UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000476

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS

Classified By: Ambassador John Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

P3 Meeting
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1. (C) Role for the Germans: P3 Ambassadors met early in
the afternoon of March 8 in advance of the P5 meeting later
in the day. French PR de la Sabliere urged German
participation in the next meeting. Ambassador Bolton said
regardless of how the meeting was described -- P5-plus-1 or
E3-plus-3 -- it would set a negative precedent if there was
German participation in a discussion of Iran by the permanent
members of the Security Council. Jones Parry said the UK
could accept the 3-plus-3 formula. De la Sabliere agreed to
the P5 formula for the meeting as planned, but anticipated
real problems with the Germans. Both Jones Parry and de la
Sabliere, however, winked as they made their points.


2. (C) Discussion of E-3 Text:

-- To meet Washington's concerns that the E3 draft PRST did
not include a specific time window for Iranian compliance
with the demands of the IAEA and UNSC, Ambassador Bolton
proposed inclusion of "immediately" in bullet 7, line 1.
UK/FR thought that would be acceptable. They did not want to
refer to a specific timeframe; i.e., fourteen days, which
they thought would sound like an ultimatum and would recall
the Iraq UNSCR's. They also asserted that the fourteen-day
reporting requirement - the last bullet point of the elements
accomplished the same objective.

-- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add "formal
requirements of the" prior to "safeguards agreement" in
bullet 7, line 11.

-- Ambassador Bolton proposed to add to bullet 8, line 2,
after the word "confidence" the following: " and that
continued enrichment activity would add to the importance and
urgency of further action by the Council." UK/FR suggested
instead an additional bullet to be injected right before the
last bullet of the draft that would read: "Underlines that
continued enrichment-related activity would add to the
importance and urgency of further action by the Council."
Subsequently, de la Sabliere reported that the Germans had
accepted the amendments.

-- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add to bullet,
line 3 "exclusively" between the words "for" and "peaceful
purposes." They preferred "exclusively" to the U.S.-proposed
"only," since it is used in the September 2005 IAEA BOG
resolution.


3. (C) Next Steps: P3 Ambassadors agreed to share the
elements with the China and Russia at the P5 meeting and to
walk them through the text in the meeting, rather than simply
send them the text without comment or explanation after the
meeting, as UK and French experts had earlier suggested. P3
Ambassadors also agreed to have a P5 meeting later in the
week to discuss reactions from Moscow and Beijing. They
recognized that the text would not stay for long within the
P5, and it would be useful to circulate it to the full
Council sometime next week. Jones Parry proposed an informal
informal meeting of the UNSC next week, which would happen
off UNSC premises and said that would be an opportunity to
share the text with the full UNSC. De la Sabliere emphasized
that obtaining P5 agreement on the text before it is
circulated would be useful; it would make bringing along the
full Council much easier.

P5 Meeting
--------------


4. (C) P5 Ambassadors met on the evening of March 8 in the
Perm Five conference room at the UN. Russian PR Denisov
tried to correct what he said was a misunderstanding in the
media ascribed to Foreign Minister Lavrov during his visit to
New York. Denisov said Lavrov had not meant to include Iran
in a list of possible participants in proposed talks on Iran
involving the UN, the EU and the U.S. Lavrov reportedly
meant to suggest only that contact with the Iranians should
be maintained. Denisov also reported that the SYG had agreed
with Lavrov at their meeting earlier in the day that it was
vital to retain the "IAEA track" in dealing with Iran.


5. (C) Denisov also reported that Russian Political Director
Kislyak had informed him that Kislyak was in touch with EU
colleagues and specifically his German counterpart and had
discussed the idea of a meeting of EU political directors
with P5 counterparts either in Vienna or New York. Denisov
opined that IAEA DG El Baradei was reluctant to come to New
York at present. He also suggested that Lavrov would be
willing to send his Vienna Ambassador to New York for such

talks. Denisov concluded that Kislyak and his German
counterpart had agreed that the "way ahead" still needed to
be discussed and that there was no clear strategy for dealing
with Iran. Denisov added that Lavrov had told him that
President Bush had agreed with him that we must carefully
think through all our steps on Iran.


