Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENTIANE1141
2006-11-28 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE

Tags:  KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVN #1141/01 3320803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280803Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6996
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0134
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0941
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0197
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0670
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1110
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0075
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0572
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 001141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC),PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT),IO/RHS (MCKEE),IO/EDA (CAROTHERS),
IO/UNP (MEYER),DRL, EUR/ERA, G-TIP;
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2106
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE
REACH ONE YEAR?

REF: A. VIENTIANE 0928

B. VIENTIANE 0894

C. VIENTIANE 0801

D. VIENTIANE 0660

E. AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 001141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC),PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT),IO/RHS (MCKEE),IO/EDA (CAROTHERS),
IO/UNP (MEYER),DRL, EUR/ERA, G-TIP;
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2106
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE
REACH ONE YEAR?

REF: A. VIENTIANE 0928

B. VIENTIANE 0894

C. VIENTIANE 0801

D. VIENTIANE 0660

E. AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This message contains an action request for the
Department. Please see paragraph 16.


2. (C) Summary: The case of the 26 missing children has been
unresolved since December 2005. Since then, there have been
rumors that the children may have been secretly deported back
to Thailand or even dispersed throughout the Lao countryside.
But the overwhelming likelihood remains that they are still
being detained by the Lao Government. Until resolved, we
believe this case must continue to be raised both in
Vientiane and abroad. Meetings held by UN Under Secretary
General Gambari, the raising of the issue at the September
UNICEF Executive Board meeting, and the possibility of an
intervention by the UN Secretariat during the UNGA have been
keeping the pressure on the Lao government to &come clean8
about the whereabouts of these children. The next step: we
believe a senior UN official needs to come to Vientiane to
press the Lao Government to resolve this case. End summary.

The Missing 26 Children: The Chronology
--------------

3. (C) Since this case has dragged on for so long, we want to
review the chronology and highlight the facts we know:

Thai Actions
--------------
November 28, 2005: Thai police in Petchabun Province arrested
a group of 29 ethnic Hmong from Laos returning from a
Christian religious service in Ban Khek Noi. The group,
mostly children, was stopped at a roadblock just outside the
Hmong camp. Since they were outside the camp, police
considered them "illegal migrants."

The Thai police held the group members for five days,

demanding 200,000 baht ($5400) in cash from the families for
their release, but the families were unable to pay.

December 2, 2005: 27 of the 29 were sent from Petchabun to
Nong Khai Province where they were held for three more days.
Two of the older members of the group remained incarcerated
in Khao Kho District, Petchabun.


4. (C) Lao Actions; the beginning of the ordeal:

Arrest and Suspicion
--------------
December 5, 2005: 27 members of the group (22 females, all
but one of whom were minors, and five males, all minors) were
taken to Ban Phak Khad, in Nong Khai Province. Thai police,
in conjunction with village officials, sent the 27 across to
Houay Khoua Phai, Tha Phabat District in Laos, Bolikhamsai
Province in two small fishing boats.

December 6, 2005: Lao officials in Tha Phabat District
arrested the group and sent them to Paksane, the Bolikhamsai
provincial capital, for questioning. (Note: Sources report
that Lao police suspected the group members were provocateurs
sent by the Thai or even by exile Hmong groups to create
disturbances. Lao police were especially suspicious because
the children claimed to be Christians, had studied English,
and had received assistance from "foreign" organizations in
Petchabun. (End note.)

Separating the Boys
--------------
December 8, 2005: The five boys in the group were separated
from the girls and were sent to Vientiane, where they were
imprisoned at Phonetong Prison for almost two months.

February 4, 2006: Due to publicity and pressure from the
international media and diplomatic community, the five boys
were blindfolded and flown by military aircraft to Phongsaly,
where they were imprisoned at Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly
City. To our knowledge, the boys remain at this facility.

