Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENTIANE307
2006-03-31 09:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

ADB EXAMINES ITS OPTIONS IN A DONOR-DRIVEN ECONOMY

Tags:  EAID EFIN PGOV PHUM ECON LA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000307 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLA AND EB
DEPT PASS TO USAID AND USTR
MANILA PASS TO ADB, AMB SPELTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2011
TAGS: EAID EFIN PGOV PHUM ECON LA
SUBJECT: ADB EXAMINES ITS OPTIONS IN A DONOR-DRIVEN ECONOMY

REF: VIENTIANE 212

VIENTIANE 00000307 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: amb. Patricia Haslach. reason 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000307

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLA AND EB
DEPT PASS TO USAID AND USTR
MANILA PASS TO ADB, AMB SPELTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2011
TAGS: EAID EFIN PGOV PHUM ECON LA
SUBJECT: ADB EXAMINES ITS OPTIONS IN A DONOR-DRIVEN ECONOMY

REF: VIENTIANE 212

VIENTIANE 00000307 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: amb. Patricia Haslach. reason 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary. As part of a new Country Strategy and
Program (CSP),the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is to re-vamp
and trim its lending and granting policies for Laos. This is
partly in response to criticisms of ADB projects from
development partners, but mostly due to ADB guidelines for
continued assistance following GoL recalcitrance in promised
reforms over more than a decade of easy money. The prospect
of changes in ADB foci in Laos seems promising, though the
CSP is still vaguely worded and likely to remain so to avoid
alarming the GoL. In fact, ADB's development priorities in
Laos need to be reversed. End Summary.

Janus meets Janus
--------------


2. (U) During the first week of March the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) in Vientiane hosted a sit-down with interested
donors and missions to review its record and offer the
outline of a gradually developing plan for the Bank's future
activities in Laos, summed up in the Country Strategy and
Program (CSP). Evidently in response to criticism of past
ADB projects, there will be some shifts in emphasis - away
from a broad, indeed scatter-shot approach to development of
"big" sectors like energy and transportation (in lock-step
with the desires of the GoL),and toward (equally broad and
really quite vague) "pro-poor growth", "inclusive social
development", "good governance", and "regional integration".
There is to be more care for consultation with development
partners and donors, which we would welcome. The new CSP is
intended to be: "mindful of risks, while helping Laos move to
a higher growth and socio-economic development trajectory
that is sustainable, employment intensive, and safeguards
options for future generations". Some observers felt
justified in questioning whether there will be significant

changes.


3. (SBU) The meeting was a useful venue for some frank talk,
but had schizophrenic aspects, as well. The ADB Resrep led
off with an upbeat if somewhat fey overview. His
presentation was well crafted and collegial, offering
coordination and soliciting input and critique, but contained
items that gave his interlocutors considerable pause. Among
them, that further ADB engagement in Laos is justified
because:
A - Poverty rates are falling (that is happening only in a
few areas).
B - There has been progress on Millennium Development Goals
(but not on non-income MDGs - i.e. on the governance-related
ones).
C - There is robust GDP growth among vibrant regional
economies (strong neighboring economies and rampant
extractive resource exploitation are producing a simulacrum
of GDP growth).
D - FDI inflows are increasing (mostly from China - Laos
remains one of the most difficult places in the world to
invest and do business).
E - Decision making has devolved to provinces and villages
(Any real decision must still go to the top of the politburo
for consideration, even for things like "will we allow a
fashion show in Vientiane?").
F - There has been improvement in core governance areas such
as rule of law, more sound financial management, public
service reforms, and people's participation (that is flatly
untrue - all of it).
The ADB Resrep also cited some "country risks" in Laos, but
merely implied that governance in Laos is not up to snuff,
and certainly did not spell out that the GoL, long the
recipient of so much aid, is the whole problem. If the
purpose of the oddly upbeat presentation from the Resrep was
to forestall counterblasts from the assembled donors and NGOs
in front of his official visitors from ADB Manila, it didn't
work.

Collared
--------------


4. (SBU) The core message was yet to come. The Resrep was
followed by his ADB visitors, who explained why ADB must now
begin to lend to Laos according to a "collar" of
performance-based standards, like those applied to other
countries. The reason: Laos has not performed as promised.
ADB is now obligated by its own guidelines to impose some
limits on its program funding in Laos, due to GoL failures to
toe the mark in reforms over the past 15 years. This collar
may or may not result in real reductions on grants (cutbacks
of approximately 50 percent were mentioned). Eighteen
criteria with reference to financial management, rule of law,
transparency, and other aspects of governance, are to come
into play whenever a program for Laos comes into
consideration. The GoL is utterly remiss in all these areas,
and this is the very rock on which the IMF poverty reduction
program in Laos foundered.

ADB does some good stuff here
--------------


5. (C) ADB comes in for a lot of criticism, some of it
undeserved. They are faulted by donors for throwing too much
money in too many directions, and for not watching what is
done with it very closely. The Japanese Embassy in Vientiane
(ironically, itself the source of a great deal of feckless
donorship) opines that ADB Manila is preoccupied with its
programs in China, India, and other large developing
economies, and therefore pays little heed to the quality of
its programming in tiny Laos. The result is loose
programming, looser project oversight, and sloppy budget
control. The Japanese therefore now require that each
program be explained to them individually by ADB
representatives, a practice Post will emulate. Some
ADB-funded development schemes have gone seriously awry right
from the conceptual get-go, such as pushing industrial tree
plantation in the north of the country - a large part of
which is fast becoming a Chinese, Thai, and Indonesian
commercial rubber plantation zone in which the forests have
disappeared and the traditional livelihoods and access rights
of villagers are shoved aside.


