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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
06USUNNEWYORK455 2006-03-09 23:43:00 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
Cable title:  

CONSIDERATION OF HRC POSTPONED TO MARCH 15;

Tags:   AORC KUNR UNGA PHUM PREL 
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8235
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1968
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000455 

SIPDIS

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FROM AMBASSADOR BOLTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2015
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA PHUM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: CONSIDERATION OF HRC POSTPONED TO MARCH 15;
ELIASSON WILLING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS "OUTSIDE OF THE
TEXT" ONLY

REF: USUN 443 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)



1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to a U.S. request, the UN Fifth
Committee agreed March 9 to postpone decision scheduled that
day on the budget to establish a Human Rights Council.
General Assembly President (PGA) Eliasson also put off the GA
plenary session scheduled for March 10. Both meetings are
now likely to take place Wednesday, March 15. Eliasson wants
to use the next days to discuss informally with the U.S. --
either directly or indirectly -- possible fixes outside the
text only. End Summary.



2. (C) In response to a U.S. request to postpone any decision
March 9 by the Fifth Committee regarding the budget for the
proposed Human Rights Council (HRC) and a March 10 meeting to
adopt the resolution establishing the HRC, both meetings are
likely to be scheduled by the PGA for March 15. The decision
to postpone was choreographed with Eliasson's Chief of Staff
(Amb. Wide), South African Ambassador Kumalo (current G-77
Chair) and others. Ambassador Wolff made a statement in the
formal Fifth Committee plenary session that further time was
needed for consultations, as also requested by Ambassador
Wide on behalf of the PGA, and that the U.S. would continue
to be in touch with the Office of the PGA and other
delegations as consultations continued. By postponing these
meetings, the U.S. avoids the need this week to confront --
and to vote against -- an effort to adopt the HRC or its
budgetary implications. While supporting the request, the
G-77, EU and Mexico, who were the only others to speak,
announced t
heir support for the proposed HRC budget, and by extension,
Eliasson's draft of HRC itself.



3. (C) In a subsequent conversation, Amb. Wide told Amb.
Wolff that Eliasson would reschedule both the Fifth Committee
and the GA Plenary on the HRC for Wednesday, March 15. In
the meantime, according to Wide, Eliasson was prepared to
"look at things only outside the text" with the U.S.
directly, or indirectly through a small group comprising
close collaborators with Eliasson on the HRC project (he
specifically cited the PR's of Liechtenstein, Switzerland and
Singapore). Asked whether there were any changes that
Eliasson would consider inside the text, Wide responded that
the PGA was "not willing to open up even small technical
changes". Wide added that we could look informally at what
could be done outside the text to help the U.S. He cited as
examples an interpretative statement by the PGA on the review
clause as well as specific commitments, like the EU's, by
other states or groups of states undertaking not to vote for
countries under Security Council sanctions in part for human
rights reasons.



4. (C) In separate conversations with Amb. Wolff, other
delegations, including the Swiss, Portuguese, French,
Israeli, and British continue to argue also that changes in
the text either on the voting threshold or exclusionary
criteria would not be attainable. Some believe, however that
small, technical changes, while still a long shot, might be
feasible. They, too, are focusing on "outside" changes.



5. (C) Ambassador Bolton had an extended conversation with
UK Ambassador Jones Parry, in which the latter said that
there was no chance for the United States to reopen the text
and get either of our two bottom lines: the two-thirds
majority requirement for election to the proposed Council or
the exclusion for countries under Security Council sanctions.
He said that the United States could not simply "insist" on
its bottom line, but had to find substitutes that would give
us "at least some of what we want." He proposed, for
example, that statements by the EU and others about not
voting for countries under UNSC sanctions, combined with
changes to OP 8 that would reinforce language requiring
compliance with human rights standards, might suffice on our
second point. He admitted, however, he had no ready
substitute for the two-thirds point.



6. (C) Ambassador Bolton asked if there were any sentiment
within the EU for reopening the draft text, since we had not
uncovered any. Jones Parry replied, "It depends on how
little you ask for. If you simply ask for your two points, no
one will rally to it. If you ask for something less, then
there's a chance EU governments would consider reopening the
text." Ambassador Bolton pointed out that all EU Perm Reps
with whom he had spoken, including those from France, Greece,
Italy, Poland, and Slovakia,
not to mention others very involved in the issue such as
Switzerland and New Zealand, were afraid that opening the


text for any point, no matter how slight, would open
Pandora's Box. Ambassador Bolton then asked if Jones Parry
had detected any sentiment for reopening the text among the
G-77, and Jones Parry said that he had not. Ambassador
Bolton then asked if PGA President Eliasson was not also
telling HMG, as he was telling the USG, that opening the text
was not possible, and Jones Parry acknowledged that Eliasson
was making the same point with them. Jones Parry also said
that he believed that PGA Eliasson was under increasing
pressure from G-77 countries, who were becoming increasingly
impatient that the draft text had not been put to a vote.



7. (C) Comment: The above conversations suggest that
Eliasson remains convinced opening the text to changes would
lead to the unraveling of his HRC resolution. We continue to
hear that others have threatened introducing deal-busting
provisions for the rest of the membership. Eliasson's desire
to get the HRC concluded as quickly as possible, and in a
manner that does not put at risk his compromise package,
underpin his disinclination to come in our direction even
with minor changes in the text. Direct efforts with other
delegations and groups would be required to achieve this.
What we have been hearing consistently from the rest of the
membership over the past two weeks is that they, too, don't
want to risk losing the HRC as currently envisaged, even if
it means the U.S. can't sign on.
BOLTON