Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK882
2006-04-27 17:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR WISNER DISCUSSES KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNSC YI UNMIK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0882/01 1171730
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271730Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8852
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0094
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0998
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0843
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0936
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0424
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0529
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000882 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

VIENNA FOR JEFF HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER DISCUSSES KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS
WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNAN

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000882

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

VIENNA FOR JEFF HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER DISCUSSES KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS
WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNAN


1. (SBU) Summary: In an April 25 meeting in the office of UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Secretary's Special

SIPDIS
Representative for the Kosovo Final Status Talks Ambassador
Frank Wisner communicated current U.S thinking on the road
ahead for Kosovo in 2006 and solicited the
Secretary-General's views. Wisner brought the

SIPDIS
Secretary-General up to date on his recent trip to Europe and

SIPDIS
reviewed current U.S. thinking on a final UNSC resolution.
Ambassador Wisner offered the Secretary-General full U.S.
support for Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his team and
argued for the importance of bringing the Kosovar Albanians
along on reconciliation and preventing European partners from
losing necessary resolve. Secretary-General Annan expressed
strong agreement with U.S. thinking and evinced a clear
understanding of where the Future Status Process was headed
and the obstacles likely to be erected by Belgrade and
Moscow. The Secretary-General also agreed that a "no-UN-seat
option" for an independent Kosovo would be unworkable and
concurred that it would be important to have the support of
Kosovo's neighbors in the region. End Summary.

Ambassador Wisner Reviews European Trip: Expect Strong Serb
Opposition


2. (SBU) Noting that he had met with Under Secretary Burns
the previous day and had just spoken with Martti Ahtisaari,
Wisner thanked Secretary-General Annan for the opportunity to
meet him again. Providing a brief readout of his recent
European trip, Wisner expressed concern that he had begun to
see "total Serb opposition to an independence outcome in
every way." Prime Minister Kostunica had stated his extreme
position twice now and President Tadic was falling into line.
If we looked at unreasonable positions Belgrade was staking
out, the goal appeared to be functionally carving out part of
Kosovo, not focusing sincerely on minority rights. Also
worrisome, Belgrade had begun to say it could not reach
conclusions on municipal rights until after it knew final
status.

Kosovo's New Leadership: Building a Strong Horse


3. (SBU) Ambassador Wisner appealed for a look inside of

Kosovo where there was "an extremely talented leadership
team." However, President Sejdiu did not have the moral
authority of Rugova and Prime Minister Ceku, despite his
numerous strengths, lacked a domestic political constituency.
Ambassador Wisner noted there was reason to suspect that
former Prime Minister Harradinaj does not want Ceku to
"become too comfortable in his chair." He noted that
Albanian leaders, including Prime Minister Berisha, talked
the most about "possible threats" and wanted to work to
strengthen Ceku. Wisner noted that he and Under Secretary
Burns had discussed inviting Sejdiu and Ceku to Washington
this summer. The Secretary-General asked Ambassador Wisner
whether that would not solicit a strong reaction from
Belgrade. Ambassador Wisner responded that this was
inevitable to some degree, but, it was "important to build a
strong horse so it could finish the race."

Timeline For Status Process in 2006 and UN Strategy


4. (SBU) Wisner stressed clearly to Secretary-General Annan
that the U.S. believed the status process needed to be
completed in 2006 and would "not linger into 2007." Wisner
explained that a conceptual timeline for the rest of the
status process would leave it concluding on UN turf by the
end of the year. Ahtisaari would likely produce a report
focusing on decentralization, minority rights and protection
of religious sites that the UNSC would approve, making it "a
chapeau under which Kosovo could become independent."
However, one question to be addressed was precedent for the
UN disassembling a legally sovereign nation. It would be
necessary to study whether there was anything useful in past
cases such as East Timor. The Secretary-General agreed the
question was an important one and promised to have his staff
research it, but, said his initial thinking was that neither
East Timor nor Ethiopia/Eritrea were applicable cases. "East
Timor and Ethiopia/Eritrea both involved referenda, whereas
Kosovo will essentially involve the international community
acting by fiat," explained the Secretary-General.




