GA PRESIDENT AND UNSYG CHEF DE CABINET CONSIDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000400

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FROM AMB. BOLTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: KUNR UNGA UNCHR
SUBJECT: GA PRESIDENT AND UNSYG CHEF DE CABINET CONSIDER
HRC TEXT FINAL; PALAU BACKING DOUBLES OUR SUPPORT

REF: A. USUN 00398

B. STATE 32805

Classified By: AMB. JOHN BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D)


1. (C) Summary: In our continuing consultations with other
delegations, we unfortunately find no appetite to reopen the
HRC text to accommodate U.S. requirements (reftels). General
Assembly President Eliasson's office has sent a letter to the
ACABQ (the committee considering resource needs to establish
the HRC) stating that his HRC draft "should be considered as
the final text." The EU has endorsed Eliasson's text,
although they remain divided (with the UK as the principal
holdout) on the desirability of a vote. Meanwhile, efforts
continue to muster as large a majority as possible in support
of the current text, with some considering modest gestures
"outside the text" that they hope would lead the U.S. to
join, or at least not to block consensus. End Summary.


2. (C) EU Position: Following lengthy discussions over the
previous two days, the EU agreed late March 1 to support
Eliasson's HRC text. As shared by an EU member with USUN,
the EU position states: "The EU considers that the PGA's
draft resolution meets the basic requirements for the
establishment of the Human Rights Council. The EU could
therefore accept this text as a compromise. The EU fully
supports the PGA's efforts to secure the broadest possible
backing for the early establishment of the Human Rights
Council." USUN understands there were two EU members that
disagreed with the text itself in the EU discussions, but in
the end all joined EU consensus. We also understand that EU
members had nuanced disagreements, particularly at the
tactical level, and were particularly concerned about a split
with the U.S., expressing regret that strong democracies
would not stand together on this issue. They felt it was
Eliasson's task to address Washington's concerns and to
approach Washington.


3. (C) UK View: In return for joining consensus, the UK has
issued a supplementary national statement agreed within the
EU that states: "The United Kingdom could accept the
compromise draft resolution text, although we would have
preferred stronger language in a number of areas. The UK
believes that the priority should now be to establish the
conditions for the resolution to be put to the General
Assembly to receive the broadest possible backing. In
particular, the UK believes that for the Human Rights
Council, and this new approach to the promotion and
protection of human rights, to be effective, it will need the
support of the United States. It therefore encourages
discussion with the U.S. Administration in order to identify
a basis for the widest possible support."


4. (C) In private discussions with individual EU and WEOG
members, the greatest concerns seem to be that re-opening the
text would lead to numerous other amendments by "the other
side" that would weaken the text and the HRC. Some have
cautioned that with any changes to the resolution, it could
be a situation of "all bets are off" and, for example,
provisions to constrain the use of country specific
resolutions could be re-introduced. While we have heard the
OIC might accept the current PP 7 language as it is currently
formulated (addressing efforts to enhance dialogue and
broaden understanding among cultures and religions) several
Western countries are concerned that if the text is
re-opened, the OIC would seek to strengthen this preambular
language and/or move language addressing these issues into an
operative paragraph. Several also have stated that changes
to the voting majority or strict criteria for membership on
the HRC would not be achievable, and have asked what U.S.
"bottom lines" exist for agreement to the text if other
changes could be made. All who have spoken to the precise
points of exclusion for Security Council sanctions or a
two-thirds requirement for election believe that such
proposals would be rejected. French Perm Rep de la Sabliere
in a conversation with Ambassador Bolton at noon on Thursday
was particularly emphatic on this point. Further, they are
concerned that a postponement of the discussion would hurt,
rather than help, the process and the human rights machinery
of the United Nations. Some continue to believe that the
atmosphere will never be better than it is now to reach
agreement on the HRC, noting that other delegations may have
been maneuvered into a position of accepting something they
may not be entirely comfortable with and would reject, given
more time.


5. (C) At the same time, the EU continues to debate whether
to support a vote to establish the HRC despite U.S.
opposition. UK PermRep Jones Parry told us today that he was
isolated in the EU on this point (we've heard from another EU


Perm Rep that he defended himself by stating in the EU
meeting that this was his instruction from Foreign Secretary
Straw). UK DPR Thomson told us there was still hope that we
could find a creative way of allowing the HRC to be adopted
without U.S. opposition. He lamented, however, that Eliasson
is not focused on how to do this operationally, worrying more
at this stage about solidifying support for his text to
demonstrate to the U.S. the degree of its isolation. (We
understand from Ambassador Moley in Geneva that his EU
Presidency counterpart has indicated that the Austrian
Presidency in New York is still waiting to see if the U.S.
will accept the current draft once the extent of the majority
support for it is evident.) On the other hand, the letter to
the ACABQ quoted in paragraph one was written on behalf of
the President of the General Assembly. Moreover, a meeting
of the Fifth Committee (which handles budget matters) has
been scheduled for Monday. Both steps suggest PGA Eliasson
is actively and wittingly preparing the ground for an UNGA
vote early next week.


6. (C) As for next steps, Eliasson's Deputy Chef de Cabinet
told Ambassador Wolff March 2 that Eliasson was pleased with
his March 1 conversation with Ambassador Bolton (ref B) and
wanted to remain in touch. SecGen Annan's Chief of Staff
Malloch Brown told Ambassador Wolff March 2 it was
increasingly clear from their soundings that re-opening the
text "won't work". They also fear the negative effect of a
delay of several months, particularly in the wake of what is
certain to be a "disastrous" session of the Geneva Commission
"with or without U.S. participation." Malloch Brown noted
that, as a result, there was growing momentum toward a vote.
He said Annan would try to reach Secretary Rice as soon as
she returns from her trip to see what could be done to turn
the U.S. position into a "soft no", in order to avoid an
ICC-type situation. In this regard, Malloch Brown said that
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour was thinking
about setting up the HRC for a "test drive" with a shortened
review period to see how it works. We've heard similar ideas
from other delegations (ref B),and expect this will be the
increased focus of the Secretary General, Eliasson and other
delegations in the coming days.


7. (C) On a brighter note, Palau Perm Rep Stuart Beck
confirmed today that they fully support our position on HRC.
They have asked for, and USUN will supply, talking points so
that Palau can advocate our position publicly.


BOLTON