LEBANON - POLISH VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF RESCHEDULED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001574

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR AND IO
USUN FOR AMB. WOLFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2011
TAGS: PREL KPKO LE PL
SUBJECT: LEBANON - POLISH VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF RESCHEDULED
LEBANON FORCE GENERATION MEETING

REF: A. WARSAW 1553


B. STATE 124162

C. WARSAW 1551

Classified By: CDA Kenneth M. Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Polish U/S Komorowski's delegation has
returned to Warsaw and will not be able to attend the
rescheduled Lebanon force meeting on August 3, but senior
Polish leaders remain committed to significant participation
in the process. The MFA believes that the August 1 GAERC
discussion turned out relatively well and that all options
remain open, as long as the planned Lebanon force is to
operate under Chapter VII. The Poles are concerned that a
French commanded Lebanon force would include a Russian
contingent. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On August 2 Acting PolCouns discussed the current
state of play on Lebanon with MFA Americas Director Henryk
Szlajfer, who had just returned from New York following the
cancellation of the planned July 31 Lebanon force generation
meeting (ref A).


3. (C) Szlajfer indicated that MFA U/S Komorowski had been
disappointed to have traveled to New York on a day's notice
only to have the meeting canceled. Nonetheless, Komorowski
was grateful for the opportunity to speak by conference call
with EUR A/S Fried and PM A/S Hillen about planning for the
Lebanon force. Szlajfer asked PolCouns to thank USUN for
arranging for Komorowski to speak by phone with US PermRep
Amb. Bolton and the meeting at the Polish Mission with USUN
Deputy PermRep Amb. Wolff.


4. (C) According to Szlajfer, the Polish delegation had been
forced to return to Warsaw by the press of business at the
MFA and would not be able to attend the rescheduled meeting
now set for August 3. Therefore, Poland would be represented
by its acting PermRep Beata Peksa at the UN-chaired meeting
at 1030 on August 3 and at any other relevant meetings in New
York.


5. (C) Szlajfer opined that the extraordinary GAERC meeting
convened in Brussels on August 1 had gone relatively well,
considering the "French intransigence," and that the EU
foreign ministers had at least "left the door open" for a
variety of options and the sequence of international
involvement (i.e. planning for the stabilization force before
or in parallel with cease-fire talks). With regard to the
Polish position, he considered Poland to be among the more
open-minded of the EU members as to the composition of a
stabilization force. Certainly, the force would have to
operate under a Chapter VII mandate, but beyond that there
were various possibilities, of which UN blue hats were only
one.


6. (C) Szlajfer added that he found it interesting that in
conversations about Lebanon which the Poles had had with
other Western partners, including the U.S., no one had yet
mentioned the Russians. He noted that Russian officials had
been conspicuously silent in public when asked about Lebanon,
which tended to suggest that they were "talking furiously in
private." Szlajfer seemed convinced that the Russians had
already been discussing the issue for some time with the
French, whom he expected to be given command of the Lebanon
force. In this scenario, once in command of the force the
French would invite Russia to provide a contingent for the
Lebanon force and "there would be nothing we could do to stop
it."


7. (C) Acting PolCouns noted August 2 press reports quoting
PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski's public statement that for now any
discussion of Polish participation in the Lebanon force would
be within the context of "the current Polish presence" (in
UNIFIL) and the "current mandate" and that "any changes to
this model would require decisions from the "President, the
Government and the Sejm" (parliament). The media also quoted
both PM Kaczynski and FM Fotyga (speaking from Brussels) that
U/S Komorowski had "only a limited mandate" for the New York
meetings. Szlajfer commented that the quotes had been
unfortunate, although essentially accurate. He stressed,
however, that the GOP was taking the Lebanon process very
seriously and fully intended to participate in both the
security and humanitarian aspects of the international effort
(as reported ref C).


8. (C) COMMENT. U/S Komorowski's return to Warsaw should not
be interpreted as a lessening of Polish commitment to the
Lebanon process. Komorowski and his delegation traveled with
less than 24 hours notice to make the July 31 meeting, but
the MFA cannot afford to have senior officials such as
Komorowski absent unexpectedly for an entire week.
President Lech Kaczynski (the PM's brother),FM Fotyga and
DefMin Sikorski have all expressed their public support for
the international efforts, and all our senior GOP contacts
indicate that Poland is prepared to contribute to a Lebanon
force at least the current level of troop they have in UNIFIL
(230 as of today) and quite possibly more. As reported
previously (ref C),Poland is also planning a humanitarian
contribution of USD one million or more. END COMMENT.
HILLAS