UN: FIFTH COMMITTEE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SCALE OF

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000756

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA
SUBJECT: UN: FIFTH COMMITTEE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SCALE OF
ASSESSMENT RESOLUTION


1. Summary. Following weeks of discussion and then
negotiation on a draft resolution, the Fifth Committee had
agreed to all paragraphs except operative paragraph (OP) 5,
which included eight proposals to be forwarded to the
Committee on Contributions (CoC) for its consideration this
June. In the face of Russian and Chinese opposition to
forwarding elements in the draft which their delegations did
not agree with, the Committee became deadlocked over how to
send forward Member States' proposals to the CoC. After
numerous attempts by the coordinator and delegations to break
the impasse, Fifth Committee chairman Ashe announced on April
4 that no agreement could be reached on the resolution and
the item would be deferred to the 61st GA. End summary.


2. The Fifth Committee spent nearly two weeks negotiating a
draft resolution to forward eight methodology proposals from
individual or groups of Member States for the consideration
of the CoC (in addition to the existing methodology,

proposals were made by Saudi Arabia, US, EU, Japan, Mexico,
Caricom and Singapore, and a "like-minded group" of some G-77
delegations). Though the proposals were grouped together in
one paragraph (OP5),there were a number of additional
paragraphs in the resolution that were the subject of lengthy
negotiation in the committee (relating to the principle of
capacity to pay and requests for additional information from
the CoC). Following two weeks of debate, these paragraphs
were agreed to informally, leaving only OP5 to be agreed.
Most delegations had been working on the assumption that this
would automatically be agreed, however, this assumption was
soon challenged, and ultimately blocked, by Russia and China.


3. In both 1997 and 2000 the General Assembly could not
agree on one set of criteria to be sent to the CoC for
consideration, and opted instead to send forward all
proposals without prejudice to the deliberations by Member
States on the scale later in each respective year. It was
apparent to all delegations from the outset of the current
negotiations (which began in November 2005) that a similar
approach would have to be employed this year given the
divergent views among Member States on the various elements
of the scale methodology. As such, there was a working
assumption that Member States could table any proposal to be
forwarded to the CoC. The Committee would have an
opportunity to ask questions and seek clarifications from the
proponents and from the Secretariat on each proposal but,
ultimately, the proposals would not be negotiated at this
stage and would be sent forward to the CoC for information
only.


4. As the discussion evolved, two -- and later three --
options were tabled to address OP5. The first option was to
follow the existing practice of 1997 and 2000 by requesting
the CoC to present scales based on the eight proposals
enumerated in the draft resolution. There was broad
agreement by Member States to follow this precedent, with the
exception of Russia and China who refused to forward any of
the proposals in a resolution because they were not agreed to
by all Member States. (Comment: The position of Russia and
China was precipitated foremost by the inclusion of the
Japanese proposal of a P-5 floor rate, and to a certain
extent by the inclusion of the US proposal on purchasing
power parity. End comment.)


5. As the committee came close to agreement on all other
paragraphs in the resolution, India introduced six new
paragraphs that directly targeted the US proposal on PPP.
Immediately rejected by the US, EU, Japan and CANZ for being
judgmental in nature, the paragraphs nevertheless remained on
the table. To broker a compromise, the coordinator (Iran)
proposed 1) modification of the chapeau language to OP5 to
make clear that the proposals were submitted separately by
various Member States for information only and without
prejudice to the decision to be taken by the GA on the scale
in the 61st GA, and 2) deletion of the Indian paragraphs. In
the hours after the "compromise" was introduced, there seemed
to be growing momentum towards acceptance of this package.
The US, EU, CANZ, and Mexico all agreed, while Japan, India
and China indicated their willingness to "think it over" and
possibly proceed on the compromise as a way forward.


6. Two days later, on a Sunday afternoon, delegations
reconvened with the intent of finalizing the resolution by
Monday morning. However, this was prevented by the Russian
and Chinese proposal of new language. Their language -- to
replace OP5 in its entirety -- would result in the deletion
from the resolution of all proposals, and would allow for
proposals to be submitted bilaterally to the CoC by Member
States. It also stipulated that the CoC only had to consider
those proposals that were in accordance with the principle of
capacity to pay. The language created a role for the CoC
(which is a committee of only 18 members) to take decisions
on which proposals did and did not meet the principle of
capacity to pay. This judgement, however, is reserved for


Member States in their consideration of the methodology to be
used in calculating the scale of assessment and does not
constitute a part of the CoC's mandate. In short, the
Russia/China proposal represented a radical departure from
past practice and would set precedent for an entirely new
manner of interaction between Member States and the CoC.


7. Despite numerous questions on the proposal, and
suggestions on how to change it to make it acceptable, the
Russians would not depart from their original proposed
language. As such, the proposal was strongly opposed by
Japan, the US and EU, with Mexico and the Caricom Group
expressing their strong discomfort with the language. Egypt
and India, however, were prepared to work on the Russia/China
language. And so the gap in positions widened, making the
prospect of any agreement even more distant. In a last
attempt to bridge the divide, the US and Mexico proposed
amendments to the coordinator's "compromise" language to
explicitly take into account the concerns of Russia and China
that the eight proposals have not received the full support
of all Member States. This was immediately rejected by
Russia, and the negotiations ended. Following this deadlock,
and in light of the growing divide in the Committee, Chairman
Ashe announced to all delegations on April 4 that no
agreement could be reached on the resolution and the item
would be deferred to the 61st GA.


8. Without a resolution from the GA, the CoC will likely
continue to consider elements of the current methodology
(including the base period, low per capita income adjustment,
and debt burden adjustment). It does not have a mandate to
consider any of the eight proposals tabled by Member States
this March. Member States may write to the CoC and request
that it consider their proposals, however, as the CoC
operates by consensus it is highly unlikely that the
committee would agree to consider any/all of the proposals
forwarded by individual Member States. This is a practice
that has never before been used and would most likely create
gridlock in the CoC.


9. It is clear, however, that some or all of the eight
proposals (and maybe more) will be tabled by Member States
this fall. In preparation for this, the Secretariat has
already indicated that it will attempt to gather as much
pertinent information and data as possible.
BOLTON