RUSSIAN FM LAVROV IN POLAND: A SOFT TOUCH, EXCEPT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 002188

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NSC FOR WILSON; STATE FOR EUR/NCE; OSD FOR ISP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL RS GG IR
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FM LAVROV IN POLAND: A SOFT TOUCH, EXCEPT
FOR GEORGIA AND IRAN


Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov met October 5 with
President Lech Kaczynski, PM Jarek Kaczynski and FM Anna
Fotyga during a one-day visit to Warsaw. According to senior
officials from the MFA and presidential chancellery, the
overall tone of the visit was positive, although little was
achieved on substantive issues. However, the meeting met the
overall GOP goal of re-establishing a dialogue with the
Russian government and laying the ground work for improving
bilateral relations, which are currently under severe strain.
Lavrov was largely non-confrontational on bilateral issues,
including the prospect of Polish participation in the U.S.
Missile Defense program. However, he maintained a hard line
on the current crisis in Russian-Georgian relations and
continued Russian opposition to UN sanctions on Iran. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) Media reports focused on the Lavrov visit as an
important step in improving bilateral atmospherics, while
acknowledging there had been little expectation of any
immediate breakthroughs on specific issues of contention.
Agreement was reportedly reached on a plan for Polish-Russian
bilateral consultations over the next year, including
discussion of UN, OSCE and EU-Russia dialogue issues. Lavrov
stated publicly that Presidents Kaczynski and Putin were
looking forward to a summit meeting sometime in 2007. When
queried by the press about possible U.S. Missile Defense
deployments in Poland, Lavrov made no negative comments but
merely expressed the hope that U.S.-Polish talks would be
"transparent." Lavrov took the party hard line on Georgia,
telling the media that Russian-Georgian relations could only
improve "if Georgia gave up its anti-Russian policy." He
also threw cold water on questions about Iran sanctions,
stressing that such an approach would be "radical" and the UN
should first "do everything to use other resources."

President Lech Kaczynski
--------------


3. (C) Presidential foreign policy adviser Amb. Andrzej
Krawczyk told DCM that Lavrov's meeting with Lech Kaczynski
was dominated by energy security, the crisis in Georgia and
the continuing Russian ban on Polish meat exports. Krawczyk
said that the energy discussion revolved around the Baltic
pipeline. Kaczynski reiterated Polish objections to the
Russian-German project's detour around Poland, and Lavrov
said the pipeline would go forward because the Russians
considered it the best approach. However, rather than
seeking to overcome Polish opposition, Lavrov offered
assurances that the pipeline was not directed against Poland
and in the end concluded that "you have your view and we have
ours." The impasse over Russian oil deliveries to the
Mazeiku refinery in Lithuania was not discussed.


4. (C) Not surprisingly, Lavrov was at his most animated on
the subject of Georgia, calling President Mikhiel Saakashvili
anti-Russian. He accused Saakashvili of creating a
dictatorship and asserted that there was no respect for human
rights in Georgia, alleging that there was regular use of
torture in Georgian prisons. Lavrov also asserted that
Saakashvili saw the U.S. and NATO as providing a protective
umbrella from behind which he could pursue adventurous goals.
Kaczynski replied that it seemed Saakashvili was making a
legitimate attempt to restore Georgian sovereignty, in
response to which Lavrov reverted to his standard formula:
"You have your view and we have ours."


5. (C) On other bilateral issues, Lavrov promised to give a
new impulse to efforts to remove the ban on importation of
Polish meats. He also told Kaczynski that President Putin
would indeed like to hold a summit meeting in 2007, though he
did not propose either specific dates or a venue.


6. (C) Lavrov apparently did not try to dissuade Kaczynski
from cooperating with the U.S. on Missile Defense. Instead,
he indicated simply that Moscow wanted to understand Polish
plans and to have assurances that if the GOP moved forward on
MD it would do so in a transparent and predictable way.
Kaczynski responded that discussions with the US were still
in a preliminary stage and no decisions had been taken.
Krawczyk said that Lavrov,s lack of hostility on this issue
surprised the Polish side, and they were still assessing
whether there had actually been a real change in Russian
policy toward Poland. (COMMENT. Lavrov's public and private
comments on MD lost some of their value after Russian DefMin

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Ivanov's sharp public criticism of MD on October 10, which
was widely covered in Poland. END COMMENT.)

PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski
--------------


7. (C) According to MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski, Lavrov
covered much the same ground with PM Kaczynski as he had with
the president, though with some additions and new twists.
When the PM queried him on Russian-Georgian relations, Lavrov
engaged in a long historical discourse about the early bid by
the Caucasus nations to join the Soviet Union and the many
political and economic benefits it brought them, surprising
even the Poles with his Soviet-style explanation. In
contrast to his meeting with President Kaczynski, Lavrov was
more direct with PM Kaczynski about Russian opposition to MD,
but he was not heavy handed and he repeated Moscow's desire
for transparency and predictability.


8. (C) Lavrov was very critical of the U.S. policy on Iran,
asserting that current US sanctions were out of line with P-6
principles. He also criticized U.S. policy in Iraq and
Afghanistan, arguing that efforts to build democracy were
moving too fast, failing to respect the interests of
neighboring states, and putting too much emphasis on military
force and not enough on the political process.


9. (C) On issues closer to home, Lavrov reportedly raised a
technical issue about two border crossing points on Poland,s
border with Kaliningrad. In reply, Kaczynski noted Russia's
refusal to grant maritime access to Polish shipping to the
Vistula Bay, which is shared with Kaliningrad and accessible
only via the Strait of Baltiysk in Russian territorial
waters. According to Waszczykowski, the PM made clear that
if the Russian closure - which Warsaw views as political - is
not lifted, Poland will go forward with construction of a
canal across the Vistula peninsula to provide direct access
to the Gulf of Gdansk. Lavrov responded that Russia was open
either to negotiating a new Protocol on Polish access to the
Gulf or to amending the current one.

FM Anny Fotyga
--------------


10. (C) Waszczykowski told DCM that Lavrov had told FM Anna
Fotyga that Moscow was considering a ban on Polish milk
exports to Russia because of "health and safety concerns."
Along with the current ban on meat imports (see paragrph 5
above) the Poles took this as a explicit reminder that Moscow
was still prepared to use the trade stick to pressure Poland
in other unrelated policy areas.


11. (C) During a discussion about "what to do with
Lukashenko," in which Fotyga complained about the treatment
of the Polish minority in Belarus, Lavrov drew a parallel to
Latvia's treatment of its Russian minority. Lavrov
reportedly then made a pitch for "Slavic solidarity" in
dealing with the Germans, making reference to "the Polish
minority in Eastern Germany." Fotyga pointed out that there
was no such minority, but it then became clear that Lavrov
had in mind the Sorbs (a historical Slavic minority in Saxony
and Brandenburg not directly related to the Poles).
Waszczyskowski said this line of reasoning (like the line
about the Caucusus states having wanted to join the Soviet
Union) really took Fotyga and the others aback. The Poles
left the meeting perplexed.

Positive Tone - A "Favor" from Lavrov
--------------


12. (C) Presidential advisor Krawczyk told DCM that, overall,
Lavrov's meetings were positive in tone and that the Poles
believed his visit had improved the atmospherics, though
without resolving any outstanding problems. In addition to
plans for a Putin-Kaczynski summit, a bilateral commission of
experts was to be created to deal with cultural relations and
historical issues (including the Katyn massacres). However,
this was all left vague, with the details to be worked out
later. Krawczyk acknowledged that Lavrov,s visit had shown
Russia engaging Poland in a constructive way, perhaps to
impress West Europeans. U/S Waszczykowski too expressed
pleasant surprise at Lavrov's positive approach and apparent
willingness to improve bilateral relations.


13. (C) Comment: There has been some speculation at very
senior levels of the MFA that Lavrov viewed the weakened

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Kaczynski government as needing a foreign policy success, and
therefore came to Warsaw to test the waters. Poland's
political leadership is for the most part inexperienced with
foreign policy and has little practice dealing with the
Russians, but even the experienced diplomats Krawczyk and
Waszczykowski seemed almost entranced by Lavrov's good
behavior and relatively mild treatment of substantive
problems. Whether or not the Russian expression of interest
and good will is genuine, the Kaczynskis and their advisers
seem desperate for a foreign policy success and are therefore
likely to pursue this opening as far as it leads. END
COMMENT.
ASHE