Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK734
2006-04-05 23:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC/SUDAN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION ON DARFUR

Tags:  PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3660
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0734/01 0952346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 052346Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8626
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0317
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0771
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1014
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0632
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0183
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0144
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0590
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0797
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0882
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000734 

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION ON DARFUR

USUN NEW Y 00000734 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000734

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION ON DARFUR

USUN NEW Y 00000734 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Progress toward transition of
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations
operation is stalled due to a stonewalling and recalcitrant
Government of National Unity (GNU) in Sudan and a passive
African Union (AU). While everyone at the UN talks about
engaging Khartoum in the transition process, no one seems
willing to do anything about it. The Council is as divided
as ever on the issue of Sudan, with Khartoum apologists
Qatar, Russia and China arguing for a
do-nothing-until-the-GNU-is-onboard approach. Recently
others, including Japan and Greece, while not intervening
explicitly on behalf of the GNU, seem content to move at a
slow pace. Even AU Council Members Tanzania, Congo and Ghana
seem hesitant to move forward against the wishes of the GNU.
The UN Secretariat exhibits a similar aversion to moving
ahead. On the military planning side, Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) continues to do what it can in
New York but stresses that further planning progress depends
on getting its 40-person assessment team on the ground in
Darfur. However, as of April 4, there has been no movement
within the Secretariat to request visas for the team. The
Secretariat is both convinced and afraid of a GNU refusal.

SIPDIS
USUN intervened repeatedly at both working- and
Ambassadorial-level to jump-start this process, but so far
without result. An ideal opportunity would have been a phone
call to Sudanese President el-Bashir by Secretary-General
(SYG) Annan and AU Commission Chairperson Konare during their
March 31 meeting, but Annan and Konare ultimately opted not
to do so. If we want progress in Darfur, we must step up
efforts to create a political environment within which the
Council and the Secretariat can move forward. END SUMMARY
AND COMMENT.

DPKO BLAMES ITS VISA STALLING ON DEADLOCKED POLITICAL PROCESS
-------------- --------------

2. (C) As of April 4, there has been no movement by DPKO to

request visas for the 40-person assessment team it plans to
dispatch in the near future to Darfur. Ambassador Wolff
spoke with senior Secretariat staff March 31 on the need for
DPKO to move more aggressively on visas for the mission.
DPKO A/SYG Annabi reported that the situation with the GNU
had deteriorated to such a point that Special Representative
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Pronk was predicting the team
would not be allowed to function even if it secured visas.
SYG Annan's Chief of Staff Mark Malloch Brown agreed with
Ambassador Wolff's point that the UN had to be more assertive
and vowed to address the matter personally. DPKO had looked
to a March 31 meeting between SYG Annan and AU Commission
Chairperson Konare as a 'litmus test' for how the UN and AU
planned to jointly approach the GNU about visas for the
assessment team. Originally Annan had plans for a joint
phone call with Konare to President el-Bashir, but according
to DPKO, Konare needed further convincing before he would
agree to reach out to the GNU. According to DPKO A/SYG
Annabi in April 4 consultations, Konare refused to
acknowledge an eventual UN transition at all in his meeting
with Annan. Instead, Konare presented three 'scenarios' for
addressing the Darfur crisis: first, a joint UN-AU operation;
second, an 'AMIS-plus' scenario; and, as a distant third,
transition to a UN operation. Annabi thus urged increased
engagement with the AU toward a united position on
transition. To this end, a high-level DPKO delegation, to be
headed either by U/SYG Guehenno or A/SYG Annabi, will travel
to Addis Ababa the week of April 10; among issues to be
discussed is the planned assessment mission to Darfur.
However, according to DPKO, the UN must not be alone in its
outreach efforts; the international community and the
Security Council needed to ramp up their own parallel efforts
to engage Khartoum.


3. (C) DPKO acknowledged a 'hardening' of the positions of
el-Bashir and Vice President Taha against a UN operation in
Darfur, which was manifesting itself in Khartoum's repeated
rejections of all UN overtures to enlist its cooperation in
transition planning. Annabi reported that el-Bashir and FM

USUN NEW Y 00000734 002.2 OF 003


Lam Akol told SRSG Pronk and Department of Political Affairs
U/SYG Gambari that they were not convinced AMIS should
transition at all and expressed concern that any contingency
planning for such a transition was taking place. Lam will
reportedly come to New York this month to discuss transition
issues. When pressed in April 4 Security Council
consultations by Ambassador Sanders for specifics on any
official requests DPKO had made to the GNU for visas, Annabi
cited Khartoum's 'rejectionist' posture as evidenced by its
refusal to grant OCHA U/SYG Egeland entry to Sudan and then
grudgingly admitted DPKO had not yet approached the GNU with
a request. DPKO told USUN privately that even without having
made a formal visa request, 'of course we have received a no'
from the GNU, based on its rhetoric and actions to date.
DPKO is quick to throw the ball not in Khartoum's court but
rather in that of the Council 'heavies' (U.S., UK) who it
views as positioning the UN in the middle of their tug-of-war
with the GNU and the AU (NOTE. Despite this characterization
by DPKO, the UK does not seem to share our sense of urgency
on the need for DPKO to make a visa request. In fact, UK
PermRep Jones Parry called Ambassador Wolff to complain about
our insistent stance with DPKO on this issue. END NOTE).
Visible contingency planning, DPKO argues, is not a
substitute for the 'quiet diplomacy' that needs to be done to
secure GNU acceptance of AMIS transition.