6. (C) Speaking on behalf of the EU3, UKUN Perm Rep Jones
Parry then outlined the EU's approach, reviewing the
agreement at the London P5 1 meeting. They had agreed to
demand Iran completely suspend all enrichment activity but to
give a one month period for further diplomatic activity
before taking further action. Unfortunately Iran had moved
in the opposite direction since then by proceeding apace with
centrifuge development and ignoring the IAEA and its February
4 resolution. The issue was Iran's failure to comply with
IAEA demands and, worse, compounding the problem and the
threat of its nuclear program by its actions. Meanwhile
Iran's unacceptable nuclear R and D continued; it was
therefore high time for the Council to reinforce the IAEA's
demands and exert maximum pressure for full, verified
suspension of all enrichment activities and extend full
cooperation to the IAEA.


7. (C) Jones Parry added that the Council response should be
incremental and calibrated, open always to resume
negotiations should Iran comply with demands on the table.
Unity of the Council should be maintained, but not at any
price in the face of this threat. The IAEA's demands had to
be reinforced in a timely and sufficient fashion-- more talk
simply allows Iran's enrichment program to proceed. All
Council members should be deeply concerned that within 12
months, Iran will have the clear potential to develop
weapons. Jones Perry then highlighted the major elements in
the current EU draft- without acknowledging that they reflect
several U.S. amendments. (Latest draft emailed to Department
with this report). Jones Parry concluded that the Council
must respond appropriately and urgently because the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery was an absolutely clear threat to international
peace and security.


8. (C) French PR de la Sabliere added that the text of a
Council response must be crafted carefully to support the
IAEA; there is a problem with time as the time given in
London has run out and the Council must now act. It was the
EU hope that a Council Presidential Statement could be
adopted by next week. P5 consensus was very important--
there were no surprises in the text. He asked that the three
other P5 seek reaction of their capitals without delay and
agree to meet again on Friday March 10. De la Sabliere noted
that the PRST text called on the IAEA DG to report to the
Council within 14 days of its adoption. This was essential
to put a stop to the illicit activity on the ground in Iran,
which continued.


9. (C) UK and France then circulated the PRST elements.
Chinese PR Wang said simply that they would need time to
study the results from Vienna and this text and he was not
ready to engage in particulars. He noted that there was no
final agreement on strategy in the Council and that
diplomatic efforts elsewhere were still underway. Ambassador
Bolton intervened to express support for the EU's points
without fully endorsing the PRST text. Bolton noted that for
four years the U.S. had been deeply concerned about Iran's
drive to master centrifuge technology and now Iran was
apparently on the threshold of overcoming the last technical
hurdles and the capability to produce fissile materials. If
Iran masters these processes, it will forever be beyond the
reach of the IAEA or any other verification regime. The time
for action is now; we should proceed deliberately to prevent
Iran from crossing the technological threshold to nuclear
weapons capability.


10. (C) Bolton agreed that the first step of the Council must
be to strengthen the IAEA's demands, but we are at a critical
juncture that demanded action. Ambassador Bolton also
briefly reviewed a possible amendment to the PRST text, which
tactic had been suggested by the UK and France at the earlier
P3 meeting, saying that Iran should be called on to engage
in "active cooperation", and to stop denial and deception
activities, as noted by the IAEA's report itself. The issue
of trust and confidence should be met head on. Bolton
supported the call for another P5 meeting to consider the
draft PRST the next day or at the latest on Friday.


11. (C) Russian PR Denisov noted that his Minister was
traveling for the next few days and he could not guarantee
such a quick response from Moscow. UK PR Jones Parry replied
that delaying P5 action would not be well received by other
Council members who were well aware that the P5 had begun its
discussions. Denisov agreed to meet "if only for further

discussion" but pleaded for confidentiality of discussions,
asking that only the Germans be made aware of P5 discussions.
All ambassadors agreed that nothing specific should be given
to the press as yet. Unprompted, PR Wang laid down a marker,
saying that he hoped those sponsoring action would not resort
to "intimidation" by making public comments suggesting that
Council unity is important, but not at any price. The P-5
agreed to meet again on March 10th in the afternoon after
consultation with capitals, and would decide further steps at
that point.
BOLTON