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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
06VILNIUS51 2006-01-20 13:24:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Vilnius
Cable title:  

(C) GOL DENIES EXPORT LICENSE FOR IRANIAN HELO

Tags:   KSTC PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR RS LH 
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					  C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000051 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB, EUR/PRA, AND ISN/CATR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: KSTC PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR RS LH
SUBJECT: (C) GOL DENIES EXPORT LICENSE FOR IRANIAN HELO
PILOT TRAINING IN RUSSIA

REF: A. VILNIUS 15

B. SECSTATE 1970

C. VILNIUS 1346 (2005)

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Martynas Lukosevicius of the MFA's Arms Control,
Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament Division informed us
January 19 that the GOL would refuse the Lithuanian firm Avia
Baltika's request for a license to broker helicopter training
in Russia for Iranian pilots (ref C). The decision of
government's interagency export control board was unanimous,
Lukosevicius said, ensuring that the Ministry of Economy's
licensing division will reject Avia Baltika's application.
He told us that the Ministry of Defense, a member of the
interagency board, never received additional information it
had requested from Avia Baltika (ref A), and that uncertainly
surrounding the deal doomed it. Most importantly, the GOL
was not able to verify with Avia Baltika the identity and
affiliation of the Iranian pilots due to receive the training.



2. (C) Lukosevicius said that the MOD thought it odd that
the Russian company, SPARC JSC, would need its Lithuanian
associate company to broker a course in Russia for third
country attendees (ref C). Avia Baltika's role in the
venture seemed tangential and its share of the profits would
have been very small. We asked why the Russian firm would
involve the Lithuanians at all, since doing so put the ball
in the court of a government with close ties to the USG and a
keen enough understanding of the Tehran regime to know that
this deal would raise suspicions. Lukosevicius told us that
the MFA was asking itself the very same question.
MULL