6. (C) However, ADB's successes should not be discounted.
Just as there would be no health care to speak of in Laos
without the Global Fund, there would be no infrastructural
development to speak of without Japanese and ADB largesse.
Infant mortality has dropped, the population is growing fast
(though with no educational system or job market to receive
all the young people),and there are some new roads and other
kinds of infrastructure. The rural electrification effort
ADB has mounted over the past decade has been a fine example
of how development ought to work.

But it costs a lot. . .
--------------


7. (C) . . . . so maybe the multilateral donors who fund ADB
in order to promote economic growth and free market reforms
should get some such reforms in exchange. The average ADB
loan in Laos is $11 million. For the period between 1995 and
2005 alone, $710 million in loans came Laos' way (grants only
kicked in during 2005),$557 of it direct, and $154 million
for broader, regional use. Of the money given directly to
Laos, 28 percent went to transportation and communications,
20 percent to urban water supply and sanitation, 19 percent
to energy-related projects, 12 percent to agriculture and
natural resource exploitation, 8 percent to finance, industry
and trade development, 8 percent to education, 5 percent to
health and nutrition. ADB prides itself on the degree to
which its programs dovetail with the GoL's 5-year development
plan and its 20-year plan for poverty reduction. The former
is a Communist Party document that only this year, for the
first time, contains any reference to the poverty reduction
goals, and (also a first) has been glimpsed by donors before
being graven in stone. The latter is a wholly donor-made and
donor-driven document intended to justify largesse, and quite
deficient in proposals to develop private enterprise and a
free economy. This year (also a first) the donor's poverty
reduction plan was at least mentioned in the draft 5-year
plan.

Is more aid the solution?
--------------


8. (C) Despite two generations of aid from successive
congeries of donors (American, then Soviet, then
international),this is still an extremely poor country, if
one does not belong to the political elite. Although GoL
ministers and officials with salaries of less that 75 dollars
per month sport villas and cars worthy of Monte Carlo, GDP
per capita is still officially less than $400 (probably a lot
less - GoL figures have a good deal of wish fulfillment to
them). Debt amounts to 80 percent of GDP. Unemployment is
epidemic, underemployment is endemic, crime is rising, and
the investment climate is among the least hospitable in the
world. The tiny banking sector is opaque and remains an
non-performing loan (NPL) factory for SOEs and other forms of
crony lending, despite IFI attempts to install reforms.


9. (C) It's no accident that these economic ills are not
addressed. There is almost no rule of law or basic human
freedom in Laos, and education is in the hands of a corrupt
and ideologically hidebound ministry that uses ADB money to
build a grandiose but unnecessary new ministry building while
rural children sit on logs and try to remember what a teacher
looked like. Any motion on the part of the GoL, however
insignificant, is greeted with applause from donors wont to
treat even stonewalling as cause for guarded optimism.
Almost every donor publication that discusses the economy
touts the GoL's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of the mid-1980s
as a turning point toward a brighter future. In fact, the
NEM is almost identical to the New Economic Policy (NEP)
installed by Lenin in the nascent USSR in 1921, suggesting
that the regime in Laos thinks it has plenty of time to hold
the outside world at arm's length.

Whose fault is this?
--------------


10. (C) It is a commonplace among foreign representatives in
Vientiane that Laos has donors and foreign NGOs (indigenous
NGOs are forbidden),instead of good government. There's a
simple reason for that - by bankrolling the government here
donors insulate it from pressures to change. Now that the
Chinese are in the investment and aid games with both feet,
it may be that a 15-year opportunity to elicit reforms in
exchange for aid and budget support (since the collapsing
Soviets withdrew their aid) is lost. Whether that is the
case or not, at last there is a belated measure of donor
stock-taking. Reftel recounted the GoL's sorry record in
living up to its obligations under International Financial
Institution programs, and the attitudes the IFIs are
displaying about it.


11. (C) In fact, though, no one is likely to really do much.
The several IFIs have different corporate cultures, but
singly or collectively they have never held the host
government's feet to the fire when one of their supposedly
interlocking programs is thwarted. In Laos, of the three
(IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank),the IMF is
most often openly critical of the GoL, while ADB is most
egregiously prepared to overlook poor performance in the
interests of uninterrupted disbursement.


12. (C) Comment: It is a great pity that a half-century of
aid and the GoL's manifest dependence on it has not been
translated into leverage for reform. This has not happened
because neither the Japanese (the largest bilateral donor),
nor ADB (the largest multilateral) have a sense of what such
a fulcrum might be used for. Now that ADB is claiming to be
re-thinking development priorities, those priorities should
be reversed. Health, nutrition, and education projects
(provided there is a heavy ration of curriculum reform) are
morally unambiguous and do not directly benefit a bankrupt,
corrupt, and reflexively repressive regime. Small business
development is likewise a potentially productive way to go,
especially in that it may result in something akin to a civil
society - or at least an interest group not entirely under
the thumb of the Communist Party. These worthy things have
had the short end of the ADB development stick heretofore,
and the vague promise that they will now be given greater
weight should be lived up to. In contrast, infrastructure
development, while doubtless to the good, is seized upon by
the regime as a badge of all they have done to develop the
country, and why one and all should acquiesce in their
remaining in power. Such large construction projects are
also most readily tuned to the purposes of corrupt GoL
contracting patronage networks. Donors who wring their hands
quietly over human rights abuses, and the GoL's refusal to
reform much of anything, are to consider that to bankroll a
regime like this one is to be complicit in its career.
HASLACH