Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06WARSAW2404
2006-11-16 15:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
TRANSNISTRIA: POLAND SUPPORTIVE ON EU PEACE
how-toVZCZCXRO1173 OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHWR #2404 3201553 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 161553Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2446 INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0069 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0481 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002404
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2011
TAGS: OSCE EUN PREL PL
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: POLAND SUPPORTIVE ON EU PEACE
CONSOLIDATION MISSION BUT DOUBTFUL OF PROSPECTS
REF: STATE 187131
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002404
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2011
TAGS: OSCE EUN PREL PL
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: POLAND SUPPORTIVE ON EU PEACE
CONSOLIDATION MISSION BUT DOUBTFUL OF PROSPECTS
REF: STATE 187131
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Pol External Chief delivered reftel points to
Mieczyslaw Kuzinski, action officer for global threats and
the Eurasian conflicts in the MFA Security Policy Department.
Kuzinski noted that Poland continued to support strongly
efforts to develop an EU Peace Consolidation Mission (PCM)
for Moldova, as it had since the idea first surfaced at the
OSCE under the Dutch CIO in 2003 and the subsequent Dutch EU
Presidency in 2004 (during the tenure of former OSCE HoM
Moldova Amb. Bill Hill). He also commented that the U.S.
proposals were very similar to the most recent paper of the
Belgian CIO that was issued in June 2006.
2. (C) Kuzinski stressed that the first priority was to
develop a consensus within the EU for such a PCM.
Unfortunately EU member states were far from agreed on the
approach, although Poland regularly lobbied both the
Commission and Council in Brussels and other EU states on the
urgent need for a common position. There was little prospect
for such consensus in the short term, but the GOP would
continue its efforts.
3. (C) Kuzinski agreed that it was very important to keep
both Russia and Ukraine involved in any follow-on to the
current Russian-led PKF, within the framework of limiting any
one nation's participation to 25-30 percent of the entire
force. The optimal solution would be an OSCE-mandated force,
but there was little prospect of Russia ever agreeing.
4. (C) With regard to the deadlocked political settlement
talks in Moldova and the stalled Istanbul Commitments
process, Kuzinski lamented that the Russians had essentially
"done nothing in over two years." He agreed that perhaps
achieving EU consensus on a PCM would provide a jump-start to
the settlement talks, and cited the surprising success of the
EU Border Assistance Mission. He emphasized that the
Istanbul Commitments were of overriding importance to the GOP.
5. (C) COMMENT. Poland has maintained a keen interest and
active involvement in the Transnistria problem for over a
decade. (Former FM Daniel Rotfeld was the first OSCE Special
Rep for Transnistria in 1992, and the OSCE Mission in Moldova
has routinely included a Polish staffer.) The GOP can be
counted on to remain constructively engaged on Moldova in
both the OSCE and EU contexts, as well as in its bilateral
contacts with Ukraine. However, given the broad range of
difficult issues currently in Polish-Russian relations, it is
unlikely that Warsaw will engage on the issue bilaterally
with Moscow. END COMMENT.
HILLAS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2011
TAGS: OSCE EUN PREL PL
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: POLAND SUPPORTIVE ON EU PEACE
CONSOLIDATION MISSION BUT DOUBTFUL OF PROSPECTS
REF: STATE 187131
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Pol External Chief delivered reftel points to
Mieczyslaw Kuzinski, action officer for global threats and
the Eurasian conflicts in the MFA Security Policy Department.
Kuzinski noted that Poland continued to support strongly
efforts to develop an EU Peace Consolidation Mission (PCM)
for Moldova, as it had since the idea first surfaced at the
OSCE under the Dutch CIO in 2003 and the subsequent Dutch EU
Presidency in 2004 (during the tenure of former OSCE HoM
Moldova Amb. Bill Hill). He also commented that the U.S.
proposals were very similar to the most recent paper of the
Belgian CIO that was issued in June 2006.
2. (C) Kuzinski stressed that the first priority was to
develop a consensus within the EU for such a PCM.
Unfortunately EU member states were far from agreed on the
approach, although Poland regularly lobbied both the
Commission and Council in Brussels and other EU states on the
urgent need for a common position. There was little prospect
for such consensus in the short term, but the GOP would
continue its efforts.
3. (C) Kuzinski agreed that it was very important to keep
both Russia and Ukraine involved in any follow-on to the
current Russian-led PKF, within the framework of limiting any
one nation's participation to 25-30 percent of the entire
force. The optimal solution would be an OSCE-mandated force,
but there was little prospect of Russia ever agreeing.
4. (C) With regard to the deadlocked political settlement
talks in Moldova and the stalled Istanbul Commitments
process, Kuzinski lamented that the Russians had essentially
"done nothing in over two years." He agreed that perhaps
achieving EU consensus on a PCM would provide a jump-start to
the settlement talks, and cited the surprising success of the
EU Border Assistance Mission. He emphasized that the
Istanbul Commitments were of overriding importance to the GOP.
5. (C) COMMENT. Poland has maintained a keen interest and
active involvement in the Transnistria problem for over a
decade. (Former FM Daniel Rotfeld was the first OSCE Special
Rep for Transnistria in 1992, and the OSCE Mission in Moldova
has routinely included a Polish staffer.) The GOP can be
counted on to remain constructively engaged on Moldova in
both the OSCE and EU contexts, as well as in its bilateral
contacts with Ukraine. However, given the broad range of
difficult issues currently in Polish-Russian relations, it is
unlikely that Warsaw will engage on the issue bilaterally
with Moscow. END COMMENT.
HILLAS