THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY'S GAME PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000302

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PINR PGOV SOCI LA
SUBJECT: THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY'S GAME PLAN

REF: VIENTIANE 275

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)
-- the ruling Communist Party -- has absolute confidence in
its ability to govern Laos well into the future. The Party
believes that it is responsible for economic gains over the
past decade, not comprehending that much of that progress was
the inevitable result of Laos' geographic position among
economic powerhouses like China and Thailand. With positive
economic gains and a pliant population, the Party has set a
course to further consolidate and strengthen its control.
Communist rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War is in vogue;
the LPRP is also convinced that the U.S. is actively trying
to undermine its rule, putting an additional strain on our
already shaky relationship. Far from moving toward a more
pluralistic government, Laos is heading toward deepening
authoritarianism and entrenched dynastic oligarchy. End
summary.


2. (C) The overarching message from the March 18-21 8th Party
Congress was the Party's conviction that it alone was
responsible for Laos' economic achievements of the past
half-decade. The Political Report, which formed the basis of
Congress discussions, and the Party Resolution, issued at the
end of the Congress, made some mention of shortcomings,
especially in the area of implementation of Party doctrine.
But those shortcomings were not failures of the system so
much as of individuals within it. On overall strategy, the
Congress had no criticism of its handling of the country.
Its assessment of Laos' economic performance since the last
Party Congress in 2001, and more broadly since the country
adopted a "renovation policy" in the 1980's, was glowing: the
Party took credit for increases in foreign investment, trade
and foreign assistance. It also claimed success in raising
living standards, signaled by increases in per capita income,
life expectancy, literacy rates and other basic quality of
life measures.


3. (C) The Party's attribution of its economic success to its
"renovation policy," the economic liberalization set up in
1986 in tandem with "doi moi" in Vietnam, was disingenuous.
Much of what has happened in Laos in the economic sphere has
been an inevitable result of Laos' position in the midst of
economic giants like China, Thailand and increasingly
Vietnam. These are countries that are in need of new markets,
sources of energy and raw materials, and places to put their
investment money. Laos has played that role well, not so much
because of the government's open-armed welcome of foreign
investment (Laos remains a difficult place to do business
because of a lack of rule of law, corruption, and overall
inefficiency),but because it is exploitable. Any government
running Laos probably would have done as well.


4. (C) By taking credit for economic progress, however, the
LPRP has concluded that it alone has the foresight to direct
Laos' development. Having convinced itself of the truth of
its own rhetoric, the Party believes it has a mandate not
only to direct the current program for removing Laos from the
ranks of Least Developed Countries by 2020, but to continue
to run the country well beyond that time. The political
signals from the Congress, and from other political
activities of the past several months, point to a shift by
the Party toward greater conservatism and less willingness to
eventually concede power. Far from seeing economic
development as an opportunity for political liberalization,
the LDRP is trying to consolidate and strengthen its grip.


5. (C) The new initiatives are comprehensive. New Politburo
member Somsavat Lengsavad said at a post-Congress press
briefing that the Party would work to woo new members, to
expand Party membership far beyond its current level of
148,000. The Party's ranks have grown significantly in the
last decade, in large part because membership provides the
only realistic hope of advancement for anyone in the GoL,
including the country's teachers and doctors. The new
initiative will increase the pressure on those outside the
Party to join.


6. (C) The LPRP has also consolidated its grip on the
political process. Earlier this year the National Assembly
announced that Assembly elections originally scheduled for
2007 would be held in April this year, to make its five-year

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tenure concurrent with that of the new Central Committee.
That change, in turn, would assure that Party policy could be
more effectively translated into legislative action,
according to National Assembly spokesman Viseth Svengsuksa.
Finally, the LPRP is committed to weeding out its
non-performers. Among other measures, the Party announced at
the conclusion of the Congress that it had strengthened the
authority of the Party Secretariat, the Party institution
charged with enforcing discipline. The change would promote
"correct" behavior of Party members, thereby preventing the
bad actions of a handful from impacting on the population's
confidence in the LPRP's infallibility.


7. (C) The shift to the right also spells a more troubled
relationship with the U.S. According to Singapore Embassy
contacts, reporting information they in turn had picked up
from the Russians, in the course of the Congress the senior
leadership discussed the bilateral relationship, and
determined that the U.S. was actively working to undermine
the Party. As evidence, the leadership noted that the U.S.
Embassy was frequently aware of the GoL's internal activities
(possibly referring to our knowledge of the detention of 27
Hmong children by Lao authorities since December). The
leadership felt certain there were "spies" working for the
USG within the GoL, and that contact with both the U.S.
Embassy and with our allies (including the Singaporeans) was
dangerous.


8. (C) The Party billed the new Central Committee lineup as
an injection of youth into the leadership. It was that: the
average age of the new members is 51, versus 60 for the
Central Committee veterans. The purpose of the shift to a
more youthful Committee was not to introduce new ideas,
however, but to guarantee the Party's long-term survival: the
19 new members all possess unquestionable credentials as
Communist faithfuls, and they are unlikely candidates for
change. For example, four of the new members came from the
military's political department or from the Party's political
school, and are experts on Marxism-Leninism. Several others
came from within the Party administration. The new CC may be
younger, but it is no less Communist.


9. (C) The new appointments also reveal a desire to establish
political dynasties. Three new appointments to the Central
Committee are children of the senior leaders: Nam Vignaket
(son of Politburo member Samane Vignaket),Sonesay Siphandone
(son of retiring Party Secretary Khamtai) and Sanyahak
Phomvihane (son of LPDR founder Kaysone Phomvihane and the
second of Kaysone's sons on the CC). Insiders tell us the
leadership has struck a bargain to promote each other's
children to the Central Committee, providing for their
political futures and thereby their economic futures as well.



10. (C) Comment: Although "reform" was a major theme of the
8th Party Congress, that term applied only to changes within
the system designed to improve Party efficiency and give the
Lao population even less room to complain. Nowhere in the
platform was there discussion of any long-term opening of the
political system. The message from the Party Congress was not
one of gradual change, but of maintaining the status quo as
far into the future as possible. End comment.
BAUER