DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000386

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL TH LA
SUBJECT: DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES
HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS

REF: A. VIENTIANE 321 AND PREVIOUS

B. VIENTIANE 360

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) During his April 25-26 visit to Vientiane for
ASEAN-related meetings, DAS Eric John met with Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, who
categorically denied Laos faced any human rights problems in
the areas of religious freedom or treatment of the ethnic
Hmong minority. Somsavat said the Lao had "heard about"
Thailand's expulsion of 27 Hmong people to Laos, but the Thai
government had still not handed over information Laos needed
to complete its search for the missing group. DAS John also
met with the UNDP ResRep, Australian and French Ambassadors,
and EU and Swedish Charges, who generally agreed that, for
the moment, the diplomatic dance between Laos and Thailand
over the 27 Hmong should be given time to play out.
Unfortunately, many in this group wish to give the Lao the
benefit of the doubt on human rights problems rather than
holding the GoL accountable for its actions. We are much
less inclined to see the silver lining, but we do support an
expanded dialogue with the Lao as the best way to make
progress on issues of interest to us. End summary.

Somsavat meeting
--------------

2. (C) DAS John used his visit to Vientiane for the
ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Cooperation meetings to meet with FM
Somsavat and with members of the international community to
discuss the Lao human rights picture. Accompanied by
Ambassador, he met with FM Somsavat Lengsavad April 26 and
raised several key human rights concerns that have plagued
the relationship.


3. (C) DAS John told the FM that the two countries shared
many interests, especially in the economic field, and worked
closely in a number of areas of mutual interest, such as
finding the remains of Americans lost in the Vietnam War and
fighting narcotics. Moreover, Laos and the U.S. now had a
Bilateral Trade Agreement and Normal Trade Relations which
over time could stimulate investment and trade, as had
happened between the U.S. and Vietnam. As in any
relationship, however, there were issues of concern. Most
prominent was the fate of 27 Hmong people, 26 of whom were
minors, deported from Thailand to Laos last December and now
being detained, incommunicado, by Lao authorities (ref A).
The international community's interest in this case wasn't to
embarrass the Lao government, but to see the children
reunited with their families. By the same token there were
many people in the U.S. concerned about the plight of Laos'
"remote people," ethnic Hmong living deep in the forests who
according to some reports were under intense attack by Lao
military forces.


4. (C) Somsavat broke in to say it was important in any
relationship to resolve problems through quiet discussion
rather than public blame. For example, Laos respected
religious freedom but Christians who broke the law and who
were arrested often claimed their arrest was for their
religious beliefs, inciting outsiders to unfairly criticize
Laos. He also claimed churches sometimes inflamed local
communities by saying other religious beliefs, like Buddhism,
were "wrong." From religious freedom, Somsavat moved on to
the Hmong, uncharacteristically referring to that ethnic
group by name. He stated categorically that all reports of
the Lao government mistreating the Hmong were "lies"
concocted by Vang Pao, and should not be believed. He told
DAS John said Laos' Hmong were thriving under the GoL's
leadership.


5. (C) Somsavat then addressed the 27 missing Hmong. He told
DAS John that the week before, the Thai Ambassador had seen
the Deputy FM and had informed the GoL that Thailand had
indeed expelled the children to Laos last December.
Unfortunately, the Thai Ambassador had not provided details
of the time and place of the expulsion, with the result the

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Lao were unable to complete their "search" for the children.
Since Lao people were free and could move about the country
at will, the children could be anywhere. The government would
continue to look for them, but would need more information
from the Thai before it could proceed in earnest. However, he
added, if his government could not find the children,
Thailand rather than Laos should be blamed for their
disappearance.

