A/S FRIED'S MEETINGS WITH FM FOTYGA, MFA AND MOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 002159

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON OVIP
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETINGS WITH FM FOTYGA, MFA AND MOD
OFFICIALS


Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Summary: (C) A/S Fried met September 8 with MFA and
MOD officials to discuss a range of bilateral issues, and was
hosted at dinner later that evening by Foreign Minister
Fotyga. An extensive part of both conversations focused on
Ukraine, and how to encourage the Ukrainian government to
continue reforms and to maintain a western-oriented policy,
with Poles urging a more forward-leaning position on a NATO
MAP. MFA officials agreed with the need for closer ties with
Germany, but pointed to political issues that made that
difficult. Both sides agreed on the need for Poland and
Europe as a whole to diversify their energy sources. Polish
officials described their commitment to improving the
situation in the Broader Middle East, and offered to host a
ministerial level conference on a range of issues, if that
would be useful. They assured A/S Fried of Poland's interest
in Missile Defense and understanding that there were no
linkages to other issues. End Summary.


2. (C) Attending the morning meeting, chaired by MFA U/S
Witold Waszczykowski, were, MOD U/S Boguslaw Winid, MFA
Security Policy Dept Director Robert Kupiecki, MFA Americas
Department Deputy Director Andrzej Jaroszynski, MOD Defense
Policy Department Deputy Director Piotr Pacholski, and MFA
Americas Desk Officer Maciej Pisarski. A/S Fried was
accompanied by Poloffs. Fotyga was accompanied at dinner by
America,s Director Szlajfer, Eastern Policy Director
Wojciech Zajaczkowski, and Wladislaw Lindenberg, Chief of the
Minister,s Secretariat. A/S Fried was accompanied by
Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns.

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UKRAINE AND BROADER EASTERN POLICY
--------------


3. (C) Waszczykowski said that Ukraine and energy security
were at the top of the Kaczynski government's agenda.
Ukrainian FM Tarasiuk had visited Poland in late August, and
PM Yanukovich had been in Poland two days earlier on
September 6 and met at length with PM Kaczynski. The Polish
message to the United States and the rest of the EU was
"Don't forget Ukraine" and "Don't forget MAP." Tarasiuk had
suggested indirectly that the West should not worry about
changes in Ukrainian foreign policy, as President Yushchenko
had constitutional responsibility for foreign and security
issues.


4. (C) Fried briefed the Polish side on his September 7
meeting with PM Yanukovich, which had been scheduled for one
hour but gone on for two. He said Yanukovich was clearly
nervous about how the West perceived him and had devoted more
than hour to a lengthy explanation of his agenda and motives.
Fried informed Yanukovich that the United States supported
the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to the Polish
refining center in Plock. Yanukovich had then talked about
opening up the Ukraine energy sector to Western companies and
working with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on energy
diversification. Yanukovich had said all the right things on
energy, with the significant exception that he did not signal
any plans to change the gas deal with RusUkrEnergo.


5. (C) Fried said he had told Yanukovich that the best
approach to eventual NATO membership for Ukraine was to take
it slow and get it right. Better to take a cautious approach
and build political support than to be aggressive and outrun
his political cover. Fried said he had also told Yanukovich
that neither NATO nor the United States were putting any
pressure on Ukraine to move faster on membership--it was
Ukraine that should decide the pace. Yanukovich had clearly
been relieved to hear this. Fried said the Secretary had
asked him to reassure Yanukovich that the door to the West
was open and Ukraine would always have a "Western option."


6. (C) Waszczykowski asked what Yanukovich planned to say at
his scheduled meeting with the North Atlantic Council about
the Riga Summit and a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for
Ukraine. Fried replied that Yanukovich did not feel prepared
to pursue MAP yet and therefore would probably not push for
MAP at Riga. However, that did not mean that Ukraine would
not be on the agenda at Riga. It was still important to talk
about NATO expansion in general and develop a basic plan for
the next tranche of NATO aspirants. MOD U/S Winid suggested
that it would be good for the United States and Poland to
compare notes on Ukraine at the Lisbon Conference in early
October, where he expected to see ASD Peter Flory.


7. (C) The subject of Ukraine also figured significantly in
the discussion at the dinner hosted by Foreign Minister
Fotyga later that evening. She argued it would be useful to
give Kiev an incentive to good relations with the West by
offering a NATO MAP. Fried repeated that a lot depended on
Yanukovich,s performance during his upcoming visit to NATO.


