UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS CONTINUED

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000467

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR AA
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS CONTINUED

REF: USUN 0456

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Perm Five Permanent Representatives met
at 5:00 pm Friday, March 10 at USUN to discuss the
British-French draft elements on Iran. Discussion went round
and round, as the Russians and Chinese had no specific
instructions on the text, speaking instead in general terms
about how to proceed. Both urged a much shorter text; the
EU-2 agreed to provide a shortened, edited text by 5:00 pm
Saturday, March 11. The next P-5 meeting will be held
Monday, March 13 at 8:00 am at the U.S. Mission. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Bolton opened the meeting asking for
reactions to the British-French text. Russian Ambassador
Denisov said he could only provide general comments, and
initially asked whether the point of this exercise is to
maintain the non-proliferation regime and keep the Iranian
issue under the control of the IAEA, or to punish Iran. He
hoped it was the former, and suggested the elements provided
for a text were placing formal requirements on Iran, rather
than simply supporting IAEA efforts. He considered these
elements more technical, not the parameters of the Security
Council, and said that the specificity with this text was an
ultimatum which would not allow for further negotiations if
Iran changes course. The refocusing from the IAEA to the
Council &we don't like.8


3. (C) On timing, Denisov suggested that the 14 day
reporting period would not allow time for Iran to reverse
course. He then raised the possibility of the rumored March
20 meeting of political directors in Vienna or New York which
he said would be for one purpose: to discuss and reach
agreement on the way ahead. This would not mean that the
Council could not work on a text meanwhile but in doing so,
the P-5 should keep in mind these general reactions from
Russia. If we need to do something in the Council next week,
perhaps a text could be considered as food for thought, or
elements of a future statement.


4. (C) China Amb. Wang said he had no reply as yet from
Beijing but as a general comment, &the Iran nuclear issue is
at a crucial moment.8 Iran has a right to peaceful use but
also has obligations under the NPT. We need balance. It is
best to address this issue in the IAEA. The Security Council
complicates the situation. But if colleagues think we need
SC action, we should not replace the IAEA role, but reinforce
and support it. He finished by reminding the group that
there is still time for diplomatic action.


5. (C) Ambassador Bolton said the U.S. understanding after
the London statement by our Foreign Ministers was that all
five agreed that Iran,s weapons program should be reported
to the SC, as was then reflected in the February 4 Board of
Governors resolution. The FMs further agreed that none of
the P-5 would take any action until after the March 6 IAEA
meeting, in order to let things play out and to watch for any
action by the Iranians that would change our views.
Negotiations did not make progress during that period due to
Iran; there was nothing new at the March 6 Board meeting, and
the IAEA report was conveyed to the SC by the Director
General. From the U.S. perspective, it is entirely
appropriate to now consider next steps, and this draft before
us was consistent with what the FMs agreed in London. The
preamble supports the IAEA and the Board, and the elements
fairly reflect the views as stated by Amb. Denisov. Amb.
Bolton offered to work through the weekend or early Monday to
move this process ahead, mentioning the leak to the press of
the elements as making it difficult for the P-5 not to
circulate something to the P-10 Monday or Tuesday of next
week. It would be appropriate to do so in any event, and a
plus if the P-5 could agree on a text first, though either
way we should distribute to the others early in the week.


6. (C) British Ambassador Jones-Parry assured the Russians
that the text was meant to support the NPT and the IAEA, and
to reinforce very clearly the facts in order to minimize the
chance of Iran going nuclear. He said it would be perverse
if the Council did not repeat what we have said in the IAEA,
including specifying the end of enrichment, the end of R & D,
the moratorium, and return to the Additional Protocol. As to
the 14 day deadline, he said Iran could easily reverse its
concealment in that time frame by making tangible,
demonstrable efforts to show its intent. We have given Iran
a lot of time and don't have much to show for it.
Jones-Parry said we do not need to wait for a political
directors strategy session in order to move forward, with the
existing Ministers, understanding that we will support the
IAEA, and urge Iran to comply with the Board decisions,

calibrated to be reversible by Iranian positive actions. He
agreed with Amb. Bolton that we need to get a draft to the
other Council members early next week.


7. (C) French Amb. de la Sabliere said he thought in
principle we were all in agreement ) to support the IAEA,
and to put pressure on Iran. Time is running out with
developments on the ground in Iran. The main question is how
the Council can use its weight to strengthen the IAEA
requests and have Iran respond positively. The elements
include Board language expressing what Iran has done and the
concerns of the international community. We cannot use
general language, as it will not pressure Iran and will not
reinforce the IAEA. Iran will think we are weakening what
came out of Vienna. On timing, de la Sabliere said we need
to reflect reality but also the emergency situation at hand.
It could be 14, 18 or 20 days, but part of our discussion
should include keeping in mind at each step, there will be
more action if Iran does not respond. He suggested going
paragraph by paragraph through the text to see where general
problems exist.


8. (C) Russia said it was not ready to react to specific
language. Denisov said the problem is not the 14 days
indicated, but what would happen on &day 15.8 He suggested
we might start with a &milder8 text which could be
strengthened, rather than a strong text which would be
weakened and appear &non-constructive.8


9. (C) China further complained about the length of the
text, arguing that it was longer than the Board resolutions.
He suggested a short text, supporting the IAEA, and one or
two elements calling on Iran to comply with the IAEA.
Ambassador Bolton explained that it might look long, but was
reflecting three years of Iranian activity. This was not a
technical issue ) Iran was violating the NPT and seeking to
acquire nuclear weapons, despite very generous offers that
had not persuaded them to change course. If we do not
incorporate the past three years, Iran will think we are
going to start over again, a big mistake for Iran and for the
Security Council. The key rests with Iran ) if it is
willing to give up its pursuit, this can be easily dealt
with.


10. (C) After a back and forth about how to proceed, the
group agreed that the UK and France would edit and shorten
the text in an effort to reflect the various P-5 comments,
and would redistribute to the Five by 5:00 pm Saturday
evening. It was also agreed that the P-5 would meet again
Monday morning, March 13 at 8:00 at the U.S. Mission to
continue discussion on the new text. All agreed that any
statement to the press would simply be: &Good meeting,
consultations continue.8


11. (C) Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton phoned
German Ambassador Plueger to give him a readout of the
meeting, and offered to debrief him on future discussions.
BOLTON