Meeting with Embassies and UN
--------------

6. (C) In addition to his meeting with the FM, DAS John met
with the UNDP Resrep and several diplomats who closely follow
Lao human rights. UNDP ResRep Finn Reske-Nielsen described
the previous day's meeting of UN agencies and interested
embassies on the children, telling DAS John the group had
agreed that there appeared to be ongoing discussions between
the Lao and the Thai on the return of the children and this
process should be given time to work itself out. There would
be other occasions to raise the issue with the Lao over the
next few weeks, such as the FM's upcoming visit to Sweden and
the EU Ambassador's scheduled visit to Vientiane in early
May. These meetings would serve to remind the GoL that the
issue would not disappear. Reske-Nielsen said that if after
several weeks there had been no movement on the children, the
"like minded group" had agreed it would be time to take more
forceful measures, such as a joint demarche to the GoL.
Resek-Nielsen also said that he had been instructed by the
Political Directorate at the UN to raise with the Lao recent
reports of killings of Hmong civilians by Lao security forces
(ref B).


7. (C) In a separate meeting organized by the Ambassador, DAS
John heard from the French and Australian Ambassadors and
Swedish and EU Charges on the human rights situation in Laos.
The four painted a generally positive picture of Lao human
rights, saying they believed there had been some improvements
in recent years. They felt the Lao could not be pushed on
human rights, but rather had to be encouraged through quiet
dialogue and diplomacy. However, all four acknowledged that
this tactic had so far produced meager results and it
remained difficult to have any sort of dialogue with the
government on sensitive human rights topics. The EU and
Sweden had both established human rights dialogues with the
GoL, and the Australians would follow suit later this year.
These dialogues were a potentially helpful mechanism for
addressing human rights concerns.


8. (C) The group thought that the Lao wanted better relations
with the U.S. The French Ambassador pointed out that younger
Lao leaders had a more nuanced understanding of foreign
policy than the old generation and sought balance in Laos'
foreign relations. To the younger generation, the U.S. was a
welcome counterweight to offset Laos' atavistic fears of
Chinese and Vietnamese hegemony. Turning to the Hmong
children, the French Ambassador and EU Charge both felt the
Lao had been backed into a corner and would not release the
children unless they felt confident the release would not
embarrass them. The French Ambassador described the essence
of the problem as one of "face": the Lao could not back down
if there was any chance they would be blamed for the
children's detention. Reassuring the Lao that a quiet
solution would remain quiet would be crucial. All the
participants in the meeting believed that the best outcome
would be that the Lao would release the children directly to
the Thai, with no recriminations following.

Comment
--------------

9. (C) Securing the release of the Hmong children is our key
concern at present, and DAS John's conversations with the
international like-minded group were useful for identifying
advantages and pitfalls of various strategies for reaching a
solution. The consensus is that for the moment the process
initiated by visiting UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner
Chamberlin in March should be allowed to play itself out.
With luck, the Lao and Thai will come to an accommodation to
return the children to Petchaboon. That said, we worry that
the poor treatment the boys, in particular, have been subject

VIENTIANE 00000386 003 OF 003


to will make it hard for the Lao to release them under any
circumstances.


10. (C) On the overall human rights picture, however, we
believe our "like-minded group" isn't so like-minded after
all. With the exception of the Australians, our colleagues
continue to hold a patronizing attitude toward the Lao which
exonerates them for any blame for their actions and sees
"progress" in the feeblest gestures. The Lao government is
masterful at playing the international community's
sympathies, making the most serious human rights charges go
away though a policy of concerted and coordinated denial,
such as that displayed by the Foreign Minster in his meeting
with DAS John. The Lao are serial human rights abusers,
especially toward the remaining Hmong groups still in the
forest. The last of these groups are dying daily in penny
packets or sometimes (as the massacre of April 6
demonstrates) in larger groups. Most of those dying are
women and children. Yet tragically this story is being
ignored by even those here in Vientiane's diplomatic
community who should be paying attention, and the Lao
government is once again getting off scott-free for its
egregious conduct.

11. (C) While we have our differences with our like-minded
colleagues, we share the view that we need more dialogue with
the Lao. The GoL's mistrust and misunderstanding of us could
hardly be deeper. Expanding our dialogue with the government
on many levels will, we believe, help allay some of their
fears of us and in the longer term give us more leverage in
moving the Lao in the right direction, in human rights as
well as in other areas. End comment.


12. (U) DAS John did not clear this cable.

HASLACH