Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN1110
2007-10-31 18:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D' IVOIRE SCENESETTER FOR D VISIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4572
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1110/01 3041811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311811Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3696
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001110 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
AF/AS FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: COTE D' IVOIRE SCENESETTER FOR D VISIT


Classified By: AMB WNESBITT, REASONS 1.4 (b, d)

Overview

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001110

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
AF/AS FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: COTE D' IVOIRE SCENESETTER FOR D VISIT


Classified By: AMB WNESBITT, REASONS 1.4 (b, d)

Overview


1. (C) Embassy Abidjan warmly welcomes your visit to Cote
d,Ivoire. You will be the highest ranking USG official to
visit Abidjan since 2005 when AF Assistant Secretary Connie
Newman visited to discuss the peace process. We believe your
visit will be viewed as a sign of increased USG interest in,
and perhaps concern about, Cote d,Ivoire. It will be an
excellent opportunity for the U.S. to reiterate our desire to
see Cote d,Ivoire be a peaceful, prosperous, well-governed
nation that can be a positive force in the region and an
effective partner in deterring threats such as terrorism and
drug trafficking. Ivorians remember fondly the days when
their nation was a guiding light in the region and most long
for a return to Abidjan,s golden era. To move forward,
however, the country must overcome the stalemate of the last
five years.


2. (C) The overall security situation has improved since
the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) but
there is still widespread uncertainty about the future.
Reportedly the result of direct negotiations between the
government and rebel forces, the OPA was facilitated by
President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and signed by Cote
d,Ivoire,s two primary protagonists (President Gbagbo and
now Prime Minister Soro) in March 2007. It is a viable
roadmap for the country's emergence from the political crisis
but the pace of implementation has been slow and
disappointing. We hope that your visit will help to shore
up the government's commitment to following through on
implementation despite opposition from radical elements in
each of the respective camps. The USG is very positively
viewed in Cote d,Ivoire and your public statements will have
great influence. In a poll taken within the last 12 months,
the U.S. was favorably viewed by 88 percent of Ivorians.

Nationality Issue is Key


3. (C) The question of nationality or "Ivoirite", is at the
heart of the stalemate. A substantial number of individuals
(estimates range from 300,000 to 3 million) are currently
undocumented as Ivorians and are thus unable to participate

fully in Ivorian society where the possession of a national
ID card governs a broad swath of activities, including
eligibility to vote and to own land for agricultural
cultivation. A majority of those who are undocumented have
family ties to Burkina Faso and were initially welcomed into
the northern region of Cote d,Ivoire as much-needed laborers
in the cocoa sector. Cote d,Ivoire,s founding father and
first president Houphouet-Boigny took a very liberal approach
to integrating this group into Ivorian society; his
successors (Bedie and Guei) actively promoted a more
restrictive approach, including changes to the constitution
that emphasized the national divisions between north and
south, and between Christian and Muslim. The 2002 coup
attempt which quickly evolved into an armed rebellion that
split the country in two underscored the depth of emotion
attached to this question. Reunification of the country and
the restoration of government authority throughout the
national territory will be difficult to achieve unless the
issue of nationality is dealt with in a manner acceptable to
both sides.


4. (C) The "audiences foraines" or public tribunals called
for in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (and several
previous peace agreements) are intended to facilitate voter
registration and the eventual issuance of ID-cards to those
who qualify by providing numerous fora at which persons whose
births were never registered are issued birth documentation
(jugements suppletifs). While there are many legitimate
administrative difficulties associated with carrying out the
audiences foraines, Embassy Abidjan,s larger concern is that
President Gbagbo has yet to demonstrate a firm commitment to
the success of the audiences foraines. In both 2005 and 2006
then Prime Minister Banny took very serious and successful
steps to get the process underway. Radical and sometimes
violent supporters of the President succeeded each time,
however, in derailing the audiences foraines and stalling the
overall peace process. The political stakes are much higher
for PM Soro as it is his constituency in the North that will
benefit primarily from these courts.

National Issue Link to Next Presidential Election


5. (C) So far this year, the government has taken steps to
facilitate the return of administrative personnel, especially
judges, to the north and Prime Minister Soro has been visibly
engaged in efforts to ensure that these personnel will have

ABIDJAN 00001110 002 OF 003


the housing, security, and wherewithal they need to operate
effectively. As of October 15, 2007, however, only 25 of 65
audiences foraines sites were operational and the OPA states
that the audiences will be in operation for three months.
This time could easily be extended should both sides agree
but the slow pace of implementation causes many in the north
to question the government's sincerity. The Forces Nouvelles
(New Forces) who maintain de-facto control of the north, have
stated repeatedly that they will not disarm until the
question of nationality is satisfactorily addressed; it is
unlikely they will accept a deeply flawed process. DDR is
effectively on hold for this and other reasons.