5. (SBU) Wisner noted that Germany had circulated at a
recent Contact Group meeting the idea of accepting
independence for Kosovo while denying it a UN seat. Wisner
said he had told FM Bakoyannis in Athens that that was an
extremely poor idea, saying Under Secretary Burns shared
fully his sentiments. Wisner also noted that FM Draskovic
had argued the idea as a gambit in Belgrade, but,
encountering opposition, dropped it as quickly as he had
raised it. "I do not think placating Belgrade on this point
will buy us anything," explained Wisner. The
Secretary-General agreed fully, saying a sovereign and

SIPDIS
independent Kosovo that lacked a UN seat would be "wholly
unworkable."


6. (SBU) Wisner noted Ahtisaari would have the difficult job
of taking positions to Belgrade and Pristina to show he has
gone the extra mile and bringing them back and would then sit
down with the Contact Group probably in June to discuss the
ultimate questions. Through the summer and into the fall it
would be necessary to make a decision and then to implement
it in the final months of the year, explained Wisner.
Secretary-General Annan responded that he hoped by then there

SIPDIS
would be significant progress on decentralization, minority
rights and protection of religious sites that would put the
Kosovar Albanians "in the right light and avoid playing into
the hands of Belgrade." Wisner agreed, emphasizing that we
had stressed to the Kosovar Albanians that they ought to be
highly magnanimous even outside of the constraints of the
Future Status Process. He noted that Bishop Theodosia's
invitation to President Sejdiu to Easter Mass in Decani had
played out very well.

Countries in the Region


7. (SBU) Turning to the subject of neighbors in the region,
Wisner explained that some were complaining the future status
process was moving too fast. The Secretary-General asked
whether that meant Russia and Wisner explained that it did,
but, messages were also coming from capitals closer in
proximity to Kosovo. In Athens, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis
had stressed strongly that the status process at the current
time was "too fast, too bold and too ambitious." The
Secretary-General noted neighboring countries including

SIPDIS
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece would surely have
concerns. Wisner concurred, adding that Slovakia was
conveying concerns as well. The USG had recently demarched
European capitals and there had been no voices completely
opposing independence, but, a majority had cautioned against
moving too quickly and favored finding a fig leaf for
Belgrade. The Secretary-General stated that he thought it
would be important for the U.S. to support these countries
and carry them along. Wisner agreed, noting he had also
discussed with Under Secretary Burns the need to make sure
that Moscow saw no rift between Washington, London and Paris.
Wisner noted that China seemed convinced that Kosovo was a
special case, but, it was not yet clear whether this argument
would work with Russia. Wisner explained that he would make
ample free time to be part of the discussion on the final
UNSC resolution and had also told Ahtisaari that he was
prepared to assist him in upcoming shuttle diplomacy.


8. (SBU) Secretary-General Annan said he believed "the
outcome of the referendum in Montenegro would also have
impact." Wisner suggested that in recent conversations in
Belgrade President Tadic and young intellectuals had behaved
as if Montenegro was already over in their minds and were
treating it like it was "a matter of the good kids and bad
kids in the same family." To Belgrade's thinking, it might
not be so significant, he stated.

UNMIK Should Finish Strongly


9. (SBU) As the meeting drew to a close, Wisner raised with
the Secretary-General the U.S. belief in the importance of
the Kosovo process ending with "a gold star on the UN's blue
flag." "It is important that we think about how UNMIK should
operate in its final phase and ensure it has energy right
until the end and then a smooth hand off," stated Ambassador
Wisner. He also asked whether SRSG Jessen-Petersen's


successor would be the first Euro super Ambassador and last
SRSG or whether his term would be a short one. The
Secretary-General agreed that this was an important question

SIPDIS
to reflect on and offered that he recalled having brought in
a double-hatted deputy as the UN mission in Bosnia was
winding down, which might serve as a good model for Kosovo.
On this point, too, the Secretary-General would task his
staff with research.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Wisner.

BOLTON