Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK889
2006-04-28 19:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC/SUDAN: CONGO FEELS NO SENSE OF URGENCY ON

Tags:  CD NI PGOV PREL SU UNSC ZF KPKO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281901Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8864
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0615
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0339
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0827
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1066
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0642
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0237
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0819
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0163
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0613
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0815
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8780
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0934
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000889 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: CD NI PGOV PREL SU UNSC ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: CONGO FEELS NO SENSE OF URGENCY ON
DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00734

USUN NEW Y 00000889 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000889

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: CD NI PGOV PREL SU UNSC ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: CONGO FEELS NO SENSE OF URGENCY ON
DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00734

USUN NEW Y 00000889 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. April 26 United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) consultations witnessed a veritable face-off
on Darfur. In one corner was Congolese Permanent
Representative (PR) and representative of the African Union
(AU) Chairmanship Ikouebe, who, under obvious pressure from
Paris and Khartoum, told Members that while he was sensitive
to the situation in Darfur, there were other equally pressing
concerns in Africa, namely Cote D'Ivoire. Ikouebe made a bid
for a troop increase to the UN peacekeeping mission there and
declared that the Council should wait on planning for a UN
mission to Darfur. In the other corner was Ghanaian PR
Effah-Apenteng, who began a call echoed by the majority of
other Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's
opposition to a UN presence in Darfur and for the UN to
proceed with its contingency planning. Ambassador Bolton
stressed that the negative signal from the Government of
National Unity (GNU) could not be underestimated, especially
as it was impeding attempts to protect the population of
Darfur.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTD. This polarization of views
revealed not only the reach of Khartoum's influence, but also
the breadth of France's position with regard to Sudan, as
well as the AU's susceptibility to external pressures.
Secretary-General (SYG) Annan, Department of Peacekeeping

SIPDIS
Operations (DPKO) Under-SYG Guehenno and DPKO Assistant-SYG
Annabi all described the continuation of Darfur violence and
the GNU's obstructionism, in the face of which the UN was
persisting in its efforts to get an 'indispensable'
assessment team on the ground so that a formal Council
decision could be made on getting UN forces into Darfur. The
effort to secure this sequencing could be irreparably harmed
by vacillation by the country at the helm of the AU and that

country's effectively joining the ranks of Council spoilers
to the process. It may be necessary for other parties to
assume the mantle of leadership in place of Congo in the UNSC
setting; both Ghana and Tanzania have demonstrated a
readiness to do just that. Similarly, we have only just
begun to see the obstruction to come from France on AMIS
transition, especially as the realities of potential price
tags and force levels (and their impact on competing French
priority issues) come to pass. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

UN STILL ENGAGED ON AMIS TRANSITION . . .
--------------

3. (SBU) SYG Annan, DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and DPKO A/SYG Annabi
were all on hand for April 26 UNSC consultations to update on
the status of contingency planning, as mandated by OP 4 of
UNSCR 1663 (2006). Annabi reported there had been no
improvement in Darfur security and that escalating violence,
banditry and militia movements were resulting in large-scale
displacements and worsening humanitarian consequences. He
acknowledged the complicating factor of Chad in undermining
efforts to end the Darfur crisis and urged Members to push
N'djamena and Khartoum to implement the Tripoli Agreement.
On the Abuja Talks, Annabi reported a 'measure of progress,'
with a complete package delivered to the parties April 25 for
an envisaged April 30 adoption. U/SYG Guehenno spoke to the
need for the UN to increase its engagement in Abuja, since
the package would likely include provisions for AMIS
transition (NOTE. At first reading, the proposed Abuja
Agreement makes mention only of strengthening AMIS, not of
re-hatting it. END NOTE).


4. (SBU) Guehenno and Annabi addressed continued GNU
opposition to the UN's technical assessment mission, which
both called 'indispensable' to the Secretariat's ability to
make recommendations to the Council for its determination of

USUN NEW Y 00000889 002.2 OF 003


a mandate for the eventual Darfur force. SYG Annan added
that AU forces on the ground were not a substitute for the
work the UN needed to do there, but he acceded that the
mission could be a joint AU-UN undertaking. Despite Annabi's
assurances during his visit to Sudan that the GNU would be
involved every step of the way on transition contingency
planning, President Bashir had declared that neither the GNU
nor the Parliament could agree to such preparation or to the
planned assessment mission, suggesting instead that once an
Abuja agreement was reached, planning could proceed, per the
Naivasha Agreement model.


5. (SBU) DPKO's planning was proceeding regardless, according
to Annabi, based on the principles of establishing lasting
peace and stability and of protecting civilians. He outlined
(per reftel) the two broad options DPKO had developed, noting
that the ultimate scale of the operation would be determined
by the degree of parties' compliance with any Abuja
agreement. In the absence of an agreement, Annabi warned, an
organization other than the UN (the SYG suggested an
unspecified 'multinational force') would have to assume
responsibility for Darfur. Annabi concluded by repeating the
need for an assessment team to fine-tune the work DPKO had
done so far.

