Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENTIANE298
2006-03-30 06:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES' LAO VISIT

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL KCRM TH LA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6576
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0298/01 0890653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300653Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6442
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2600
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2049
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1722
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0844
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0169
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0663
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0647
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0308
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0531
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0073
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000298 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLA, DRL, PRM, S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM TH LA
SUBJECT: DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES' LAO VISIT
-- SOME HOPE FOR HMONG CHILDREN

REF: VIENTIANE 234 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000298

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLA, DRL, PRM, S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM TH LA
SUBJECT: DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES' LAO VISIT
-- SOME HOPE FOR HMONG CHILDREN

REF: VIENTIANE 234 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Wendy
Chamberlin's March 28-30 visit offered some promise of a
positive resolution to Laos' continued detention of 27 Hmong
deportees. Chamberlin met with Politburo member Pany
Yathoteu, and ethnic Hmong, and with Deputy Foreign Minister
Phongsavath. Both relayed that the GoL cannot search for the
missing group of Hmong until the Thai provide an
"explanation" for their deportation to Laos in December.
Chamberlin told both that she would relay this requirement to
the RTG. She suggested that a Thai verbal explanation to the
Lao Ambassador to Bangkok would satisfy the Lao demand.
Chamberlin concluded from her meetings that the Lao would not
require a third party to broker the handover of the children,
but could make the arrangements directly with the Thai. She
suggested that should the Thai deliver and the Lao then fail
to uphold their end of the bargain, the international
community, including ASEAN countries, should get much tougher
with the GoL. End summary.

Background of the visit
--------------

2. (C) The UNDP handled all arrangements for Deputy High
Commissioner (and former U.S. Ambassador to Laos, 1996-1999)
Wendy Chamberlin's visit, designed to find a resolution to
the Lao government's continued detention of the 27 Hmong
following their deportation from Thailand as illegal
immigrants. Although UNDP presented the visit as a "courtesy
call," GoL approval was only given the day before her
arrival. (Comment: we believe her trip to Vientiane was
approved only following deliberation at the highest levels of
the government, with the Lao no doubt well aware of her real
mission.)


3. (C) In its diplomatic note requesting the visit, UNDP had
asked for meetings with "appropriate officials," but had
verbally relayed to MFA its desire for Chamberlin to meet

with the Foreign Minister, with Minister to the President's
Office Soubanh Srithirath, and with National Assembly Vice
President Pany Yathoteu, a member of the Politburo. In its
approval, however, MFA notified UNDP that the Deputy High
Commissioner would meet with Deputy FM Phongsavath Boupha, a
much lower level interlocutor than UNDP had sought. Only
after Chamberlin's arrival did the GoL grant her a second
meeting, with Pany; UNDP felt Pany agreed to the meeting as a
personal favor to UNDP, an organization that had supported
her activities in the Assembly and was in part responsible
for her recent promotion to the Politburo.

Meetings with the GoL
--------------

4. (C) In a meeting with select diplomats and heads of UN
agencies the afternoon of March 29, Chamberlin discussed the
results of the two meetings. She said she told the two Lao
officials that the purpose of her visit was "friendly,"
since she had many friends in Laos from her days as U.S.
Ambassador. She loved the Lao people, and wished to help
resolve the problem of the missing children. She conveyed to
Phongsavath and Pany that, while she was in Bangkok, she had
met with Thai NSC Director General Winai Phattiyakhul and MFA
PermSec Krit Garnchana-Goonchorn, who had given her a
consistent message: the Thai had "made a mistake" in
deporting the group of Hmong to Laos; the RTG would allow the
children to return to Thailand on a one-time basis, with NSC
arranging with Thai immigration for their smooth transfer
from Laos; the Thai wanted to see the children in the group
reunited with their families; and there would be no publicity
surrounding the return.


5. (C) Chamberlin told the diplomats and UN officials that
both Pany and Phongsavath had complained that their
government had begun looking for the children, but that they
had not yet received a formal explanation of the deportation

VIENTIANE 00000298 002 OF 003


from the Thai. Without that information, they could not
complete their search. Chamberlin emphasized that neither
Phongsavath nor Pany said the explanation needed to be in
written form, and she felt strongly that a verbal explanation
would be sufficient. (At a reception for Chamberlin later
that evening, the UNDP ResRep told DCM that he had checked
with contacts in the GoL who had confirmed that they did not
require a written explanation from the Thai.) Her impression
from the two conversations was the Lao saw the Thai
unwillingness to provide them with an explanation as a
diplomatic slight, and deeply offensive to Lao pride.

The plan -- call in the Lao Ambassador to Thailand
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Chamberlin said she told both Lao officials that she
would be meeting with Winai and Krit in Bangkok on her return
there, and would convey to both the Lao demand that they
explain the children's deportation. She mentioned to them
that she would suggest to the Thai that they call in Lao
Ambassador to Thailand Hiem Phommachanh and give him the same
four-point explanation they had given her. The Deputy HC
later told DCM privately that, if possible, this should be
done concurrently with a call by the Thai Ambassador to
Vientiane on the Lao MFA, to deliver the same message.
(Comment: The gathered diplomats welcomed the idea of calling
in the Lao Ambassador. Hiem has apparently been tapped to
become a Deputy FM and will be returning to Vientiane within
months to take up his new post. His promotion is viewed
positively among the diplomatic community here, who see him
as a realist rather than an ideologue.)


7. (C) Chamberlin said at the briefing that neither
Phongsavath nor Pany responded directly to her suggestion,
but Phongsavath did say after her proposal that his
government had been preoccupied with the recent Party
Congress, and had not had time to look for the children. Now
that the Congress was over, the government would continue the
search. Phongsavath also told Chamberlin he did not
understand why Laos, and not Thailand, was getting blamed for
the children's situation. She responded that she was blaming
no one, but was merely looking for a solution that would
return the children to their families.


8. (C) The Deputy HC had no way to assess the chances of
success of her proposal, but felt it merited an effort to get
Thai agreement to talk to Ambassador Hiem in Bangkok. She saw
her visit as a "last chance" to resolve the issue quietly. If
the Lao failed to deliver the children after the Thai had
talked with Hiem, the pressure on the GoL should be ratcheted
up significantly. She also felt that ASEAN countries needed
to weigh in much more strongly; at a reception the evening of
March 29 Chamberlin told several ASEAN Ambassadors that their
countries had an obligation to speak out on the missing
children, an issue that was non-political, to demonstrate
that ASEAN could take on substantive issues.

Comment
--------------

9. (C) Chamberlin's visit elicited the first signs of
flexibility on the missing children we have seen from the Lao
side in over a month. Lao statements about the missing
children since late February have generally been much more
categorical that the children were not here, leading us to
believe that they had closed the book on the case and had no
intention of releasing them. But Phongsavath's and Pany's
comments to Chamberlin indicate that there is still a chance
the Lao will release the group, providing their demand for a
Thai explanation can be met. They have thrown the ball
squarely back into the Thai court. Chamberlin's intention is
to press the Thai to give the Lao what they are looking for,
pointing out that the Thai would have to tell the Lao no more
than they told her.


10. (C) If Chamberlin's read of the Lao is correct, they are
looking for a way out of the corner they have boxed
themselves into by detaining the children for so long, but
need to be confident they will not be blamed for what has
happened. As a result of that requirement, one critical

VIENTIANE 00000298 003 OF 003


element to securing the release of the children will be
convincing the Lao that the handover will be without
publicity and without recrimination. To assure a discreet
handover, Deputy HC Chamberlin felt the matter should ideally
be handled directly between the Lao and Thai, without the
involvement of the international community. End comment.
BAUER