Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENNA230
2006-01-25 16:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

Tags:  PREL AU EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000230 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PREL AU EUN
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

REF: A) STATE 11254 B) STATE 10181

Classified By: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREGORY E. PHILLIPS
REASONS: 14.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000230

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PREL AU EUN
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

REF: A) STATE 11254 B) STATE 10181

Classified By: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREGORY E. PHILLIPS
REASONS: 14.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) EconPolCouns and Pol Unit Chief delivered ref (a)
demarche to Austrian MFA Common Foreign and Security Policy
Coordinator Andreas Riecken on January 24. Riecken noted
that, in addition to the topics mentioned in reftel, the EU
Foreign Ministers would discuss the problem of granting visas
to Burmese officials for an upcoming ASEM Deputy Finance
Ministers meeting. The Dutch Foreign Minister had also asked
for time to talk about Afghanistan in preparation for the
London Conference. Riecken noted that this session of the
Council was likely to be brief, since important participants,
including Austrian Foreign Minister Plassnik, would have to
leave early for other meetings in London.


2. (C) IRAN: Riecken told us that the Austrian MFA had been
in intensive contact with the EU-3 and the EU Council
Secretariat on draft language for the GAERC Conclusions. The

SIPDIS
draft was now with the EU Political and Security Committee
(PSC),which hoped to finalize the language on January 24.
For the moment, the role of the IAEA was paramount, but it
was not too early to think about a strategy for the period
after a referral to the UN Security Council. U.S. contacts
with London, Paris and Berlin would be the determining
factor, Riecken thought. We agreed, but said that Austria's
chairmanship of EU Councils, plus its commercial and
diplomatic engagement with Iran, gave it important leverage
with the Iranians and Austria should use it.


3. (C) IRAQ: Riecken thought there would be an abbreviated
discussion on Iraq centering on the outcome of the elections.
An upcoming expert level seminar in Brussels sponsored by
the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) would likely have
a significant impact on European thinking about Iraq. Gudrun
Harrer, the new Austrian/EU Presidency envoy in Baghdad,
would brief the seminar on her findings and activities.
Riecken said EU thinking focused on providing assistance on
constituional issues.


4. (C) MEPP: Riecken echoed Robert Cooper's comments at the
U.S.-EU Political Directors' Meeting in Alpbach (ref b). The
EU would watch Hamas' performance in the Palestinian
elections carefully. Hamas, if it did well enough, would be
a political reality that we somehow had to manage. Getting
Hamas to lay down its arms and change its attitude toward
Israel was crucial, but it would be a long-term process.


5. (C) BELARUS: The EU's focus in the January 30 GAERC would
not be on travel bans, but on how to deal with the run-up to
the presidential election, Riecken said. The Belarus
government had communicated to ODIHR in Warsaw on January 19
about sending a an election observer mission. This would
allow enough time to set up a credible monitoring presence
and was a positive contribution to the discussion. On the
other hand, Solana was wary of the invitation he had received
to meet Lukashenko in Minsk and did not want the regime to
use such a "photo-op" for pre-election propaganda purposes.


6. (C) MONTENEGRO: Solana's new special representative,
Slovakian PolDir Miroslav Lacjak, will report to the GAERC
on his findings, Riecken said. While it is clear that the
current government feels confident it can win a referendum on
independence, it must also take account of the political
opposition. The EU's chief concern is that a referendum be a
reliable indicator of the true wishes of the Montenegrin
people. It was also important to avoid cross-linkages with
the situation in Kosovo.


7. (C) KOSOVO: The Commission was preparing a paper on the
West Balkans for the March Gymnich ministerial in Salzburg,
Riecken told us, but the issue was not yet ready for
consideration in formal Council meetings. Rugova's death had
caused delays in the process and possibly complicated the
situation. The EU and Austria were prepared to take over
certain tasks from UNMIK, such as policing, but did not want
UNMIK to dissolve at this stage. Riecken remarked that in
Bosnia, expectations for the EU security role had been too
high, but perhaps some of the lessons learned there could be
applied in Kosovo.
KILNER