AMBASSADOR BOLTON PROPOSES TO JUMP START SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000794

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BOLTON PROPOSES TO JUMP START SECURITY
COUNCIL ACTION ON WESTERN SAHARA

REF: STATE 48549

Classified By: Amb. John Bolton. E.O. 12958. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary. The conflict in Western Sahara remains at a
stalemate. From my perspective in New York, a fresh approach
to Security Council action on MINURSO's mandate is one
available option if we seek to accelerate Moroccan action on
autonomy for the Western Sahara. If such an approach fails
to win the support of other members of the Security Council,
I recommend hosting direct talks between Morocco and the
Polisario in New York. Absent these initiatives, Polisario
frustration is likely to compound unhelpfully. The stasis in
the Security Council after more than 15 years of engagement
in this issue contributes to an erosion of Council
effectiveness. End Summary.

Whither Morocco's Autonomy Proposal?
--------------


2. (C) Prior to the decision by the Security Council in
October 2005 to extend the MINURSO mandate for another six
months, the Moroccan government indicated that it would draft
an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara and share it with the
Security Council prior to April 2006, when the Council was
scheduled to again consider extension of the MINURSO mandate.
In March 2006, the Moroccan government sent a delegation to
Washington to inform U.S. officials that Rabat had indeed
prepared a draft autonomy plan for Western Sahara, but
asserted that it would require an additional six to nine
months for "consultations" within Morocco before a finalized
plan could be presented to the Council. In addition, the
Moroccans told U.S. officials that we should be prepared for
up to two additional six-month renewals of MINURSO before the
presentation of the plan (reftel). In recent days, Moroccan
officials in New York have been repeating the same message to
Security Council delegations at the UN, asserting that up to
one year may be required to complete its internal
consultations. I understand King Mohammed VI sent a letter
to the President conveying the same "consultations" argument.


3. (C) It appears the Moroccans are resorting to their
time-honored tactic of stalling for time and relying on a
risk-averse Security Council to renew MINURSO's mandate
routinely on the grounds that failure to do so might cause an
outbreak of violence in the region. The other parties in the
region -- the Polisario and Algeria -- have already denounced
the Moroccan autonomy plan, even though it has not been
rolled out, based on their assumption that any plan drafted
by Morocco would exclude any option allowing for
"self-determination." As Special Envoy van Walsum has
indicated to the Council, no progress is possible on the
status of the Western Sahara until parties engage with each
other. Routine renewal of MINURSO's mandate -- first
established more than 15 years ago -- will do nothing to
generate movement toward such engagement.


4. (C) I believe that acknowledging Morocco's announcement
that it needs an additional six to twelve months for
"consultations" would constitute USG acquiescence to their
effort to put off submission of an autonomy plan without
condition and indefinitely. I judge the Moroccan effort to
perpetuate the status quo, which is heavily in their favor,
through inaction to be ill-advised. Moreover it is an effort
unlikely to work. The so-called Western Sahrawi intifada,
begun in October 2005, has succeeded in drawing international
attention to the issue of human rights in the Western Sahara.
Moroccan stonewalling of international observer missions has
only compounded Sahrawi frustrations and increased their
determination for a hearing of their grievances.

Polisario Reaction
--------------


5. (C) The Polisario leadership traveled to New York the
first week of April to make its case to the Secretary-General
and to most members of the Security Council. They have
argued that they are nearing the end of their patience. They
say that they have observed the cease-fire; they have
accepted the Baker Plan, which Morocco subsequently rejected;
and have released the remaining Moroccan prisoners of war;
and yet there has been no progress toward a referendum. They
are angry with the Secretary-General, who has allowed his
Personal Envoy to suggest that the Baker Plan is dead and to
suggest that a Moroccan autonomy plan be the starting point
of any future negotiation. They are deeply disappointed that
the Security Council has not reaffirmed its commitment to the
Baker Plan and self-determination for the Sahrawi and has


done little to move the process forward.

New Approach to MINURSO Mandate Renewal
--------------


5. (C) In light of the above, I propose the following
alternative approach. I recommend we seek a resolution to
extend for a limited period the current mandate. The
resolution should include the following elements:

-- extend MINURSO's mandate for 90 days,

-- call on the Secretary-General to report to the Council on
the status of Morocco's plan for resolution of the status of
Western Sahara to the Council within that period,

-- call on the parties in the region to engage in direct
discussions on the future status of Western Sahara, and

-- call on the Secretary-General to report to the Council
prior to the end of the 90-day mandate on the prospects for
MINURSO carrying out its mandate to observe a referendum on
the final status of Western Sahara.

Direct Talks
--------------


6. (C) If the member states of the Security Council are
unable to agree to this approach as means of imposing a
solution, the next best alternative is to continue to
encourage dialogue between the parties. As Morocco has
publicly stated it will only negotiate with Algeria, and
given that Algeria continues to insist that only the
Polisario should negotiate with Morocco, then perhaps we need
to think about more creative ways of facilitating dialogue.
One way the parties might be brought together would be if I,
with the Department's authorization, were to offer to host at
USUN an unofficial meeting between Morocco and the Polisario.
I understand that when the subject of unofficial meetings
with the Polisario was raised with some Moroccan officials in
Washington, there was a positive response. Our soundings
here with the Polisario have thus far been met with silence
but not rejection. We should consider actively pursuing this
strategy.
BOLTON