Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ZAGREB461
2006-04-11 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

VPOTUS SCENESETTER: PUSHING CROATIA'S INTEGRATION

Tags:  PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHVB #0461/01 1011259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111259Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5981
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0067
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000461 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/ES-S, EUR/SCE - ENGLISH, BELL
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP - JOSEPH WOOD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR
SUBJECT: VPOTUS SCENESETTER: PUSHING CROATIA'S INTEGRATION
AGENDA

ZAGREB 00000461 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000461

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/ES-S, EUR/SCE - ENGLISH, BELL
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP - JOSEPH WOOD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR
SUBJECT: VPOTUS SCENESETTER: PUSHING CROATIA'S INTEGRATION
AGENDA

ZAGREB 00000461 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Vice President Cheney will visit
Croatia at a time of political optimism following the opening
of accession negotiations with the European Union in October
2005, the arrest of war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina in
December 2005, and the prospect of NATO membership growing
ever larger on the horizon. The right-of-center government
of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is aggressively promoting its
international credibility, serving as a leader in fostering
regional stability and actively lobbying within the European
People's Party to generate political support for Croatia's
Euro-Atlantic integration. VP Cheney's meetings with PM
Sanader and President Stjepan Mesic will provide a unique
opportunity to acknowledge the government's political courage
in contributing to the arrest of Gotovina, encourage
Croatia's continued reforms in preparing for NATO membership,
and push for further action on an Article 98 agreement. A
separate meeting with Adriatic Three (A-3) prime ministers
will serve as a useful forum to support continued regional
cooperation on the road to NATO membership. END SUMMARY AND
COMMENT.

COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL STABILITY
-------------- ---


2. (U) PM Sanader and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
were elected in 2003 on a platform promising to bring Croatia
into the EU and NATO. The HDZ has proven it is no longer cut
from the same cloth as the nationalist HDZ of late president
Franjo Tudjman. Not only did PM Sanader enter into coalition
with the leading ethnic Serb and Muslim parties and begin
serious implementation of programs to promote refugee
returns, he has also made great strides in normalizing
relations with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including high-level visits, visa-free travel,
and free trade agreements.


3. (C) The opening of EU accession negotiations last fall was

a major victory both internationally and domestically for the
Sanader government. Croatia cleared a further political
hurdle with the arrest of Ante Gotovina, a former Croatian
general under indictment by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of war
crimes committed in the aftermath of the 1995 liberation of
territory occupied by rebel Serbs. The Gotovina arrest,
applauded by the U.S. and the international community, was
not popular domestically, as many Croats consider Gotovina a
hero of their fight for independence. At significant
political cost, the Sanader government provided critical
intelligence that led to Gotovina's arrest in Spain, then
worked to keep the few post-arrest protests focused on
"support for Gotovina" rather than opposition to the
international community or the ICTY.


4. (U) Demonstrating its credibility as an international
partner, Croatia has gone from a recipient of UN peacekeeping
assistance less than ten years ago to a contributor of 31
troops to ten UN peace support operations (including command
of UN forces in Kashmir) and more than 50 troops to NATO's
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.


5. (U) OBJECTIVE: Thank Croatian leaders for their regional
leadership, relatively significant contribution to
international peace missions, and political courage in
bringing Gotovina to justice.

NATO: JUMPING TO JOIN, BUT ARE THEY READY?
--------------


6. (U) PM Sanader is pushing for a NATO membership invitation
at the earliest opportunity, but while there is consensus
among the political elite that Croatia belongs in the
alliance, the government admits it must do more to educate a
general public that is split roughly down the middle over the
issue. While the PM's people have a public relations program
in the works, we have reminded them that Croatia needs to
generate support not just for joining NATO but also for
continuing to meet its alliance obligations throughout its
membership.


7. (U) Croatia's ambitious military reform program is
designed to make the armed forces "NATO-ready" by 2007, a
difficult task under the best circumstances thanks to a
defense budget burdened by excess personnel and obligatory
pension payments to war veterans. The government has minimal
resources for much-needed equipment procurement. We support

ZAGREB 00000461 002.3 OF 002


Croatia's NATO ambitions, but have been very clear in our
message that defense reform is an essential pre-condition for
Croatia to demonstrate that it will become a net contributor
to security through NATO operations.


8. (U) Croatia has tried to play a leadership role in the
A-3, hosting numerous summits and multilateral exercises. In
late April, MFA Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic will host a meeting
of foreign ministers from the A-3 and the Baltic states (B-3)
to share NATO accession advice and experience.


9. (U) OBJECTIVE: Encourage Croatia to build public support
for NATO membership and continue necessary defense reforms
while working closely with its A-3 partners.

ARTICLE 98: ROOM TO MANEUVER DESPITE PRESIDENT, EU?
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Despite promises when he first took office, PM
Sanader has been unable to deliver an Article 98 agreement,
due primarily to EU pressure and domestic political
opposition based on inaccurate comparisons between the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICTY. As
explained by President Mesic, the most outspoken opponent of
an Article 98 agreement, it is difficult to justify to the
public a pact not to turn U.S. citizens over to the ICC when
the U.S. expects Croatians to turn their wartime leaders over
to the ICTY.


11. (C) Much to our frustration, Article 98 provides a clear
picture of the political differences between PM Sanader on
the right and President Mesic on the left. In contrast to
Sanader's unwavering focus on bringing Croatia into the EU
and NATO, Mesic's unique brand of populism harkens back to
the non-aligned movement of Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito,
focusing his foreign policy efforts on places like Libya,
Syria, and Iran. Despite limited constitutional powers,
President Mesic serves as the moral tiller of the nation,
often setting the political agenda for the general public.
With PM Sanader's enthusiasm somewhat dampened by EU
overtures against action under Article 98, President Mesic's
support has become critical to a future agreement.


12. (C) With Gotovina's arrest, however, we have reason to
believe movement is possible on this issue. Recently, a
number of prominent Croatian politicians, including some
members of PM Sanader's HDZ, have begun promoting the signing
of an Article 98 agreement as a way to improve relations with
the U.S. Public reaction to these comments has remained
muted. President Mesic sent somewhat mixed messages in
separate March meetings with U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria
Nuland and Senator George Voinovich. After telling
Ambassador Nuland that Gotovina's arrest opened up room for
"preparatory work" on the issue, he flatly told Senator
Voinovich that Croatia could not consider an Article 98
agreement until the ICTY completes its work in 2010.


13. (U) OBJECTIVE: Reinforce the importance the USG attaches
to an Article 98 agreement and push leaders to reopen the
issue in light of the Gotovina arrest.
FRANK