ARMENIAN FM OSKANIAN REFLECTS ON RAMBOUILLET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000238

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR STEVEN MANN AND UNDER SECRETARY BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL AM AJ OSCE
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN FM OSKANIAN REFLECTS ON RAMBOUILLET


Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Oskanian was not as
pessimistic about the results of Rambouillet as we had
anticipated when we heard him reflect on the event and on his
views of the way ahead February 15. Although agreement
eluded the two presidents at Paris, it was Oskanian's view
that many issues had been resolved, and that there was still
hope for a settlement. Oskanian not surprisingly put the
blame on the Azeri side for failing to accept a deal that
would restore five of the seven occupied territories
immediately ("even tomorrow") and all of them (save a slice
of Lachin) in the long run. Oskanian said he was eager to
hear what the co-chairs would conclude after their early
March consultations in Washington. Some of what Oskanian
said obviously was practiced "spin," but we came away
wondering whether progress before (or at) the St. Peterburg
G-8 might yet be attainable. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Foreign Minister Oskanian briefed Yerevan-based
Ambassadors February 15 and I had a short private meeting
with him thereafter. Although he has been quite guarded on
such occasions in the past, this time Oskanian was quite
frank about what had been on the table and what the problems
were. While the ground rules for Oskanian's briefings call
for confidentiality, this time it was clear that the Foreign
Minister was attempting to put a positive spin on what had
happened the previous weekend, and we can expect a similar
line to emerge in the public domain. He admitted that there
had been no success at Rambouillet, but said that if the
Presidents had agreed, the result would have been a full set
of agreed basic principles, so it was "not a total failure,"
and "the basis for a solution is still strong." He went on
to say that the two Presidents might take a second shot at
reaching agreement, and confirmed that Ministers would
continue their discussions.


3. (C) Oskanian next dwelt on the context in which the Paris
talks had taken place and reviewed the longer-term
perspective. He reminded everyone that until comparatively
recently, the positions of both sides had been "maximalist,"
with Armenia saying that there could be no return of occupied
territories until the question of Nagorno-Karabakh's status
was resolved, and Azerbaijan conversely saying that until the
territories were returned, status could not be discussed.
Armenia had modified its position to say that it would
consider the return of some of the territories if the right
of self-determination was recognized, even in a delayed form.
He recalled that the one-pager under discussion at Paris
called for recognition of the right of self-determination in
exchange for return of five of the seven occupied territories.


4. (C) Oskanian stressed that agreement foundered on the
linkage between the last two territories (Kelbajar and
non-corridor Lachin) and the referendum on status of N-K. He
characterized the Azeri position in Paris as toughened over
previous stated positions, in which the idea of a referendum
in Karabakh had been fully accepted. He dated the toughened
Azeri position to the London FMs' meeting in January. Asked
about the legal point that according to the Azerbaijani
constitution a referendum had to be of the entire Azeri
nation, Oskanian pointed out that formulations could be found
to avoid this, or else the constitution could be amended,
given that Aliyev has only six parliamentarians in
opposition.

Azerbaijan can have Five of Seven Territories "Tomorrow"
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Oskanian stressed that Baku could have five of the
seven occupied territories back and start resettling all but
maybe 25,000 of the million or so refugees, and the question
of Nagorno-Karabakh's status would still be in the balance.
Were this to happen in the context of a more positive
atmosphere, with borders opened and social and economic ties
starting to heal, the current dynamic would be transformed.
Oskanian admitted that it could be tough for President Aliyev
to sell such a deal, but he argued that the opportunity
should be seized for the good of the entire region. He
stressed that the deal was still on the table, that Armenia
would not backtrack, and that Azerbaijan could get five of
the territories back "even tomorrow."

6. (C) Moving to the question of rhetoric, Oskanian first
denied the rumor reported from Baku that Kocharian had left
Rambouillet early on account of the death of MoD Sargsian's
father-in-law. The talks had run their course. He went on
to condemn statements (ascribed to an unnamed Azeri figure)
about "wiping Armenia off the map" and hinting at a military
solution by saying that "Azerbaijan's patience is not
unlimited." Armenia's patience might also wear thin, he
added, saying that Armenia cannot simply wait for an Azeri
attack, and can do things to strengthen its defense posture.
He expressed the hope that the most extreme rhetoric in Baku
did not reflect the thinking of top officials there.


7. (C) Asked whether he thought there was a chance for
progress prior to St. Petersburg, Oskanian said "yes." He
said the Presidents had asked him and his Azeri counterpart
to work on the details of what had already been agreed. The
co-chairs, he reported, were cool to this idea, and he
understood their reluctance in this regard. Still, he
maintained, the opportunity to make progress continued to
exist. "One good sentence could do it, he said." He was eager
to hear what the co-chairs would conclude at their meeting in
Washington.


8. (C) In my brief private meeting with Oskanian, I asked him
whether reports and speculation about the possible outcome of
the Kosovo status deliberations were having any effect on
Armenian thinking. He said they were not. I also asked him
whether post-Rambouillet might not be a good time to put more
of the issues out for public discussion in Armenia. He said
that he had noticed that most of the key issues had by now
gotten out (he cited especially the Radio Liberty report from
last week that was, as he put it, "extremely accurate") and
were being debated. This should, he said, be encouraged.


9. (C) COMMENT: In view of what we have heard so far about
the outcome of Rambouillet, it is hard to credit Oskanian's
relatively upbeat take on the meeting, unless it was
something like Reykjavik in 1986: a failure in formal terms,
but encouraging for what was put on the table. As
sympathetic as we are to the argument that there is not
enough time to "do a deal" before the G-8 in St. Petersburg,
we are led to wonder whether it makes sense to throw in the
towel altogether at this point. As with so many of the
long-running conflicts, the best one can often do is manage
them, prevent them from getting worse, and keep hopes of a
resolution alive so as to forestall precipitate actions by
either of the sides or by non-state actors. We wonder if the
question of how to press the parties towards a major step
forward by the time of the G-8 might figure on the agenda of
the consultations that Under Secretary Burns is scheduled to
have with Russian DFM Karasin February 21. END COMMENT.

EVANS