MISSILE DEFENSE: STRONG POLITICAL WILL IN POLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001676

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PL
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: STRONG POLITICAL WILL IN POLAND

REF: STATE 01522

Classified By: CDA Kenneth Hillas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Public opposition to hosting a U.S. MD site
in Poland is, as the opposition to the Iraq War, thin and not
strongly felt. All major political parties on the left and
the right continue to support an MD site, and the government
leadership is committed to the project. There is no doubt
that an MD Agreement would pass with a strong majority in the
Sejm, especially given PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski's dominance of
the government coalition. Public media coverage of MD has
outpaced the official dialogue, and, with its concerns about
Polish national security and extraterritoriality, does not
accurately reflect the Polish political dynamic. MD Post
strongly believes that the GOP expects a U.S. decision to
deploy both ground based interceptors and radar in Poland,
and anything less would be perceived as a policy failure. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poland's political reliability as a defense and
security relations with the United States is exceptional.
There are few countries in the world where alternating shifts
of government power between the left and the right have had
virtually no impact on the strategic relationship with the
United States. This long-term predictability is an important
asset as the USG approaches a decision on MD.


3. (C) The GOP believes that it has addressed earlier U.S.
questions and concerns, making clear that there are no
preconditions, that MD is viewed as a net gain for Polish
national security, and that there are no legal or procedural
problems related to MD implementation. Therefore, the GOP
expects that it will be selected for deployment of both a
ground based interceptor (GBI) site and ground based radar
(GBR) facility, unless there are clear technical advantages
to locating elsewhere. In post's view, a different outcome,
including a split decision placing GBI in one country and
launchers in another, would not be understood by the GOP and
could have a negative impact on our strategic partnership.

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Unofficial Media Speculation Colors Public Perception
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4. (U) In recent weeks, Polish press commentary on MD
Consultations have increasingly refereed to U.S. demands for
"extra-territoriality" for MD facilities, "exclusive rights"
for missile launch decision, and "U.S. law" jurisdiction over
base personnel. The media overlooks the fact that none of
these items have yet been negotiated, as the MD process is
still in the consultation phase. Hence, the public debate
has outpaced the official dialogue. This out-of-control
speculation colors public opinion and has contributed to
doubts on the part of the Polish public, which is already
sensitive to foreign bases after 50 years of sizeable and
threatening military occupation by Nazi and later Soviet
forces.


5. (U) The respected Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, recently
conducted a poll in which 63% of Poles opposed locating MD
assets in Poland and only 23% supported such action, up from
54% opposed in June and 32% opposed in December 2005.
However, while public opposition to MD seems to be growing,
this is primarily a function of a lack of information and a
response to suggestions that Polish sovereignty would be
diminished. The GOP does not view public opinion as an
obstacle and has developed a public relations strategy that
it would employ once USG makes a decision on MD.

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Disconnect Between Polls and Policy: the Iraq Example
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6. (U) Public opposition to MD has not and is not likely to
translate into opposition by key political leaders. Iraq
offers a valuable example. Despite strong public opposition
over time, Poland has maintained a leading role in Iraq. In
March 2005, only 26% of Poles polled by the Public Opinion
Research Center (CBOS) thought that Poland should, "remain
there until the end of the mission," while a February 2006
CBOS poll found that 72% of Poles opposed their nation's
presence in Iraq. However, this "opposition" never
translated into a lack of political will in Poland. In fact,
the Poles are considering expanding their involvement in the
Global War on Terrorism by deploying more troops to
Afghanistan, where they are even more likely to encounter
casualties. Post expects that the same phenomenon will
apply. That is, the public may grumble about MD, but it is
not an issue around which political action will coalesce.

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Venting the Pressure
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7. (C) To be sure, the GOP is not entirely immune to public
opinion. The declaration this week by the President's chief
of staff that Poland would not allow "extraterritoriality"
for an MD site responds to media speculation on this issue,
some of which may have been engendered and supported by
Russian interests. It is notable that the only party to
speak out publicly and clearly against deploying MD in Poland
is Self-Defense (SO),whose leader Andrzej Lepper has
surrounded himself with cast-offs from the Communist military
and security services. Indeed, PM Kaczynski believes that SO
was "inspired" by Russia.


8. (C) Some Polish commentators have speculated that Poland's
target profile will increase if it hosts MD. There is no
doubt that the MD discussions have energized the GOP's
interest in enhancing its own national air defense
capabilities, and this will be a topic for further discussion
with the USG. However, Poland's MD working group has made
clear that security assistance in this area is not a
precondition for an MD agreement. Indeed, they undertook to
keep this topic off the agenda of our MD exchanges. (See
reftel)

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Political Stability Will Anchor Any MD Site
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9. (U) COMMENT: Despite public opinion polls, Poland has
demonstrated itself a dependable and unwavering U.S.
strategic partner. This stability sets Poland apart and
represents a significant asset in terms of long-term
political reliability. One of the few countries in the world
where shifts in government between the left and right have
had virtually no impact on defense and security policy,
Poland is exceptional for the depth and breadth of its
strategic partnership with the United States.


10. (C) The GOP believes that it has allayed any concerns the
USG may have had regarding possible linkages between MD and
security assistance, the GOP view of MD's contribution to
Poland's security, or legal problems connected to an MD
agreement. On these critical issues, there are is no space
between the U.S. and Polish positions. Senior Polish
diplomats have made clear that, having addressed those
concerns and made clear their interest in MD, The USG will no
doubt select Poland for any European MD site, unless there
are clear technical reasons for going elsewhere. The Chair
of the Polish MD Working Group has made clear that any other
decision would be hard for the GOP to understand and would be
viewed as an explicit decision by Washington to devalue the
U.S.-Polish strategic relationship. A "split decision" to
deploy GBI and GBR in separate countries would also be viewed
as a political loss for Poland. In Post's view, the USG
would have to manage serious political fall-out in its
relations with Poland should there be a decision to deploy MD
in another European country. The repercussions are difficult
to predict but the risk is nonetheless real. END COMMENT.
HILLAS