Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ZAGREB823
2006-07-07 11:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIA SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED

Tags:  PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1951
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DE RUEHVB #0823/01 1881149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071149Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6379
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000823 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRIED, EUR/SCE - ENGLISH, BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED

REF: ZAGREB 813

Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000823

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRIED, EUR/SCE - ENGLISH, BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED

REF: ZAGREB 813

Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: During your July 9-10 stop in
Dubrovnik for the conference "Completing Europe's Southern
Dimension: The Values that Bind Us," you will witness
firsthand the GoC's unshakable enthusiasm for promoting
Euro-Atlantic integration. Still paddling on the wave of
political optimism that followed the opening of accession
negotiations with the European Union in October 2005 and the
arrest of war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina in December 2005,
the center-right government of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is
trying to cement its international credibility by serving as
a leader in fostering regional stability. At the same time,
the GoC must still sell its skeptical constituents on the
benefits of NATO membership. Your speech at the conference's
opening roundtable can contribute to this public education.
Your bilateral meeting with PM Sanader will provide an
opportunity to thank Croatia for its recent increase in troop
levels in Afghanistan (last week going from 69 to 144
soldiers - reftel) while encouraging continued reforms on the
road to NATO and renewed GoC consideration of language that
meets the definition of Article 98. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL STABILITY
-------------- ---


2. (SBU) PM Sanader and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
were elected in 2003 on a platform promising to bring Croatia
into the EU and NATO. The HDZ has proven it is no longer cut
from the same cloth as the nationalist HDZ of late president
Franjo Tudjman. Not only did PM Sanader enter into coalition
with the leading ethnic Serb and Muslim parties and begin
serious implementation of programs to promote refugee
returns, he has also made great strides in normalizing
relations with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including high-level visits, visa-free travel,
and free trade agreements. The bitter legacy of the 1990s
war is slowly fading -- most refugee returns are complete and
domestic war crimes trials of ethnic Croats are no longer

controversial. In this light, we fully expect the local OSCE
mission to complete the bulk of its mandate by the end of

2007.


3. (SBU) The opening of EU accession negotiations last fall
was a major victory both internationally and domestically for
the Sanader government. Croatia cleared a further political
hurdle with the arrest of Ante Gotovina, a former Croatian
general under indictment by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of war
crimes committed in the aftermath of the 1995 liberation of
territory occupied by rebel Serbs. The Gotovina arrest,
applauded by the U.S. and the international community, was
not popular domestically, as many Croats consider Gotovina a
hero of their fight for independence. At significant
political cost, the Sanader government provided information
that led to Gotovina's arrest in Spain, then worked to keep
the few post-arrest protests focused on "support for
Gotovina" rather than opposition to the international
community or the ICTY.


4. (U) Demonstrating its credibility as an international
partner, Croatia has gone from a recipient of UN peacekeeping
assistance less than ten years ago to a contributor of troops
to ten UN peace support operations (including command of UN
forces in Kashmir). Since the beginning of 2006, the GoC has
nearly tripled its presence in NATO's International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan.


NATO: JUMPING TO JOIN, BUT ARE THEY READY?
--------------


5. (U) PM Sanader is pushing for a NATO membership invitation
at the earliest opportunity, but while there is consensus
among the political elite that Croatia belongs in the
alliance, the government admits it must do more to educate a
general public that is split roughly down the middle over the
issue. At a July 4 briefing, MFA State Secretary Hidajet
Biscevic told the diplomatic corps that the July 9-10
Dubrovnik conference is part of the GoC's new campaign to
educate the public, delivering the Euro-Atlantic message
"both outwardly and inwardly" while showcasing Croatia as an
exporter of stability and a reliable regional partner. We
have reminded GoC officials that they need to generate
support not just for joining NATO but also for continuing to
meet its alliance obligations throughout its membership.


6. (SBU) Croatia's ambitious military reform program, as

ZAGREB 00000823 002 OF 002


outlined in its 10-year Long-Term Development Plan now before
Parliament, is designed to make the armed forces "NATO-ready"
by 2007. With both presidential and GoC support, the plan
provides the fine details and identifies the necessary
resources to reorganize, re-equip, professionalize, and
further downsize the Croatian Armed Forces. We support
Croatia's NATO ambitions, but have been very clear in our
message that defense reform is an essential pre-condition for
Croatia to demonstrate that it will become a net contributor
to security through NATO operations.


7. (U) Croatia has tried to play a leadership role in the
Adriatic-3 (A-3),hosting numerous summits and multilateral
exercises. In April, MFA Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic hosted a
meeting of foreign ministers from the A-3 and the Baltic
states (B-3) to share NATO accession advice and experience.
In May, the GoC organized a meeting for Vice President Cheney
with the A-3 prime ministers during his stop in Dubrovnik.

ARTICLE 98: ROOM TO MANEUVER DESPITE PRESIDENT, EU?
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) PM Sanader has been unable to deliver an Article 98
agreement, due primarily to EU pressure and domestic
political opposition based on inaccurate comparisons between
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICTY.
President Mesic, the most outspoken opponent of an Article 98
agreement, publicly states that it is difficult to justify a
pact not to turn U.S. citizens over to the ICC when the U.S.
expects Croatians to turn their wartime leaders over to the
ICTY.


9. (C) This highlights the political differences on certain
issues between PM Sanader on the right and President Mesic on
the left. In contrast to Sanader's unwavering focus on
bringing Croatia into the EU and NATO, Mesic's unique brand
of populism harkens back to the non-aligned movement of
Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, focusing his foreign policy
efforts on places like Libya, Syria, and Iran. Despite
limited constitutional powers, President Mesic serves as the
moral tiller of the nation, often setting the political
agenda for the general public. With PM Sanader's enthusiasm
somewhat dampened by EU bullying against action under Article
98, President Mesic's support has become critical to a future
agreement.


10. (C) With Gotovina's arrest, however, we believe movement
is possible on this issue. This spring, a number of
prominent Croatian politicians, including some members of PM
Sanader's HDZ, began promoting the signing of an Article 98
agreement as a way to improve relations with the U.S. Public
reaction to these comments has remained muted. President
Mesic continues to publicly oppose an agreement, but in early
July his office responded to our continued overtures about an
alternate "Security Cooperation Agreement" by reporting that
it had forwarded a "compromise proposal" to the GoC for
consideration. The GoC has not yet shared this with us.
BRADTKE