LAO REFUSE JOINT DEMARCHE, LIKE-MINDED GROUP LOOKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KIRF TH LA
SUBJECT: LAO REFUSE JOINT DEMARCHE, LIKE-MINDED GROUP LOOKS
TO UP THE ANTE

REF: VIENTIANE 542

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The Lao Foreign Minister has refused to receive a
joint demarche on the missing children, the GoL saying the
President's June 22 letter to the UN Secretary General
provided the government's final word on the matter. The UN's
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was not pleased with
that response, and is looking to follow up, likely with a
high-level visit to Vientiane and possibly with a follow-on
letter from the SG. The like-minded group has interpreted the
FM's refusal as an affront and is visiting a number of ideas
to push the GoL on the missing children, starting with
individual calls by members of the group on MFA
Director-Generals to stress that the issue is costing Lao
serious political capital. In the meantime, there is little
new information about the children, leaving us more concerned
than ever about their condition. End comment.

GoL refuses joint demarche
--------------

2. (C) The like-minded group met July 12 at the residence of
the Australian Ambassador to discuss next steps on the
missing children. The Ambassadors of France, Australia and
the U.S., Charges or mission personnel from the Swedish,
German, Polish, and EU missions, and the UN Acting ResRep
attended. In addition, UNHCR's Deputy Regional Representative
traveled from Bangkok to join the meeting. UNDP, which has
been the lead agency on the joint demarche, began by briefing
on the MFA's refusal to receive the demarche. MFA's
International Organizations Department told UNDP July 10 that
the newly-seated FM believed the GoL had already made its
position on the missing children clear, and that in any event
he would be unavailable to meet until the end of July. The IO
Department noted the Lao government had addressed the issue
on many occasions, most recently in the President's June 22
response to the UNSG's letter. The government felt it had
nothing further to say on the matter. MFA also emphasized
that any future discussions of the issue should be made at
the MFA's DG level.


3. (C) The UNDP representative said that the President's
letter had not gone down well with the DPA in UN New York. It
was interpreted as arrogant in tone and dissimulating in its
characterization of the events revolving around the
children's disappearance. The DPA did not intend to let the
matter rest, but planned to send a high-level official from
the office to Laos as soon as practicable, probably in
mid-August. The DPA was also considering whether the SG, who
was personally following the issue, would follow up with a
second letter to the Lao President. The DPA had also urged
the Vientiane UNDP office to submit the contents of the joint
demarche to the Foreign Minister via diplomatic note or
letter.


4. (C) The group generally interpreted the GoL's refusal to
accept the demarche as a serious miscalculation, and a
galling protocol breach. Several of those attending offered
their ideas on why the Lao had chose to "dig themselves
deeper," in the words of the German Charge; most believed the
Lao simply thought they could put their foot down and make
the matter go away, in their usual style. Others believed
the Lao could not release the children because they were
either dead or badly mistreated. In any event, the GoL's
strategy had quite the opposite effect, and all the
participants agreed that they needed to press ahead. The
question what not whether to follow up, but how.

Next steps
--------------

5. (C) The group put forward a number of suggestions on how

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to leverage the GoL, including:

-- Attempting to organize a meeting between the Lao President
or PM (one of whom would presumably be attending the
September UNGA in New York),his Thai counterpart and the SG;

-- Encourage the visit soonest of a senior representative
from the DPA, and encourage as well a follow-up letter from
the SG;

-- Seek ministerial level pressure, using for example the
upcoming ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting in KL to raise the
issue directly with the Lao FM. This could include having
the respective Foreign Ministers write the Lao FM to express
concern about the children;

-- Seek to engage the Japanese and ASEAN countries to raise
the issue with the Lao at appropriate opportunities;

-- Send the demarche points, signed by all the intended
participants, to the Lao under cover of diplomatic letter;

-- Appeal to the Lao government's "compassion" in some public
forum.


6. (C) In view of the government's refusal to receive the
demarche, the group agreed that "upsetting" the Lao was no
longer a concern. There was an abundance of evidence that
the children were in Laos and under GoL control. This fact
needed to be communicated to the Lao in some fashion to
demonstrate that the community did not accept their
protestations about not knowing where the children were --
the Lao need to "know that we know that they know," as the
Australian Ambassador phrased it. This could include
informing the Lao by some means that there was "proof" the
government had the children, in the form of the Bolikhamsai
province police report on the interrogation of the 22
females. It was also important for the Lao to understand that
this issue was costing them political goodwill. The longer
the children remained "disappeared" in the GoL system, the
more outcry and condemnation there would be from the
international community.


7. (C) Still, care needed to be taken not to challenge the
Lao so directly that they might retaliate against the
children. With that end in mind, the group concluded that the
proposal to submit the demarche points to the Foreign
Minister was likely to be provocative and therefore
counter-productive. A better plan, they felt, was to raise
the missing children on a one-on-one basis with the
appropriate DG's in MFA, essentially to remind MFA that the
international community was not accepting the GoL explanation
of the event and would continue to press on the issue. It
was agreed that each participant would seek a meeting with
its appropriate MFA DG to convey the continued interest in
the children. The French Ambassador would use his personal
relationship with the MFA Press Spokesman (who seems to have
a direct line to the Politburo on this issue) to make the
same points. The group would meet again after these series of
meetings to take stock.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) If it was intended to nip the issue in the bud, the
Lao refusal to receive the demarche on the children could not
have been more badly calculated. The GoL's arrogance, not
only on the demarche but also in the tone of the President's
letter to the SG, has goaded even the most passive members of
our like-minded group. Gone is the excuse-making for the Lao.
The group has unanimously come around to believing that the
Lao should no longer be coddled, and the government be put on
notice that the international community does not believe its
version of events.


VIENTIANE 00000655 003 OF 003



9. (C) Behind our efforts, however, is the fear that the Lao
won't release them because they can't -- some of the children
may be dead, or at least badly treated. It is also worrying
that almost all news about the children has dried up. Sources
(including family members in Thailand) who several months ago
could relate limited information now report they are hearing
nothing, and have no idea about the children's location or
condition. The government seems to believe that it can
simply write them off, and the international community will
drop the matter. It also believes it can absolve itself of
responsibility for their fate. In fact, this denial of
responsibility was a repeated theme in the President's letter
to the SG. But the sense of outrage about the children is
growing, and this issue is going to continue to haunt the
GoL. End comment.
HASLACH