. . . BUT CONGO EVIDENTLY ISN'T
--------------

6. (C) Congolese PR Ikouebe began his intervention by noting
Khartoum's reluctance toward AMIS transition and stressing it
was up to Africans to obtain GNU consent, calling upon the AU
to support its March 10 communique. Ikouebe's tone changed
as he discussed the importance of reaching an April 30 Abuja
agreement, insisting that with only four days to the
deadline, the Council needed to stop sending 'mixed messages'
which might be misconstrued by the GNU. Ikouebe said the
Council should wait a week to assess Abuja results;
otherwise, 'we will be faced with a war.' In an obviously
pre-cooked collaborative statement with France, he compared
the Darfur situation with Cote D'Ivoire, making a bid for a
troop increase to UNOCI and calling for the Council to hold
off on planning for a UN Darfur mission. Qatari PR Al-Nasser
cited Ikouebe's statement when voicing his own delegation's
stance that DPKO planning had reached its limits and that to
proceed further now would be at the expense of Abuja
agreement.


7. (C) French PR de La Sabliere - after obligatory remarks
about the 'indispensability' of an Abuja agreement with a
credible ceasefire, the need to strengthen AMIS and the
'disturbing' reluctance displayed by the GNU - made clear his
delegation's priorities with respect to a UN Darfur mission.
He wanted to know how such a mission would address the
situation with Chad and demanded a financial evaluation of
DPKO's options, which he predicted would result in a doubling
of expenditures. With Congo's statement as cover, de La
Sabliere echoed Ikouebe's sentiments on Cote D'Ivoire and
mentioned the draft resolution his delegation had just tabled
in that regard.

GHANA RALLIES SUPPORT FOR DIVINING CAUSES OF GNU OPPOSITION
-------------- --------------

8. (C) In contrast to the Congolese statement, Ghanaian PR
Effah-Apenteng began a call echoed by the majority of other
Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's opposition
to a UN presence in Darfur and stressed the need for the UN
to proceed with its contingency planning. He stressed that
the Council should focus on 'making the Government of Sudan
cooperative,' and he recommended using the AU and the Arab
League to accomplish this task. Russian DPR Dolgov endorsed
the suggestion for Arab League involvement and expressed hope
that the GNU position would change, particularly regarding
the assessment team.

USUN NEW Y 00000889 003.2 OF 003




9. (C) Ambassador Bolton shared Effah-Apenteng's sentiments,
drawing a direct correlation between the GNU's reaction to
DPKO's efforts to secure entry for the assessment team with
the escalation of Darfur violence. SYG Annan agreed that the
GNU had not lived up to its responsibility to protect its
people, a point he said he had tried repeatedly to make in
letters to President Bashir and in his requests for
interventions with Khartoum by African and Arab League
leaders, including Egyptian President Mubarak. Annan was
hopeful Khartoum would change its tune after April 30 and
demonstrate its 'good faith' in the event of an Abuja
agreement.


10. (C) Peruvian PR de Rivero was even more explicit about
the GNU's attitude, stating that its obstructionism was
nothing new, given its 'disdain' for the UN and humanitarian
organizations. He urged the Council to enlist the assistance
of African leaders in selling the GNU on AMIS transition,
which, in his opinion, should not be conditioned on prolonged
Abuja discussions. UK PR Jones Parry insisted that DPKO
maximize its contingency planning but noted that in the
absence of a successful Abuja outcome and GNU consent, the
Council 'faces a stark choice,' given the GNU's failure to
exercise its responsibility to protect its population.


11. (C) Japan joined the call for immediately dispatching the
assessment team and questioned whether the GNU's 'mistrust'
of the UN was a genuine concern or merely a pretext. The
Japanese DPR asked about any UN public relations strategy to
counter this problem; the SYG said such an effort would not
be effective, given the centralized nature of the Khartoum
regime. Argentine PR Mayoral recommended the Council send
unequivocal messages to Khartoum that the incoming UN force
would not be a 'crusade' and that the UN would not abandon
the Darfur civilian population. Slovakian PR Burian asked
about a rumored visit by Sudanese FM Lam Akol, which the SYG
said had not yet been scheduled.


12. (C) Tanzanian DPR Manongi warned that if Abuja failed to
restore peace in Darfur, the Council should be ready to
respond, making a UN role all the more critical and AMIS
transition planning all the more urgent. Manongi suggested
the Council issue a strong statement on the necessity of GNU
cooperation and the urgency of its acceptance of the UN
assessment team. The Congolese PR declared he did not share
the Council's concept of urgency and would not associate his
delegation with any initiative that was 'hasty' or that
risked angering the GNU. Similarly, Chinese PR and SC
President Wang advised that open pressure on the GNU would
not succeed; to deal effectively with Khartoum, Members must
make the GNU feel 'equal' to the Council and not portray it
as 'the bad guy.'

NEXT STEPS
--------------

13. (SBU) We are still awaiting release of the SYG Report on
Sudan, originally due April 24 but delayed at least until
early May as a result of Khartoum's refusal to grant access
to the assessment team. According to the draft calendar for
May (when Congo will hold the UNSC Presidency),Sudan
consultations will be May 5; SRSG Pronk will be in New York
and is likely to brief.
BOLTON