8. (C) When Fried suggested that we could not make a NATO
offer until Ukraine clearly stated it wants NATO, Fotyga
questioned whether it would possible to develop "a viable
energy perspective" with Ukraine if it does not have a NATO
perspective in hand. Fried reiterated that we should hold
open the possibility, but it is the Ukrainians who must push.
Fotyga argued NATO should make some kind of offer, making it
clear we would welcome Ukraine when it is ready. This would
then be an incentive for Ukraine to move forward, helping it
solidify its interest in NATO. Fotyga argued that we have to
remove lingering doubts among Ukrainians that the West does
not really want them. Being forthcoming on NATO membership
would help. A/S Fried concluded by saying we should wait and
see what Yanukovich says in Brussels.

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Energy Security and Russia
--------------

9. (C) Foreign Minister Fotyga described upcoming EU-Russian
discussions on an EU-Russia agreement, and said Poland
worried that other EU members wanted a quick liberalization
of Russian access to the EU market. Poland wants a strong
reciprocity aspect to any such agreement, and sees dangers in
quick Russian investment in the Polish infrastructure.
Poland wants some guarantees, she said of its own investment
possibilities, leading to a diversification of Poland,s
energy supply, before agreeing to liberalize the EU market
for Russia. She said Poland wanted to ensure liberalization
also of the "people-to-people" aspect of EU-Russian exchange,
and not limit it to business and political exchanges. She
said Poland also had some concerns about Kaliningrad,
particularly with regard to weapons and the environment.
Other Baltic Sea countries also had some concerns, including
regarding security of navigation and the environment.


10. (C) She said Poland was actively seeking alternative
energy sources. A/S Fried described various efforts underway
to challenge Gazprom,s monopoly, and said we are active in
talking to a number of governments. We are making some
progress, but countries such as Greece and Bulgaria feel
Russian pressure not to cooperate. The United States would
welcome Poland talking to the Turks about the issue, noting
longstanding historical ties between the two countries.
Fried also described the importance of Kazakhstan moving gas
on pipelines not controlled by Russia. In response to
Fotyga,s question about whether they could act
independently, Fried said he thought Aleyev was a good
strategic thinker, but he was not sure how things would come
out.

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BROADER MIDDLE EAST
--------------


11. (C) During the morning meeting, U/S Waszczykowski said
that Poland was deployed all over the BME, from Afghanistan
to Lebanon. "All of a sudden we're a power in the Middle
East!" He noted Poland's considerable experience in the BME,
with military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to Lebanon and
the Golan Heights, and with strong area and language
expertise in the Arab and "Persian" world. He said he had
encouraged PM Kaczynski to ask Fried a blunt question at
their meeting later the same day: "Why won't democracy work
in the Middle East the way it did for Poland and its
neighbors?" The West had been trying hard to build a
democratic Middle East, but it was going poorly. Should we
then readjust our goals or set our sights lower?


12. (C) Waszczykowski said the GOP was ready to offer
Warsaw as the venue for a conference at the ministerial or
sub-ministerial level to explore these questions and search
for new approaches. Perhaps Central European states could
bring useful insights to the table on the challenges and
successes of democratization. Foreign Minister Fotyga
reiterated the offer at dinner that night, saying that Poland
believes that, because of its longstanding engagement in the
Middle East, it could bring some value-added to efforts to
bring peace.


13. (C) Fried responded with interest to Waszczykowski's
suggestion and undertook to consult on it with appropriate
senior colleagues on his return to Washington. He opined
that Polish experience would be particularly valuable with
regard to Iran, where the United States was still lacking
expertise in both the area and the language. He suggested
that Secretary Rice would be particularly interested in the
proposal if PM Kaczynski were to raise it at their luncheon
on September 13. He reiterated the point to Minister Fotyga,
saying Poland probably had much to offer with regards to
intelligence on the internal political situation in Iran in
particular.

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AFGHANISTAN
--------------


14. (C) Fried noted that SACEUR General Jones had recently
visited Afghanistan and had concluded that the British
commander onsite had been correct when he stated that the
Coalition and NATO needed more forces on the ground. The
United States would not press for more troops from Poland,
which was already pulling its weight, but there were other
Allies who had yet to make meaningful troop contributions.
General Jones was likely to raise this issue at the September
7-9 meeting of the NATO Military Committee and NATO CHODs
taking place in Warsaw.


