UN: OIOS ISSUES REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000893

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KUNR PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: UN: OIOS ISSUES REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE
MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS


1. Summary. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/296
in which the Assembly requested the Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive
management audit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO),OIOS issued a summary report (A/60/717) of its seven
separate audit reports of the department. The audit covered
the areas of procurement, financial management and budgeting,
human resources management, information and communication
technology, mission planning, substantive operations, and
best practices. In general, the OIOS concluded that while
efforts have been made to improve the management of
peacekeeping operations in recent years, the changes have
been outpaced by the challenges the UN faces in its field
operations. DPKO needs to strengthen its internal controls
and enforce accountability. It also needs to bolster the
standards of ethical behavior to reverse the current
prevailing culture of impunity in the department. OIOS
highlighted a number of actions that could be taken to
strengthen the management of peacekeeping, including:
reorganization of the budget process to reduce duplication;
adequate monitoring by headquarters of recruitment authority
delegated to the field; strengthened mission planning and
strategic guidance; improved coordination between DPKO and
other relevant UN actors; greater implementation of best
practices and lessons learned. OIOS made a total of 158
recommendations, of which 105 were considered to be critical.
The Department of Management (DM),Department of Safety and
Security (DSS) and DPKO accepted 133 of the recommendations,
most of which were being implemented. The Fifth Committee is
expected to consider and to take note of the report during
its second resumed session this spring. A summary of key
findings is outlined below. End summary.

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Procurement
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2. OIOS highlighted the lack of adequate internal controls
and enforcement of existing controls as a an underlying cause
of an environment ripe for fraud and abuse in procurement.
OIOS found substantial evidence that senior management was
negligent in applying existing controls and in calling for
greater controls where necessary. This resulted in, among
other things, a pattern of violations of the Financial Rules
and Regulations of the UN.


3. In many cases, OIOS found that budgeting for mission
requirements was not based on realistic assumptions and, as a
result, in some cases there were significant financial losses
to the UN. A handful of case studies were highlighted,
pointing to overestimation of commodity requirements in two
missions, at a cost of $53 million and $31 million
respectively. OIOS also determined that greater efforts
should be made to rationalize the holdings of spare parts,
and that the use of air transport for contingents and
equipment (which is seven times the cost of sea transport)
should only be used when no other means of timely transport
is available.


4. Among other things, the audit highlighted the general lack
of basic procurement concepts by some field-based procurement
staff, and OIOS noted that due to incomplete records
management, the auditors were unable to determine whether
staff had the prerequisite qualifications prior to being
hired. OIOS pointed to the imbalance between the number of
procurement staff at headquarters and in the field vis-a-vis
the percentage of procurement activities for which they were
responsible. While headquarters is responsible for handling
more than half of all procurement, the number of procurement
staff at Headquarters is only a fraction of the total
procurement staff employed in the field.

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Financial management and budgeting
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5. OIOS' review of the budget process found that it was
lengthy, cumbersome, and with field missions, DPKO and DM
each reviewing peacekeeping budgets, it was often
duplicative. As a result, there was little flexibility
within the current budget process to provide a flexible
approach in response to changing mandates. OIOS also found
that there was a general disconnect between the cost centers
to which funds were allocated and managers who were delegated
authority to implement the budget. As a result, there was
little practical accountability for budget management and
implementation. OIOS further found a general disconnect
between strategic mission planning and the use of the
results-based-budgeting framework.

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Human Resources Management



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6. Although the GA has in recent years reiterated the central
authority of the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM)
in the monitoring and approval of the recruitment and
placement of staff, OIOS found that the delegation of
authority to DPKO for recruitment of mission personnel had
resulted in OHRM relinquishing authority for its oversight
function. In addition, rather than recruiting from missions
-- which are closest to the work required to be performed --
recruitment by DPKO has been conducted largely from
headquarters. This practice runs contrary to the intent of
delegation of authority, which was to provide greater
opportunity for missions to recruit the necessary personnel
for operations. As such, OIOS believes that a review of the
delegation of authority should be reviewed to assess whether
the delegation should remain with DPKO.


7. Concerning recruitment and placement, OIOS noted that
despite an average vacancy rate of 23 per cent in field
missions (as at 31 May 2005),no mechanism was in place to
address the problem of vacancies and to reduce the overall
level. OIOS also found that the recruitment process suffered
from a general lack of transparency and pointed to a number
of cases in which recommended candidates were appointed
without a vacancy announcement process. Such lack of
competition meant that there was no assurance that the best
candidates were selected. OIOS further pointed to the need
for increased training and staff development of personnel.

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Information and communication technology
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8. OIOS' audit of the ICT function in DPKO concluded that its
present placement -- as a subset of the Office of Mission
Support -- was an impediment to its role in advocating the
ICT agenda at the highest level. Furthermore, without a more
central organizational placement within DPKO, the
Communications and Information Technology Service (CITS)
could not effectively ensure the unification of effort and
effectively delivery of service throughout DPKO.


9. OIOS found that although there was a draft information
management strategy within DPKO (due to be finalized by June
2006),it did not specify specific and measurable outcomes,
responsible parties, and indicators of achievement. OIOS
also commented on the proliferation of information systems
and their general lack of integration. There are at least 5
different systems used by DPKO, none of which are linked by
common interfaces and/or databases. There was also no
function within CITS to provide for IT security or backup in
the event of disruption to the system. Finally, OIOS
commented that the maintenance IT assets in missions should
be more rigorously managed to ensure that new IT assets were
utilized upon their procurement and not left unused.

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Mission planning
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10. OIOS noted that although DPKO had developed a mission
planning process handbook, there was minimal consultation
with key UN partners in its preparation and, in general, DPKO
leadership appeared to be reluctant to consult and/or
collaborate with key partners on an integrated approach to
peacekeeping. Both OIOS and DPKO acknowledged that the
absence of dedicated mission planning cells and involvement
of senior leadership at the planning stage had a negative
effect on the overall ability of the department to develop
coherent strategies for mandate implementation, resource
identification and budget formulation.

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Substantive operations
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11. OIOS' audit covered the substantive areas of electoral
assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
(DDR); demining operations; and human rights, the rule of law
and protection of civilians. In electoral assistance, OIOS
found that greater collaboration with and directive from the
Department of Political Affairs' Electoral Assistance
Division was required, as were greater security measures for
electoral assistance personnel in the field. With respect to
DDR, OIOS concluded that under the current staffing
complement there is limited capacity for DPKO to effectively
monitor the implementation of DDR activities in missions.


12. OIOS found that DPKO had not made any provisions with
troop contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure that
contingents charged with demining were doing so in compliance



with the International Mine Action Standards, and that
efforts should be made to formalize this arrangement in
memoranda of understanding with TCCs. Finally, OIOS
concluded that oversight and accountability for human rights
and rule of law programs was generally weak and substantive
guidance from headquarters on these issues was lacking.

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Best practices
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13. OIOS concluded from its review that best practices were
not regularly categorized and disseminated based on lessons
learned, and that more effort was required to ensure that
positive and negative lessons learned are comprehensively
shared with field missions so that they may benefit in a
timely manner. OIOS also highlighted overlap in the area of
knowledge management between the Best Practices Section and
DPKO's office of Change Management, and recommended that
their respective roles be clarified.

BOLTON