The Girls
--------------
Meanwhile the 22 females (one adult and 21 children) were
held at Ban Thong Noi, Paksane Province, close to military
encampment number 17, just outside Paksane. The girls were
questioned extensively by the Paksane police who reported to
Vientiane in early January that they suspected the girls had
been sent to Laos by foreigners (i.e. the U.S.) to create
disturbances.


5. (C) USG and Other Actions during December ) January:

December 6, 2005: The U.S. Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok
learned of the deportation, made immediate inquiries to Lao
and Thai authorities, and raised the case with UN
organizations and other embassies. In early January, Embassy
Vientiane obtained a Thai immigration police report on the
arrest that definitively pointed to the group being in Laos.
The Thai information included the names and other information
about each of the group members. Subsequently the Embassy
also received a copy of the report completed by the
Bolikhamsai police after interrogating the group members as
well as photos of group members behind bars.

January 13, 2006: Convinced that evidence overwhelmingly
showed the 27 were in Laos, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane
requested and received Department permission to demarche the
Government of Laos (GOL) to seek access to them.

January 18, 2006: The Ambassador met with Deputy Prime
Minister/Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad to convey the
demarche on the missing children, requesting the GOL to look
for them and provide immediate access to them by observers
and doctors from the international community. The Ambassador
also gave Somsavat a copy of the Thai immigration police
report as well as the list of names and other information
about the group members. (Note: because of the way the
Bolikhamsai police report was obtained, that report was not
given to Somsavat. End note.) The Foreign Minister replied
that his government would do all it could to locate the
children, and requested the USG obtain a Royal Thai
Government (RTG) pledge to permit the children to return to
Thailand, if they could be located in Laos.

January 27, 2006: When quiet attempts to get the GOL to send
the children back were rebuffed, the Ambassador requested a
second meeting with the Foreign Minister to deliver another
demarche demanding immediate access to the missing children.
Because the Foreign Minister was unavailable, the Ambassador
conveyed the demarche points via letter.

January 30, 2006: The Lao MFA Press Spokesman held a press
conference to say the GOL had learned of the disappearance of
the 27 and "was looking for them." The same day, the UNDP
Acting Resident Representative delivered a letter to MFA
offering to assist in caring for the group and returning them
to Thailand.

Just prior to this press conference, Embassy Vientiane
learned that Embassy Bangkok had convinced senior RTG members
to agree to allow the group to return to Petchabun, provided
it was done quietly. The Ambassador conveyed this
information to the Lao MFA Press Spokesman after his press
conference. He asked that we attest to this in writing.

January 31, 2006: The Ambassador sent another letter to the
Foreign Minister, again conveying the RTG pledge regarding
their return to Thailand.


6. (C) February 2006; GOL Demands More Details:

February 1: In response to GOL intransigence and refusal to
return the children to Thailand as requested in our January
31 letter, the Department issued a statement sharply critical
of the GOL and urging immediate access.

February 2: the Lao relayed to the Embassy, via indirect
channels, that they would now require information from the
RTG fully explaining details of the deportation before they
would be able to "find" the group. Later that day, the Thai
Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Somsavat and promised to
relay this request to his Foreign Ministry.

February 3: The Australian Government demarched the GOL on
the children and requested a meeting with the Foreign
Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the case.
(Note: The GOL has refused to the present day to see the
Government of Australia about this matter ) stating that the
Foreign Minister,s response to the U.S. Ambassador sufficed.
End note.)

February 7: The U.S. demarched the EU, Japan, and selected
ASEAN countries requesting that they, in turn, demarche the
GOL demanding the release of the group and their return to
Thailand. At the same time, the RTG made public its
willingness to accept back the group of 27 but added that
"all Hmong in Thailand illegally" would have to return to
Laos eventually.

February 10: The EU Mission in Bangkok demarched the RTG on
the missing children. The same day, the EU representatives
in Vientiane (France, Germany and the EU Mission) also
demarched the Lao Foreign Minister.

February 20: Visiting U.S. Senator Russ Feingold met with RTG
PM Thaksin and Foreign Minister Kantathi in Bangkok and
raised the Hmong children issue. Feingold's office later
issued a press release urging the GOL and RTG to work
together to resolve the issue.