15. (C) Waszczykowski noted that there were two types of
battle going on in Afghanistan, the traditional combat of
course, but also the fight to find a cash crop substitution
for the renewed cultivation of opium poppies in the south.
Waszczykowski informed Fried that DefMin Sikorski would soon
be visiting Afghanistan, where he would travel to the
Pakistan border area to erect a monument on the gravesite of
a fellow journalist (British of Polish descent) who died
during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1970s, and to the
gravesite of the murdered Northern Alliance leader Massoud
(N.B. whom he knew personally),as well as to visit the
Polish troops in the Swedish PRT in Masar-i-Sharif.

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GERMANY
--------------


16. (C) Waszczykowski stated that the MFA was "desperate" to
find a positive agenda with Germany. He noted that the GOP
had responded quickly to the EU call for forces in Congo and
for contributions to UNIFIL-plus. The Poles were also
cooperating closely with the Germans (and Danes) in the NATO
Multi-National Corps Northeast (MNC-NE),which would be
deploying troops to Afghanistan in 2007. However, he feared
that "Schroeder's people" continued to control Eastern policy
in the Merkel government and were taking an "overly
optimistic view" of Russian actions and intentions. Both
governments agreed that there was a "deficit of democracy" in
Russia, but they differed on how to react. While the GOP was
unwilling to accept the situation and continued to push
aggressively for democratization in Russia, the Germans
seemed to have resigned themselves and were seeking the best
way to cooperate with the Putin government under the
circumstances.


17. (C) A/S Fried stressed that the Polish-German
relationship was crucial to Polish success in the EU. He
said that in September 6 meetings in Berlin his German
interlocutors had expressed concern over the deterioration in
relations with Poland, and stressed the importance the U.S.
attaches to strong Polish-German cooperation. He said he had
told the Germans frankly that he felt the GOP was justified
in its anger over the Russian-German pipeline.


18. (C) Fried told Waszczykowski the United States hoped to
see Poland become a strong player not only regionally but
throughout Europe. He cited Spain's resurgence within the EU
under former PM Aznar as a possible model. Polish advocacy
for Ukraine was not enough, especially if relations with
Germany were poor, but a Polish-German partnership could make
EU eastern policy a success. Fried reported that Ukrainian
FM Tarasiuk had acknowledged that Poland was crucial to
Ukraine's future, and had also expressed concern over the
apparent Polish-German rift.


19. (C) Fried reported that the Germans had a three-prong
plan for eastern policy for their upcoming EU presidency:
Russia; Central Asia and the Caucasus, with a focus
especially on Kazakhstan and Georgia; and Ukraine.
Waszczykowski assured Fried that Poland was not looking for a
fight with Germany. There were really only two points of
contention. The Baltic Pipeline had clearly angered the GOP,
but a cooperative approach with the Merkel government could
overcome that problem. He acknowledged that public comments
by Polish officials, including DefMin Sikorski's reference to
a second Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, were not helpful. The
second problem was a largely media-generated debate in both
countries over "past history."


20. (C) He agreed that EU eastern policy was a high priority
for both Poland and Germany and that a cooperative approach
was necessary. The GOP shared the German's EU presidency
priorities, especially with regard to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Georgia. He said Poland had decided not to take an active
role in blocking Kazakhstan's bid for the OSCE Chairmanship
in Office for 2009. The GOP would not support or advocate
within the EU, but it would also not block consensus if the
other EU member states fell in behind the Kazakh bid. Fried
replied that the United States did not have an objection in
principle to the Kazakh OSCE bid but felt that GOK democratic
reforms would not have proceeded far enough by 2009, and that
a later date such as 2011 would be more appropriate.

MISSILE DEFENSE


21. (C) Fried thanked Waszczykowski for the close cooperation
to date on missile defense. He said that U.S. MD
deliberations were moving forward but noted that a decision
on whether, and, if so where, to deploy a Third Site for MD
in Europe was still a month or two away. He suggested that
there was still a real possibility that such a decision would
split the interceptor site and the radar site between Poland
and the Czech Republic.


22. (C) Waszczykowski said the GOP was fully ready to proceed
with negotiations, when and if the United States made a
concrete offer. He stressed that, despite the recent flurry
of media speculation over the terms on which Poland would
accept a U.S. MD site, Poland would enter such negotiations
with no preconditions. MFA Security Policy Director Kupiecki
also commented that, should the United States in fact decide
to split MD, trilateral negotiations between the United
States, Poland and the Czech Republic would be very important.

DELL COMPUTERS INVESTMENT


23. (C) A/S Fried suggested to Waszczykowski that it would
provide an excellent deliverable for PM Kaczynski's visit to
Washington if the GOP were to give its blessing to the
pending offer by Dell Computers to invest over $100 million
in a production facility in Poland.


24. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried.
ASHE