POLES NOTE DETERIORATION OF ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000203

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP PL IR AORC
SUBJECT: POLES NOTE DETERIORATION OF ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN,
SUPPORT REFERRAL OF IRAN TO UNSC

REF: A. WARSAW 176


B. STATE 19516

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., K. M. Hillas, for reasons 1.4 (
B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Polish Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski, told us that his attitude
toward Iran had "completely changed" during his January 30-31
visit to Iran. He now believes Tehran is determined to
acquire nuclear weapons. In a separate read-out MFA Director
for Security Policy Robert Kupiecki described lengthy
harangues from Iranian officials about what they see as a
western conspiracy to deny Iran nuclear know-how, and Iranian
"patience" with IAEA missions. The Poles observed a clear
deterioration in the atmosphere in Tehran since their last
visit, with rhetoric regressing to the language and style of
twenty years ago. Officials threatened Poland on issues
ranging from its UN votes on human rights to its presence in
Iraq, and defended President Ahmadenijad's statements about
Israel and the Holocaust. The Poles were thus not surprised
by Iran's February 4 announcement that it would end
cooperation with the IAEA and support the referral of Iran to
the UNSC, as well as statements by the U.S. that diplomacy
has not ended (Ref C). End Summary.


2. (C) Waszczykowski told Charge and PolCouns February 6 that
his views on Iran had "completely changed" during his visit
to Tehran at the end of January. His outlook was in sharp
contrast to his gentle scolding of A/S Dan Fried during the
January 25 Strategic Dialogue for what he called the "harsh"
U.S. policy on Iran (Reftel A). Waszczykowski admitted (and
Kupiecki separately emphasized) that his views were shaped
during his years as Ambassador to Tehran under President
Katami, when it seemed there might be some chance of opening.
It took this trip to convince him that things had radically
changed. During his visit he met with Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mutaki, Deputy Minister for European and American
Affairs S. Jalili, and Chief Negotiator on Iranian nuclear
program/Secretary of the Iranian Supreme Council Ali
Larijani. Waszczykowski came away convinced that Tehran is
determined to acquire nuclear weapons and that no carrots can
succeed in deterring them. He noted the Iranians' "pockets
are full of oil dollars" and that deals with China and other
Asian countries, plus support from Russia, enabled them to
ignore pressure from the West.


3. (C) Kupiecki described the meetings in greater detail to
PolCouns, giving more flavor of the regime's rhetoric. He
noted that each meeting lasted several hours, and each
interlocutor opened with "ritual reassurances" of Iran's
desire for good relations with Poland, before moving on to
harangues and threats of harm to the bilateral relations on
several issues. Foreign Minister Mutaki first raised the
issue of Ali Ashgar Manzarpour, a British-Iranian citizen now
in Polish custody awaiting extradition to the U.S. for
violation of the ban on exports to Iran. Mutaki demanded
Manzarpour be released and warned of a deterioration in
bilateral relations should he be extradited to the U.S. Then
Mutaki criticized Poland for voting in favor of a UN third
Committee resolution regarding Iran's human rights record.
He warned Iran would "open a file" on Poland's alleged
hosting of a CIA "secret prison."


4. (C) Mutaki defended President Ahmadenijad's statements on
Israel and the Holocaust. Mutaki claimed Ahmadenijad's call
for Israel to be "wiped off the map" did not refer to
military action, but rather to the "logic of the democratic
process." He was simply calling for elections in "greater
Palestine" (meaning Israel, the West Bank and Gaza) which
would lead to the majority in the area "voting Israel out of
existence." Mutaki also questioned whether the Holocaust was
a "historical fact," and said he planned to organize an
international conference in Iran to examine the question.
Kupiecki said Waszczykowski replied firmly that Poland would
not agree to question historical facts such as the Holocaust
and or to question the "logic" of the Middle East peace
process, but his words were met with lengthy and sterile
statements. The Poles then had a separate, even longer
meeting with Jalili who essentially delivered a harangue on
the Holocaust, Israel, human rights, and "conspiracies"
against Iran.


5. (C) Kupiecki described an equally long, difficult meeting
with nuclear negotiator Larijani, which sealed
Waszczykowski's new-found alarm over Iran's intentions.
Kupiecki described Larijani as more "complex" and
sophisticated than his colleagues, but only marginally,
emphasizing that he delivered a similarly "fanatical"
message. Like his colleagues, Larijani started with an
assurance of Iran's desire for good relations with Poland,
but then launched into a defense of Iran's nuclear
activities, arguing that the allegation that Iran wants
nuclear weapons is a campaign inspired by the CIA and by
U.S.-controlled media. He criticized Poland's engagement in
Iraq and complained that the U.S. wanted to divide Iraq into
three countries.

6. (C) Larijani harshly condemned the EU3 for trying to deny
Iran the nuclear know-how it has the right to under the NPT.
He claimed Iran wanted negotiations with the IAEA, but that
the IAEA verification missions were in reality "hidden
espionage missions" by western countries. Iran had
cooperated voluntarily with 20 verification missions, which
had shown Iran was not producing nuclear weapons, but its
patience was at an end. Larijani kept repeating that Iran
wanted to continue its relationship with the IAEA, but made
clear this could only be done on Iran's terms. He also
repeated several times that Iran intended to remain in the
NPT and IAEA, even while claiming that nothing had been done
under the NPT to disarm the nuclear powers. He said Iran
wants to build peaceful nuclear power, and has nothing to
hide. He dragged up historical complaints, including support
of the west for the Shah, the war with Iraq (which he said
the west had goaded Saddam into starting),and the complaint
that Iran had paid for nuclear power plants from France which
were never delivered. In short, Kupiecki said, Larijani
veered wildly back and forth between accusing the west of
conspiracy and claiming it wanted to continue negotiations.


7. (C) Kupiecki said that EU Ambassadors in Iran all shared
the view that the situation had significantly deteriorated in
Tehran. They all fully expected what in fact transpired
later in the week, i.e., that Iran would announce it would no
longer cooperate with the IAEA and proceed with uranium
enrichment. As noted above, Waszczykowski is convinced Iran
is determined to pursue nuclear weapons. Poland supports the
reporting of Iran to the UNSC (Ref B),while welcoming U.S.
statements that diplomacy has not ended.


8. (C) Comment: Kupiecki was emphatic in describing the
worrisome atmosphere in Tehran. He said he had not shared
Waszczykowski's previously optimistic views, but felt
similarly there was a new "level of fanaticism" that
contrasted sharply with the more open mood he had observed
during his last visit to Tehran under President Katami. This
most recent diplomatic visit, however, should help strengthen
Polish support for U.S. initiatives in dealing with Iraq.
HILLAS