February 23: USUN officers met with UNICEF Deputy Executive
Director Kul Gautam to discuss the children.


7. (C) March 2006: UNHCR Becomes Involved:

March 28-30: At the urging of the Department, UNHCR Deputy
High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin visited Laos. Both
Politburo Member Pany Yathoteu and Deputy FM Phongsavath told
her that the GOL could not look for the children until the
RTG first provided more details of the deportation. Both
before and after her visit, Ms. Chamberlin also met with the
Thai NSC and MFA in Bangkok. The trip concluded with general
agreement among the RTG, UNHCR, and interested embassies that
the Thai would call in the Lao Ambassador to Bangkok to
explain the deportation, hopefully meeting the GOL demand.


8. (C) April 2006: Details ) But Not Enough

April 12: The RTG MFA Deputy PermSec formally but verbally
informed the Lao Ambassador in Bangkok that the RTG would
take back the children on an exceptional basis. The Lao
Ambassador asked for more details of the circumstances
surrounding the children's deportation, specifically dates,
place of deportation, and other additional information. The
MFA agreed to try to obtain the additional information. The
Thai MFA felt the meeting, overall, was "positive."


9. (C) May-June 2006: The UNSYG Weighs In ) And Is Rebuffed

May 18: The UN Secretary General sent a letter to the Lao
President asking about the missing children and confirming
the RTG would accept their return.

June 24: Lao President Choummaly Sayasone responded to the
UNSYG in a letter saying in part, &... the Lao authorities
had never been informed by the Thai side about this matter
and in fact the Thai side has neither handed over those 27
Hmongs to the Lao authorities8 (unofficial translation from

Lao). According to UN representatives, the UNSYG considered
the letter to be arrogant in tone and dissimulating in its
characterization of the events revolving around the
children,s disappearance. UN officials noted that the UN
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) planned to send a
high-level official to Laos (probably in mid-August).


10. (C) Summer 2006: No progress:

Early July: The Lao Foreign Minister refused to receive a
joint demarche from &like-minded8 embassies and UN as well
as international organizations, on the missing children. The
GOL said the President,s June response to the UNSYG provided
the government,s final word on the matter.


11. (C) August ) September 2006: UN Pressure ) To No Avail:

Mid-August: Bangkok-based UNICEF Regional Director Singh met
with Lao Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Thoungloun
and raised the 26 missing Hmong children. Singh told the
Foreign Minister that the UNICEF Executive Board Members, who
control the level of funding for UNICEF activities in each
country, would raise the issue of the children. She informed
him that the debate regarding funding would not be easy and
that Laos, funding could be affected by this issue.

August 29-30: UN Under Secretary General for Political
Affairs Gambari met with the Lao Permrep (Aug 29) and the
Thai Permrep (Aug 30) to try to resolve the case. The Lao
continued to say they lacked precise information from the
Thai, and the Thai continued to say they had provided all
information orally. Gambari asked that all information from
the Thai be put in writing.

August 31: UNICEF Executive Director Ann Veneman, in a
response letter to Ambassador Haslach, noted that if the case
of the missing children remains unresolved in September the
&UN Secretariat intends to raise it at the highest level8
with Lao and Thai representatives at the UNGA.

Early September: The United States and Sweden raised the
issue of the missing children on the margins of the UNICEF
Executive Board meeting.

Mid-September: A plan for the UNSYG to meet separately with
the Lao and Thai Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA
is derailed by the coup in Bangkok.