6. (C) Many of those opposed to the audiences foraines fear
the impact on anticipated national elections of adding a
significant number of new voters in the north, as well as the
longer term economic implications. Cote d' Ivoire's
electorate (there are 60 different ethnic groups in CdIs
population of 18.7 million) currently breaks down into three
broad groups; no single party or individual can credibly
claim majority support. There is a very strong consensus
that a new presidential election is a pre-requisite to ending
the division of the country and restoring a sense of
normalcy. The outcome of the audiences foraines will
therefore have a direct impact on the next presidential
election. The key message we should convey to President
Gbagbo on this topic is the importance of addressing the
nationality question and the audience foraines process in a
serious manner if the next presidential election (which he
clearly hopes to win),is to disperse the air of uncertainty
that still hovers over Cote d Ivoire. While Gbagbo has
derailed earlier audience foraines, he nonetheless wants an
election that he can win and that will be certified by the
international community to give him much-sought legitimacy.
The international community has invested heavily in this
country's stability and is eager to see results in the form
of steady, measured progress over the next 6-12 months.


Economic Overview


7. (C) The lack of a clear resolution to Cote d' Ivoire,s
political situation has had a predictable negative effect on
many parts of the economy. The key issue for the donor
community, however, has been the lack of transparency and
reluctance of the Gbagbo government to share data regarding
revenue from oil and cocoa in particular, and overall
government spending. The government's fiscal performance has
deteriorated over the past five years due to falling revenue;
pressure to increase crisis-related expenditures, such as
defense; an eroding tax base, and an increasing lack of
transparency in the budget. Spending on health and education
fell as a share of GDP while discretionary presidential
spending rose and an undetermined percentage of oil revenue
has been kept off-budget. While overall fiscal deficits
narrowed, domestic and external arrears increased, prompting
the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB to suspend engagement
until July 2007 when an arrears clearance package was
negotiated, in conjunction with an IFI package for
post-conflict and DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration) assistance. Your visit will be an excellent
opportunity to reinforce to the government of Cote d,Ivoire
that the USG shares the IFIs and other donors, concerns
about the lack of transparency and that we support linking
continued assistance to greater transparency.


8. (SBU) Economic activity in general remains sluggish and
per capita income has slumped. Overall GDP grew by 1.8
percent in 2006, a slight recovery over 2005; growth in 2007
is projected to be 2 percent. This growth can be attributed
primarily to higher export earning from oil and refined
products (now $1.3 billion annually, reasonably steady cocoa
revenues ($1 billion) and proceeds form an expanding
telecommunications sector. However, the majority of the
population is not better off. Per capita income declined by
0.6 percent in 2005 and 0.7 percent in 2006; a 0.2 percent
drop is predicted for 2007. Economic activity in the north
of the country remains well below pre-crisis levels.
Inflation has not been an issue until recently; the average
consumer price rise was about on-half a percent from
2004-2006. Rising oil prices have increased transportation
costs and the exchange rate has accelerated in recent months
in line with the Euro,s appreciation vis-a-vis the dollar.


9. (U) The hardships brought on by the division of the
country, including food insecurity in the north, triggered a
substantial movement of people from north to south; several
hundred thousand have been internally displaced since 2002.
The result has been a significant increase in poverty.
According to World Bank estimates, the poverty level has

ABIDJAN 00001110 003 OF 003


increased 5 percent, from 38.2 percent in 2002 at the onset
of the crisis to 43.2 percent in 2006. The absence of a
central government public administration severely compromised
the delivery of health, education, and other services.


10. (SBU) The cotton and cocoa sectors support some 9
million people nearly half the population; cotton output
dropped by more than 50 percent since 2000. Cocoa output has
remained essentially stable, hovering at the 1 million ton
mark since 2000, with a slight dip to 950,000 in the 2002-03
harvest. International industry and Ivorian shipping
companies estimate that up to 200,000 tons of cocoa per year
have been transshipped through Ghana and Togo to evade
artificially low prices since 2000, but those numbers appear
to have come down since 2006. Modest improvements in
economic activity have been noted since the signature of the
OPA, and civil servants are beginning to return but huge
challenges loom ahead. Foremost among those will be the
government's ability to demonstrate to foreign investors that
both political stability and an investor-friendly environment
have been restored. It would be helpful for you to highlight
in your meetings with President Gbagbo and PM Soro that
getting the economic climate right is as critical to
restoring investor confidence as political stability.

Bilateral Assistance and Sanctions


11. (C) Cote d' Ivoire has been under Section 508 sanctions
since the December 1999 coup that removed Henri Bedie from
power. Sanctions were not lifted following the 2000 election
due to government interference in the election with the
intent of manipulating the results. Cote d' Ivoire was
suspended from AGOA benefits on January 1, 2005, due to an
Ivorian government decision to violate the UN-monitored
cease-fire in November 2004 and lack of progress on key
economic reforms. A credible election and substantial
progress in meeting IMF/World Bank transparency goals would
pave the way for a resumption of aid. In the interim, a very
small bilateral assistance program focused on electoral
preparation is directed from USAID's West African Regional
Program based in Accra.


12. (C) One of the few very bright spots in the US-Cote d'
Ivoire relationship has been our PEPFAR program.
Cote d'Ivoire is one of 15 focus countries that receives
funds for HIV/AIDs prevention, education, and treatment; the
USG is by far the largest supporter of HIV/AIDs activities in
Cote d Ivoire and of the health sector in general. In 2007,
the PEPFAR program here received $85 million; we expect an
increase to about $120 million in FY 08. Ensuring the proper
use of these funds is a central focus of our PEPFAR team. We
have made remarkable strides in terms of expanding treatment
and ware working to improve joint efforts with the government
of Cote d' Ivoire to tackle ongoing issues with stigma and
HIV/AIDs education/prevention activities.
NESBITT