Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENTIANE509
2006-06-06 09:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

ROK EMBASSY ASKED TO APPROACH GOL ON 10 DPRK

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KN LA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000509 

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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KN LA
SUBJECT: ROK EMBASSY ASKED TO APPROACH GOL ON 10 DPRK
ASYLUM SEEKERS

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000509

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KN LA
SUBJECT: ROK EMBASSY ASKED TO APPROACH GOL ON 10 DPRK
ASYLUM SEEKERS

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The ROK Foreign Ministry has asked its
Embassy in Vientiane to approach the GoL to seek a
"humanitarian" solution for 10 DPRK citizens currently
imprisoned in Luang Prabang province. The ROK Embassy intends
to raise the case of these 10 with the Deputy Foreign
Minister, but -- like us -- worries that bringing the issue
of the 10 to the government's attention may lead the Lao to
deport the group to China. We share the ROK Embassy's view
that the "underground railroad" for DPRK asylum seekers
through northern Laos works best when it is out of sight and
mind of the central government. The GoL does not want to be
seen as facilitating North Korean refugee flight, concerned
as it is about the impact on both the DPRK and the Thai
bilateral relationships. End summary.


2. (C) The arrest of 10 DPRK asylum seekers by authorities in
northern Laos last week has brought to international
attention the flow of North Koreans through Laos to Thailand.
When we first learned of the detention of this group last
week, we spoke with the South Korean Embassy First Secretary,
who told us that a South Korean broker had handled the
group's travel through Laos, that the 10 North Koreans had
been detained in Luang Namtha province, and that officials
there were demanding hefty "fines" for their release. At the
time the ROK Embassy was not inclined to get involved in the
arrest, believing their intervention would wreck ongoing
negotiations between the South Korean broker and the Luang
Namtha authorities. In the end, the broker (with money paid
by NGOs) paid "fines" of $500 for each of the 10, and the
Namtha authorities released them. The group's weekend release
supported the ROK Embassy's view that non-involvement was the
best policy, the First Secretary told us.


3. (C) The re-arrest of the group in Luang Prabang province
over the weekend has, however, brought renewed calls for the
South Koreans to intervene on a more official level. The

First Secretary told us today the group was probably
rearrested because, by the terms of their release, they were
to return to China (this is at odds with an NGO report that
the group was given a seven-day "pass" for travel in Laos.)
She speculated that when the South Korean broker took the 10
south to Luang Prabang instead of north to China, the Luang
Namtha authorities alerted the police in Luang Prabang to
detain the group.


4. (C) The First Secretary said that the re-arrest of the
group had attracted a renewed call from the South Korean and
U.S. NGOs involved for intervention from the ROK government.
As a result, her ministry was under considerable pressure to
"do something" to get the 10 released from jail in Luang
Prabang. The Ministry had ordered the Embassy to approach the
GoL to "negotiate" their release. The ROK Ambassador was
seeking an appointment with Deputy FM Bounkeut (the same
Deputy FM who was helpful to us with our DPRK asylum seeker
in early 2005) to discuss the case. The First Secretary was
also seeking a meeting with Director-General-level officials
to propose in a low-key way the possibility of negotiating
their release. The South Koreans assumed that any negotiation
would involve more payments; the First Secretary said her
ministry was "prepared to pay."


5. (C) We shared our view with the ROK Embassy that raising
the arrest of the 10 with the Foreign Ministry could have
negative ramifications for their security. The First
Secretary agreed that the Lao would first and foremost not

SIPDIS
want to be seen facilitating the transit of DPRK asylum
seekers though Laos. The Lao were very conscious of the
impact of DPRK asylum seekers on bilateral relations with
both the Thai and the North Koreans. The South Koreans
pointed out that the Lao had agreed to inform the North
Korean Embassy in Vientiane any time DPRK citizens were
arrested in Laos, presumably to give the DPRK Embassy an
opportunity to vet the asylum seekers and request the return
of those of interest. For our part, we noted that last year
the Thai pressed the Lao to crack down on the transit of
North Korean through Laos.


6. (C) Comment: The use of Laos as a stop on the North Korean
underground railroad works only as long as it stays informal

VIENTIANE 00000509 002 OF 002


and below the radar screen. The Lao government has a poor
track record on protection of refugees, and in fact has
refused UNHCR permission to reopen an office in Vientiane.
The GoL is not in any way sympathetic to the North Koreans,
who may remind them all too much of their own refugee exodus
from the ethnic Hmong population. The DPRK asylum seekers
currently passing through Laos depend on the greed, not the
sympathy, of local officials to grease their passage on to
Thailand. End comment.


HASLACH