Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENNA1173
2006-04-24 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:
KOSOVO: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER BRIEFS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001173
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KS AU
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER BRIEFS
AUSTRIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Scott F. Kilner. Reason: 1.4 (
b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001173
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KS AU
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER BRIEFS
AUSTRIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Scott F. Kilner. Reason: 1.4 (
b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Frank Wisner, the U.S. Kosovo
Special Representative, discussed Kosovo status issues on
April 21 with Austrian MFA Political Director Thomas
Mayr-Harting. Wisner bluntly outlined the problem: Belgrade
has decided to ignore private messages that the outcome of
the status process will be Kosovo independence, and has
instead chosen to block progress in the negotiations on
practical issues. However, Wisner said he believed that,
while Belgrade would object strongly to Kosovo independence
as a fait accompli, Belgrade would accept this outcome in the
end. Mayr-Harting agreed with Wisner's assessment. To
Mayr-Harting's proposition that Russia's reaction would
depend on Serbia's level of objection, Wisner said Russia
would be more concerned with what else it could "trade" for
Kosovo and with the degree of U.S.-European unity on the
issue. Mayr-Harting said Austrian Chancellor Schuessel could
use his good relations with Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica
to deliver a message. Wisner said the time may not yet be
ripe for this, but said the core message would be that the
international community can help the Serbs, if the Serbs let
them. Although Mayr-Harting expressed understanding with
Wisner's decription of the core of the problem, he did not
offer suggestions for addressing the problem. End Summary.
--------------
UN Seat
--------------
2. (C) Mayr-Harting referred to reports that Under Secretary
Nicholas Burns had said explicitly at the April 20 G-8
political directors meeting in Moscow, that an independent
Kosovo should have a UN seat. Wisner responded that U/S
Burns's comments were nothing new. He added that they had
come only in response to a German statement making a
"preemptive concession" to a possible Serbian objections. It
makes no sense to make such a concession now, particularly
without any idea whether such a move would bring Belgrade
closer to accepting eventual independence.
--------------
Assessment of Belgrade Views
--------------
3. (C) The core problem, Wisner said, was with Belgrade.
Wisner said there was a real problem in that Belgrade does
not want to agree to Kosovo independence, but the
international community has started a process which will end
with Kosovo independence. In effect, Serbia is seeking to
reopen what was decided in 1999.
4. (C) Wisner said he had told Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica that if he sought to create sovereign
cut-outs of authority in Kosovo, rigid separation between
Kosovar Serbs and the Pristina government, and crippling
limitations on Kosovo's international status, he had our
opposition. If, however, he sought reasonable accommodations
for the Serbian miniority in Kosovo and assurances of the
protection of Serbian religious and cultural sites in Kosovo,
we could deal with him. Wisner said he told Kostunica that
his tactics seemed like the former. The refusal to allow
Kosovar Serbs to participate in Kosovar governing structures
and the move to cut their salaries, the blockage of Serbian
Orthodox Church participation in efforts at accommodation,
and the unwillingness to deal seriously with attempts to
negotiate practical arrangements indicated that Serbia was
not prepared to make the choice of looking forward and
confirming its future in the West.
5. (C) Wisner said we needed to draw the appropriate
conclusions ourselves. Belgrade had made its mind up, and
there was no pressure coming from within Belgrade to achieve
a reasonable compromise that would defend Serb minority
interests while recognizing Kosovo independence.
6. (C) The foregoing, Wisner said, were his conclusions on
the basis of direct observation. The next element was an
assumption he was making in light of his understanding of the
situation. The assumption was that if the international
community presented Belgrade with a decision that recognized
VIENNA 00001173 002 OF 003
Kosovo independence, Belgrade would "go wild," but would
ultimately accept the outome.
7. (C) Mayr-Harting agreed that Belgrade would "shout" about
Kosovo independence, but would accept it in the end. The
Serbians had a long history of "celebrating their defeats,"
Mayr-Harting said. That said, some issues, such as Kosovar
UN membership, might be too much for Serbia to accept.
Wisner reiterated that there is no need to address the issue
of UN membership yet. Everything would depend on the final
package, and we were not yet at that point.
--------------
Russian Reaction
--------------
8. (C) Mayr-Harting said the Russian reaction to Kosovo
independence would be important, and the Russian reaction
would depend on "the volume of Serbia's scream" about
independence. Wisner demurred: the Russian reaction would
remain unknown until the issue got to the UN Security
Council, he thought. At that point, the Russian reaction
would depend on what else was happening in the world -- the
Russians would not hesitate to "trade" Kosovo for some other
issue. The Russian reaction would also depend on how united
the U.S. and Europe were. It was therefore important for the
U.S. and Europe to continue to speak with one voice on
Kosovo. Wisner said the Serbian reaction would be only a
tertiary consideration in Russia's reaction.
