the selection on November 9 of a technical
operator to produce new ID cards as another sign of forward
momentum. The Deputy Secretary encouraged both Soro and
Gbagbo to demonstrate their commitment by implementing the
OPA as quickly as possible, noting that a resolution of the
crisis would enable the USG to expand its engagement with
Cote d'Ivoire.


4. ( C ) President Gbagbo told the Deputy that no one was
more eager to have elections than he, but that the ground
needed to be properly prepared. He said that he would have
been willing to hold elections based on an updated 2000
electoral list, but the OPA required that the audiences
foraines process take place. This was an expensive endeavor
and required much more international assistance. Gbagbo
complained that the international community did not want to
give him funds until after elections. He could not get to
elections without international funding of identification and
the DDR process. DDR was now stalled because of insufficient
funding for the retraining centers (Service Civique). Gbagbo
said that contrary to what the opposition says, delaying
elections is worse for him, as those who win elections can
govern better because they have a mandate from the public,
and they can select their own cabinet without the requirement
to appoint opposition party members. The Deputy Secretary
commented at one point that if President Gbagbo had made a
strategic commitment to implement the OPA, everything else
would follow. Gbagbo asked about the meaning of the term
'strategic commitment', and seemed not to fully grasp the
concept. However, Gbagbo told the Deputy that elections will
take place definitely by July 2008 at the latest.


5. (C ) Opposition party leaders welcomed the USG's call for
implementation of the OPA without delay. RDR (Rally of
Republicans) party leader and former Prime Minister Alassane
Ouattara opined that the government does not need financial
assistance. If funds are lacking, he said, it is due to
government mismanagement of resources. Ouattara claimed that
PM Soro had very little real power, and criticized President
Gbagbo for consistently dragging his feet on key issues. For
example, he said the President has still not signed decrees
authorizing the reconstitution of civil registers that were
destroyed in the conflict. Gbagbo, he said, consistently

ABIDJAN 00001157 002 OF 003


does just enough to give the impression of forward movement
while ensuring through his supporters that there is no real
progress. PDCI (Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire) Secretary
General Djedje Mady made a similar point, noting that OPA
implementation was supposed to be completed in ten months but
eight months have already elapsed, virtually no progress has
been made, and there is no indication that the international
community will hold Gbagbo's feet to the fire.


6. (C ) Ouattara and Mady both doubted that President Gbagbo
has the political will to implement the OPA, and lamented the
government's apparent unwillingness to keep the political
parties apprised of developments. Both opposition party
leaders stressed that they should not be excluded from a
dialogue about implementation of the OPA or election
preparations because they chose not to resort to the use of
armed force. Ouattara pointed out that 40 percent of all
mayors in Cote d'Ivoire are from the RDR; the PDCI holds a
majority of the seats in the National Assembly. Ouattara
specifically asked the Deputy Secretary to raise with
President Compaore the importance of having regular meetings
of the Permanent Consultation Framework (according to the
OPA this group would include Compaore, Gbagbo, Soro,
Ouattara, and Bedie) to ensure that the opposition has a
voice in the political process.

DDR and Security Concerns
--------------


7. ( C ) The Deputy Secretary discussed with government and
with UN officials the question of disarmament and
re-establishing a national army. PM Soro said that he and
President Gbagbo had agreed to a disarmament scheme that
involved the creation of a "service civique" (civic service).
Soro said it was unrealistic to believe that those with arms
would just give up their weapons and go home; they need a
means of supporting themselves. The service civique, as he
described it, would provide training to individuals who will
not be integrated into a new national army to enable them to
learn a skill. Soro said he hoped to launch the service
civique in January 2008, a timeframe that theoretically could
lead to significant percentage of forces being disarmed
before an election is held. President Gbagbo also cited the
service civique as a critical factor to establishing the
right security environment for elections.


8. (C ) UNOCI Deputy Force Commander Mouhamadou Kandji stated
categorically that he sees no commitment from either side to
disarm at this time. Cote d'Ivoire, he said, still has two
distinct armies with two distinct chains of command. While
there are six mixed brigades along the former Zone of
Confidence, no reintegration of forces has occurred. UNOCI
DDR expert Jean Luc Stalon confirmed that a traditional DDR
process is no longer a priority for the government. Acting
SRSG Abou Moussa and UNOCI reps also pointed out that the OPA
effectively removed UNOCI from direct involvement in
discussions between the New Forces and the National Army
(FANCI),meaning that the UN is no longer in a position to
bring the parties together to push them towards agreement.
And despite months of discussions and many meetings, the
government and New Forces have evidently failed to reach
agreement on any of the major DDR issues.


9. (C ) UN officials agreed that there was still a complete
lack of trust between the parties and that in the absence of
trust, both the PM and President were likely to want to keep
their forces intact for leverage until after the elections.
Abou Moussa thought this was highly undesirable and that a
single national army needed to be in place to provide the
proper security environment for an election. Opposition
leaders Ouattara and Mady had raised similar concerns earlier
in the day. PDCI SecGen Mady stressed that it would be
difficult for candidates to campaign nationwide in the
absence of DDR. Ouattara said there are too many guns in Cote
d'Ivoire, not a good harbinger for the future given that any
election result is likely to be contested by the losing
party/individual.


10. ( C) The Deputy Secretary raised with UN officials the
government's notion of a "service civique". UNOCI reps were
generally favorable but thought it would be critical for a
neutral third party to be involved to ensure that the service
accomplishes its intended goals. Regarding a possible
resumption of hostilities, A/SRSG Moussa said he thought it
was highly unlikely, while General Kandji noted that Ivorians
lacked the capability to resume the war.


11. (C ) Comment: The Deputy Secretary's visit was an ideal
opportunity for the USG to send a message to Cote d'Ivoire's

ABIDJAN 00001157 003 OF 003


leaders that implementation of the OPA is their best chance
of moving beyond crisis mode. There was greater harmony in
the messages we received from the Prime Minister, the
President, and the Foreign Minister than we have previously
seen, a sign that the government wanted to make a positive
impression. Several interlocutors pressed the Deputy
Secretary to have President Compaore of Burkina Faso put

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greater pressure on Gbagbo to move quickly, an indication
that Compaore is perceived as only of the only people who can
influence the Ivorian president. We do not expect that
implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement will be
greatly accelerated but there is appreciation for the fact
that the USG has delivered a strong message of support for
the OPA and hope that will have a positive impact on events.


12. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Frazer and D staff.
NESBITT