12. (C) September 21: The Curious MFA Press Briefing

After ten months of stonewalling on the case of the children,
Brigadier General Bouasieng Champaphanh, who leads the Lao
side of the Lao-Thai Joint Sub-Committee for General Border
Security Cooperation (&the Sub-Committee8),gave a press
conference at the MFA. General Bouasieng had just returned
from an &extra8 plenary meeting of the Sub-Committee held
in Bangkok on September 19 (ref a). At this meeting, the
Thai side had asked the Lao side to: collect information
about the 27 missing children (note: actually 26 children and
one adult; end note) and to stop the flow of Hmong who have
been fleeing to Thailand. According to General Bouasieng,
the Lao side agreed to provide &full cooperation8 regarding
the children but asked the Thais to also provide the
following information so the Lao &can search for the
children until they are found:8

-- the list of each of the Thai officials involved in
arresting and deporting the children to Laos, including
names, family names, ranks, positions, areas of
responsibility, and the units they belong to;

-- the place of arrest of the children (in Thailand);

-- the exact places, including village, hamlet, district, and
province, that the children were deported from in Thailand
and where they were deported to in Laos;

-- the reason that the Thai officials deported the children,
and the names, including family names, of the 26 children and
the one adult who accompanied the children as well as their
photographs;

-- details of their parents, including names, family names,
home towns, and present addresses.

(Note: even though the GOL already has been given much of the
information General Bouasieng listed above, having a senior
general give a formal MFA press conference which discussed
the children led to a brief spurt of optimism that the two
sides had finally agreed on an approach that &saves face8
for both sides and allows the 26 detained children being able
to rejoin their families. On the other hand, that was two
months ago, and the level of detail demanded by the Lao now
appears more like another movement of the goal posts. End
note.)

Where are they now?
--------------

13. (C) To our knowledge, the five boys have never been moved
from Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City.

The 21 girls have since been rumored to have been moved to
Savannakhet Province or even trafficked to Thailand, but we
believe they remain in Laos. The well-connected French
Ambassador was &unofficially8 told by senior GOL officials
in early November 2006 that the children are still in Laos
and are &in good hands,8 and that some may even be
attending school. Officially the GOL is awaiting a written
response from the Thai on the children, and until they get
that they will stick with the &official8 line that the
children have not been found.

An Additional Confirmation
--------------

14. (C) The Ambassador also asked Richard Childress, former
Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council
under President Reagan, to raise the issue of the children
with Deputy Prime Minister/former Foreign Minister Somsavat
Lengsavad in a side-bar conversation on October 30. Mr.
Childress was visiting Vientiane with National League of
Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLF)
Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths; Mr. Childress is
Senior Advisor to the NLF. Both Ms. Griffiths and Mr.
Childress have had long working relationships with senior Lao
officials on POW/MIA issues.

Somsavat told Childress that &we are in direct discussions
with the Thai on returning them.8 From his body language
and what he did not say (&We don,t know where they are,
etc.),Childress believed the GOL may actually have been in
discussion on resolving this issue at that point.

Future Action
--------------

15. (C) A month has passed since the Somsavat-Childress
conversation. At this point, we continue to believe that
only senior UN officials have sufficient weight to move the
detained children,s case toward resolution. We appreciate
USyG Gambari having met with the Lao and Thai permreps in
late August and are disappointed that a higher-level dialogue
during the UNGA meant to bring the two sides together was not
possible due to the coup. We believe that a visit by Mr.
Gambari or another senior UN official to Vientiane and
Bangkok is the only possible lever available to move the case
to resolution at this time.

Action Request
--------------

16. (C) Embassy Vientiane asks the Department to request USUN
to contact the UN to push for a visit to Vientiane and
Bangkok to pursue a resolution to this case.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) The GOL strategy seems apparent: continue to
stonewall and the outside world will lose interest. Make
information difficult to obtain, move the goal posts, and
continue intransigence, and the problem becomes just too
difficult to try to resolve. In the face of this GOL
approach, we are pleased that so many officials and agencies
have worked to help resolve the case of these missing
children during this past year. Our view here is that this
case has become a symbol of how the Lao government operates,
and whether the Lao government can be trusted to keep its
commitments. The support from the international community
remains vital to keeping the pressure on the Lao, so UN
efforts -- including the letter from the SYG, support from
the UNICEF leadership and USyG Gambari,s role -- have been
most welcome. We think, unfortunately, they have to continue.
HASLACH