--------------
Austrian Contacts with Kostunica
--------------
9. (C) Mayr-Harting said Deputy UN Special Negotiator for
Kosovo Albert Rohan had been the architect of Austria's new
relations with Kostunica's Serbia. There were good relations
between Vienna and Belgrade, he said. Austrian Chancellor
Wolfgang Schuessel had a solid relationship with Kostunica --
the two were in the same European People's Party grouping --
and if we needed it, Schuessel could help with Kostunica.
10. (C) Wisner said Schuessel should probably "keep his
powder dry" for the moment. However, the core message for
Kostunica would be that the international community was there
to help the Serbs, if they wanted to help themselves, but
they had to give us something to work with.
11. (C) Mayr-Harting asked about the status of efforts to
arrest Ratko Mladic, noting indications that the Serbs were
going to deliver him to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the end of April. Wisner
said these still seemed to be the indications. However,
Wisner expressed concern that the Serbs would try to link
Mladic's arrest and transfer to the Kosovo talks.
Mayr-Harting agreed that this was a concern, and said the
link should be between Mladic's arrest and Serbia's EU
aspirations.
12. (C) Mayr-Harting asked whether the Montenegran
independence referendum would have a bearing on Serbia's
willingness to move forward on Kosovo. Wisner said he
thought Montenegro was not material, because Serbia had
already accepted the fact that Montenegro was going away.
Mayr-Harting agreed, commenting that a pro-independence vote
between 50 and 55 percent (the latter being the agreed
threshhold for winning) would complicate matters.
13. (C) On religious institutions, Wisner noted that there
was an appropriate focus on monasteries, but there was a
continuing question of whether they came under national or
church sovereignty. Wisner said Belgrade had barred the
Serbian Orthodox Church from engaging directly on the issue,
preventing practical discussions. Mayr-Harting said Austria
had brought the communities together in conferences over the
past several years.
--------------
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Mayr-Harting understood and agreed with Wisner's
VIENNA 00001173 003 OF 003
description of the core of the problem with Belgrade, and of
the reasons for it. However, he would not offer a suggestion
on how to address it. Mayr-Harting's suggestion that
Chancellor Schuessel engage with PM Kostunica reflects an
Austrian faith in the power of personal diplomacy to win
practical agreement on sticky issues. However, the Austrian
approach would depend on a Serbian assessment that an EU
future is Serbia's primary interest, and that a pragmatic
resolution of Kosovo status will make Serbia's EU future
possible.
McCaw
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KS AU
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER BRIEFS
AUSTRIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Scott F. Kilner. Reason: 1.4 (
b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Frank Wisner, the U.S. Kosovo
Special Representative, discussed Kosovo status issues on
April 21 with Austrian MFA Political Director Thomas
Mayr-Harting. Wisner bluntly outlined the problem: Belgrade
has decided to ignore private messages that the outcome of
the status process will be Kosovo independence, and has
instead chosen to block progress in the negotiations on
practical issues. However, Wisner said he believed that,
while Belgrade would object strongly to Kosovo independence
as a fait accompli, Belgrade would accept this outcome in the
end. Mayr-Harting agreed with Wisner's assessment. To
Mayr-Harting's proposition that Russia's reaction would
depend on Serbia's level of objection, Wisner said Russia
would be more concerned with what else it could "trade" for
Kosovo and with the degree of U.S.-European unity on the
issue. Mayr-Harting said Austrian Chancellor Schuessel could
use his good relations with Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica
to deliver a message. Wisner said the time may not yet be
ripe for this, but said the core message would be that the
international community can help the Serbs, if the Serbs let
them. Although Mayr-Harting expressed understanding with
Wisner's decription of the core of the problem, he did not
offer suggestions for addressing the problem. End Summary.
--------------
UN Seat
--------------
2. (C) Mayr-Harting referred to reports that Under Secretary
Nicholas Burns had said explicitly at the April 20 G-8
political directors meeting in Moscow, that an independent
Kosovo should have a UN seat. Wisner responded that U/S
Burns's comments were nothing new. He added that they had
come only in response to a German statement making a
"preemptive concession" to a possible Serbian objections. It
makes no sense to make such a concession now, particularly
without any idea whether such a move would bring Belgrade
closer to accepting eventual independence.
--------------
Assessment of Belgrade Views
--------------
3. (C) The core problem, Wisner said, was with Belgrade.
Wisner said there was a real problem in that Belgrade does
not want to agree to Kosovo independence, but the
international community has started a process which will end
with Kosovo independence. In effect, Serbia is seeking to
reopen what was decided in 1999.
