CROATIA PROSECUTES ARMS SMUGGLER

S E C R E T ZAGREB 000215

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/SCE, NP/ECNP, INR/SPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC IR HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA PROSECUTES ARMS SMUGGLER

REF: A. 05 ZAGREB 1919


B. 05 ZAGREB 1473

C. 05 STATE 163798

Classified By: Poloff Justin Friedman, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

SUMMARY and COMMENT
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1. (S) Croatian authorities finally brought suspected arms
proliferator Sinisa Adrinek to trial on February 16 for
attempting to sell software for a weapons guidance system to
Iran. Although interagency cooperation improved somewhat
(ref A),Croatian authorities appear to have temporarily lost
Adrinek's trail, allowing him to visit Tehran briefly, but
apparently without the software he was attempting to smuggle.
This incident has highlighted for the GoC several important
gaps in their legal code and law enforcement coordination.
Post is working via the EXBS and ICITAP programs to help the
GoC fill those gaps. END SUMMARY and COMMENT.

SMUGGLER FINALLY ARRESTED
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2. (C) Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic briefed Poloff
several times over the past two weeks on the status of the
criminal case against Sinisa Adrinek. Adrinek was detained
in December (ref A) following his attempt to leave Croatia
for Iran with a laptop computer containing missile fire
control software. Bajic told us the subsequent search of
Adrinek's office and home did not turn up any copies of the
software. On Friday, February 10, a warrant was issued and
Adrinek was arrested at approximately 1600 the same day. On
Thursday, February 16, Adrinek appeared in a Varazdin County
court, pleading not-guilty to charges of attempting to evade
customs inspection. According to Bajic, Adrinek was released
from detention but his passport was confiscated.

Where Was He?
--------------


3. (S) What is not clear are Adrinek's whereabouts prior to
his arrest. Initially, Bajic told us that Adrinek had
slipped police surveillance and left Croatia. GoC
authorities were able to confirm he had traveled to Tehran
when Adrinek called his wife and was heard complaining about
his hotel. Subsequently, Bajic walked back from this
assertion, stating that it was not clear whether Adrinek had
left Croatia. When Adrinek was arrested in Croatia, he had
air tickets to Dubai, scheduled to leave on Tuesday, Feb. 14.

What Went Wrong
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4. (S) Following the December detention, Adrinek was not
arrested and charged, pending the police investigation. A
key delay appears to have been that the Ministry of Defense
did not deliver until February 8, a formal declaration that
Adrinek's software was indeed a military product. Bajic
believes that the police (Ministry of Interior, known by the
Croatian acronym, MUP) had the authority to arrest and hold
Adrinek back in December while conducting its investigation.
However the MUP had shied away from this step, waiting for
the State Prosecutor to make a determination of what charges
would be filed. In the interim, the MUP and POA (Counter
Intelligence Agency) had placed Adrinek under surveillance
which he has able to elude.

What Next?
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5. (C) Adrinek is charged with trying to avoid Customs
inspection of controlled goods which carries a maximum
penalty of eight years in prison. Bajic believes he will get
at most two years. The State Prosecutors office is also
looking at bringing charges against Adrinek of damaging
national security, but that may be harder to prove. For
Bajic, the next steps are to follow up on his lessons learned
review (reftel) with MUP, Ministry of Defense and POA
leadership to improve coordination between the intelligence
services (including military intelligence) and the police.


6. (S) The other, broader challenge for the GoC is to address
the holes in the criminal and economic crime codes that this
case has exposed. The GoC needs to strengthen criminal
conspiracy statutes to allow prosecution of "one man shows"
like Adrinek, as well as brokering activities. Penalties for
violation of military and dual use export controls need to be
stiffened. And most importantly, the capacities of
enforcement authorities ) particularly the Customs and MUP
) to work collaboratively to detect and investigate this
kind of activity need to be strengthened.


7. (S) Post is working to support the State Prosecutors and
the Ministry of Economy through the EXBS program to review
key legislative changes on brokering currently in draft form.
Also through EXBS, we are working to include
counter-proliferation in the new basic training being
implemented for all Customs officers. Through the ICITAP
program and in cooperation with the EU, we are providing
hands on training in developing interagency law enforcement
task forces to investigate and prosecute criminal
conspiracies.
FRANK