Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06USUNNEWYORK429 | 2006-03-07 10:50:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | USUN New York |
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0429/01 0661050 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 071050Z MAR 06 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8195 INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1963 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000429 |
1. (C) Summary and Comment: Efforts continue to convince us that core U.S. concerns about the Human Rights Council (HRC) can be addressed in part "outside" of General Assembly President (PGA) Eliasson's draft resolution. The focus is on excluding countries under Security Council (SC) sanctions through individual and collective commitments that would not be part of the text, including through the Community of Democracies (CD). The 2/3 voting threshold might, according to Eliasson, be revisited as part of the HRC review process, although the current draft appears to limit such opportunity. The general approach Eliasson has taken is to persuade the U.S. to voice a "soft no" rather than an actual negative vote. USUN believes that anything less than an actual "no" vote against Eliasson's text would have adverse results for the U.S. We have clearly communicated to both the SG and Eliasson in conversations with the Secretary directly that we are going to call for a vote and vote "no" unless there are changes in the text of the resolution that meet our basic objectives. That position has been consistently conveyed to other Missions in NY and Geneva, and to other capitals. This is a principled and correct position. Not to follow through on it now would seriously and perhaps irreparably damage our position in the larger structure over U.S. reform. End Summary and Comment. 2. (C) PGA Eliasson briefed Amb. Wolff March 6 on his continuing contacts with other delegations about how to address U.S. concerns on two key issues: SC sanctions exclusion and a 2/3 vote. Eliasson said he has been in contact with, among others, PermReps from Chile, France, Austria (EU Presidency), and Mali to explore a role for the Community of Democracies (CD) in excluding from the Human Rights Council (HRC) countries under SC sanctions. He said he discerned great sympathy for the U.S. view that countries under such sanctions should not be able to be elected to the HRC. Eliasson said this view also extended to the idea of coordination among CD members to vote for the best candidates running for the HRC. He said he would leave it to these countries to discuss the matter directly with us, and thought such an approach would likely ensure that the objective of excluding such countries from the HRC could be met. He added that Mali, as current CD Chair, was enthusiastic about the idea and was considering convening a meeting of CD members to pursue this point. 3. (C) Eliasson also reiterated his support for an early review of the HRC's "status", which he said would not necessarily mean a narrow definition limited only to whether the HRC remains a subsidiary body. He argued that since the current text called for a review within five years, he could make a statement as PGA interpreting the provision as allowing for a much earlier and much broader review. According to Eliasson, even the opponents of human rights would find an earlier review attractive. Such a review, he continued, might allow a reconsideration of the 2/3 voting threshold. 4. (C) Eliasson said he was determined to build bridges toward our position, albeit only outside the text since he continues to believe opening any element for re-negotiation would unravel the entire project. He told Amb. Wolff he was convinced that the current language in his draft is unprecedented in the UN system in setting expectations and conditionality for membership to a UN body. He said he was also convinced, along with a large majority of other member states, that this draft and the environment surrounding it would lead to a substantial improvement over the Geneva Commission. 5. (C) In separate conversations with Amb. Wolff, some of the same PermReps (Chile, Austria and France), and the UK presented differing interpretations of Eliasson's approach. On the one hand, they agreed that U.S. concerns about excluding countries under SC sanctions could be achieved indirectly by lining up support from a large number of countries also opposed to such candidacies; on the other, they felt this was better pursued within the UN system either though individual or other collective undertakings. They thought a process could be identified by which such commitments could be reflected, even if they had not yet identified any. UK PermRep Jones Parry also suggested the idea of incorporating into any relevant SC sanctions resolution a prohibition on serving on the HRC, although he had no immediate answer to Amb. Wolff's question whether Russia and China would agree to such a provision when they opposed the concept during the HRC negotiations. 6. (C) The plain fact is that "fixes" to the current unacceptable draft resolution can only be made in the resolution itself. Proposals that would operate outside of the text are inherently unsatisfactory, since only the text itself functions as the governing authority for the new HRC. Steps outside of the text have no more authority than individual explanations of vote, which are only advisory and not binding. As such, such "fixes" cannot provide the protection we need -- protection which was precluded by Eliasson's refusal to incorporate our position in the text or to open it for changes. 7. (C) As for the role of the CD, the organization remains untested in its ability to ensure how its members vote in UN elections. In the UN system, regional groups retain a hammer lock on the process for identifying candidates for election to bodies like the HRC. Not only is regional solidarity likely to remain sacrosanct, but the established process of trading votes would also likely trump the CD. 8. (C) We see no advantage in Eliasson's suggestion that the review of the Council, now set at five years, be held instead in 2-3 years, since the only issue understood in the text to be the subject of the review is whether the HRC should remain a subsidiary body of the GA or whether it should become a Principal Organ of the UN. Accordingly, Eliasson's draft provides no basis in a future review -- whenever it is held -- to re-examine the many elements we find so troubling, especially the majority vote threshold. In short, reducing the amount of time at which the review takes place does nothing to help advance our interests or address our concerns. BOLTON |