4. (C) Wisner said he had told Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica that if he sought to create sovereign
cut-outs of authority in Kosovo, rigid separation between
Kosovar Serbs and the Pristina government, and crippling
limitations on Kosovo's international status, he had our
opposition. If, however, he sought reasonable accommodations
for the Serbian miniority in Kosovo and assurances of the
protection of Serbian religious and cultural sites in Kosovo,
we could deal with him. Wisner said he told Kostunica that
his tactics seemed like the former. The refusal to allow
Kosovar Serbs to participate in Kosovar governing structures
and the move to cut their salaries, the blockage of Serbian
Orthodox Church participation in efforts at accommodation,
and the unwillingness to deal seriously with attempts to
negotiate practical arrangements indicated that Serbia was
not prepared to make the choice of looking forward and
confirming its future in the West.
5. (C) Wisner said we needed to draw the appropriate
conclusions ourselves. Belgrade had made its mind up, and
there was no pressure coming from within Belgrade to achieve
a reasonable compromise that would defend Serb minority
interests while recognizing Kosovo independence.
6. (C) The foregoing, Wisner said, were his conclusions on
the basis of direct observation. The next element was an
assumption he was making in light of his understanding of the
situation. The assumption was that if the international
community presented Belgrade with a decision that recognized
VIENNA 00001173 002 OF 003
Kosovo independence, Belgrade would "go wild," but would
ultimately accept the outome.
7. (C) Mayr-Harting agreed that Belgrade would "shout" about
Kosovo independence, but would accept it in the end. The
Serbians had a long history of "celebrating their defeats,"
Mayr-Harting said. That said, some issues, such as Kosovar
UN membership, might be too much for Serbia to accept.
Wisner reiterated that there is no need to address the issue
of UN membership yet. Everything would depend on the final
package, and we were not yet at that point.
--------------
Russian Reaction
--------------
8. (C) Mayr-Harting said the Russian reaction to Kosovo
independence would be important, and the Russian reaction
would depend on "the volume of Serbia's scream" about
independence. Wisner demurred: the Russian reaction would
remain unknown until the issue got to the UN Security
Council, he thought. At that point, the Russian reaction
would depend on what else was happening in the world -- the
Russians would not hesitate to "trade" Kosovo for some other
issue. The Russian reaction would also depend on how united
the U.S. and Europe were. It was therefore important for the
U.S. and Europe to continue to speak with one voice on
Kosovo. Wisner said the Serbian reaction would be only a
tertiary consideration in Russia's reaction.
--------------
Austrian Contacts with Kostunica
--------------
9. (C) Mayr-Harting said Deputy UN Special Negotiator for
Kosovo Albert Rohan had been the architect of Austria's new
relations with Kostunica's Serbia. There were good relations
between Vienna and Belgrade, he said. Austrian Chancellor
Wolfgang Schuessel had a solid relationship with Kostunica --
the two were in the same European People's Party grouping --
and if we needed it, Schuessel could help with Kostunica.
10. (C) Wisner said Schuessel should probably "keep his
powder dry" for the moment. However, the core message for
Kostunica would be that the international community was there
to help the Serbs, if they wanted to help themselves, but
they had to give us something to work with.
11. (C) Mayr-Harting asked about the status of efforts to
arrest Ratko Mladic, noting indications that the Serbs were
going to deliver him to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the end of April. Wisner
said these still seemed to be the indications. However,
Wisner expressed concern that the Serbs would try to link
Mladic's arrest and transfer to the Kosovo talks.
Mayr-Harting agreed that this was a concern, and said the
link should be between Mladic's arrest and Serbia's EU
aspirations.
12. (C) Mayr-Harting asked whether the Montenegran
independence referendum would have a bearing on Serbia's
willingness to move forward on Kosovo. Wisner said he
thought Montenegro was not material, because Serbia had
already accepted the fact that Montenegro was going away.
Mayr-Harting agreed, commenting that a pro-independence vote
between 50 and 55 percent (the latter being the agreed
threshhold for winning) would complicate matters.
13. (C) On religious institutions, Wisner noted that there
was an appropriate focus on monasteries, but there was a
continuing question of whether they came under national or
church sovereignty. Wisner said Belgrade had barred the
Serbian Orthodox Church from engaging directly on the issue,
preventing practical discussions. Mayr-Harting said Austria
had brought the communities together in conferences over the
past several years.
--------------
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Mayr-Harting understood and agreed with Wisner's
VIENNA 00001173 003 OF 003
description of the core of the problem with Belgrade, and of
the reasons for it. However, he would not offer a suggestion
on how to address it. Mayr-Harting's suggestion that
Chancellor Schuessel engage with PM Kostunica reflects an
Austrian faith in the power of personal diplomacy to win
practical agreement on sticky issues. However, the Austrian
approach would depend on a Serbian assessment that an EU
future is Serbia's primary interest, and that a pragmatic
resolution of Kosovo status will make Serbia's EU future
possible.
McCaw