4. (C) Despite the progress it has made in its planning, DPKO
admits that the operational feasibility of these plans cannot
be determined until completion of an assessment mission to
Darfur. DPKO convened an April 3 internal meeting to discuss
the assessment team's composition; 12 UK nationals were
reportedly part of the original roster, but DPKO was leery of
the Sudanese perception of this group. DPKO briefed P-3
political and military experts on April 4 on the status of
its planning, noting the information on force size was still
close-hold. Its main planning was based on a scenario that
assumed partial compliance by Darfur parties to a ceasefire,
resulting in two sub-options. The first, and more likely,
sub-option assumes a lower level of compliance, under which
the force would be in the framework of infantry battalions
and would possess both a mobile reconnaissance capability and
an active liaison element. Its regional headquarters would
be based in el-Fasher, with sector headquarters in Nyala,
Geneina and el-Fasher; it would include three battalion areas
in the north Darfur sector, and four each in the west and
south Darfur sectors, largely oriented on areas of highest
rebel activity. DPKO Force strength projections for this
scenario are approximately 12,500-13,000 maximum. The second
sub-option supposes a higher level of compliance, which would
require lower force levels and more liaison activity. Both
sub-options would presume an 'agile, capable and credible'
force. Sudan-wide DPKO envisions one overall UN Mission
under one SRSG and one force commander. Darfur would be one
division-sized element, and the existing UNMIS would be a
separate division-sized element.

DPKO'S FRUSTRATION EXTENDS TO NATO ASSISTANCE
--------------

5. (C) A working-level DPKO contact was very defensive about
what the SYG's actual request had been in his March 27 call
to NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer. DPKO Poloff portrayed it as
the SYG's having asked a general question about NATO's
capacity/willingness to provide assistance to AMIS, with de
Hoop Scheffer then making a subsequent request to the NAC for
enablers. DPKO Poloff noted that DPKO senior levels
acknowledged the value added of NATO involvement in the
transition process, but was quick to claim ownership, at
least of the planned assessment mission, saying that there
would be no value added by NATO participation, that DPKO
would need NATO's assistance only before and after the
assessment and that it was important for DPKO to be able to
conduct the mission with the UN's own machinery.


6. (C) Based on this conversation, it is fair to assert that
DPKO - at least at the working level - is wary of NATO's
stepping on its toes in contingency planning. There has been
much of what DPKO considers 'micromanaging' going on lately:

USUN NEW Y 00000734 003.2 OF 003


our checking up on the status of the assessment mission,
pressure to make a request for GNU permission for the
assessment team to enter Sudan, directives from the UN's 38th
floor to 'just give us a plan,' now what it sees as NATO
'oversight' - all of which make UN/NATO cooperation a
particularly sensitive matter. In USUN's view, it might be
more palatable for the UN in this case if there were a way
for NATO to engage in concert with other AMIS partners for
any planned assistance (i.e. a less visible effort).

DPKO NEXT STEPS AND POSSIBLE COUNCIL FOLLOW-UP
-------------- -

7. (C) On future contingency planning, DPKO is considering
reconfigurement plans for sector deployment, with a goal of
maintaining at least half of existing AMIS forces so as not
to deplete the Mission's institutional knowledge. DPKO is
also looking at an envisaged UN-led training plan to take
place in Nairobi and to result in a MAPEX. DPKO sought U.S.
expertise in charting measures of effectiveness as the UN
operation progresses. Despite its own planned way forward,
DPKO insists that political work must be done to correct the
'negative atmosphere' in Khartoum regarding AMIS transition
and to dispel any persisting 'misunderstandings' about the
goal of transition. As Annabi acknowledged in consultations,
the Darfur crisis will have a spill-over effect on personnel
throughout Sudan, noting that UNMIS staff in Khartoum had
already suffered at the hands of the GNU.


8. (C) The Council is more divided than ever on the issue of
Sudan, and the GNU's latest affronts to Egeland and to the
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) only highlight Khartoum's
resentment of the international attention focused on Darfur.
In consultations, the Council broke down among its typical
party lines: we and the UK insisted on maximizing pressure on
the GNU to move the process forward and led an unsuccessful
bid for Chinese PermRep and SC President Wang to deliver a
strong press statement deploring the GNU's rebuffing of
Egeland; the French tried to shift focus away from transition
and on to the need to bolster AMIS, in a show of 'solidarity'
with the African Members of the Council; and Khartoum's
apologists - Russia, China and Qatar - insisted on delaying
the process to seek GNU 'clarification' on why Egeland's
entry was denied, with the Qatari representative citing the
Council's failure to respect Sudanese sovereignty and 'its
way of dealing with Arab and Islamic issues.' Greece and
Japan were also surprisingly unhelpful, insisting that
clarification be sought on the GNU's position on UN troops in
Darfur and on its rationale for denying Egeland's entry.


9. (C) We will work with the UK on a Presidential Statement
to address the GNU's actions against Egeland and the NRC, as
well as to set a date for the Darfur assessment mission and
for the pledging conference to take place. However, securing
consensus on such a draft cannot be assured, given the level
of tension in New York. Passage of this statement, along
with those to come (including our resolution to mandate AMIS
transition),would be facilitated by increased engagement
with the GNU and the AU at the highest possible levels. If
we are to make any progress on the assessment mission and
indeed to get any traction for AMIS transition in the
Council, we must step up engagement with and pressure on the
GNU to create an atmosphere that could empower DPKO, silence
the nay-sayers and ultimately turn the tide in New York.
BOLTON