PROSPECT OF RE-OPENING HRC TEXT DISAPPEARING;

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000398

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
FROM AMBASSADOR BOLTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: KUNR UNGA UNCHR
SUBJECT: PROSPECT OF RE-OPENING HRC TEXT DISAPPEARING;
OPTIONS NARROW

REF: STATE 32805

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In the wake of the announcement
that the U.S. cannot support General Assembly President
Eliasson,s proposals for a Human Rights Council, delegations
are weighing options and considering next steps. Eliasson,
SecGen Annan, and others believe there is widespread support
for Eliasson,s text, despite its flaws, and expect to rally
at least 170 votes in favor if it were to come to a vote.
Senior Secretariat members do not rule out a vote, and
continue to seek signs of U.S. flexibility or changes in our
position. We have been in contact with several key
delegations and all believe there is no prospect of U.S. core
positions on voting threshold, membership exclusions or other
key issues being accepted at this time. The realistic
options remain putting off consideration of the HRC for
several months or bringing the matter to a vote (which some
expect could lead the U.S. to reconsider its position if
faced with a large majority in favor of the current text).
Many delegations, including some of our close friends,
believe the U.S. will reconsider its position if the extent
of our isolation was made clearer. We believe any
misperception at this point that the U.S. is wavering would
increase the likelihood of a vote and reduce the prospect of
a more constructive &cooling off8 period that would better
serve U.S. interests. Post requests reconsideration of
reftel guidance in light of the above. End Summary and
Comment.


2. (C) In conversations between Amb. Wolff and senior
Secretariat officials Mark Malloch Brown (MMB) and Bob Orr,

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MMB said there was solid support across all regional groups
building for Eliasson,s text. He noted Eliasson could
probably obtain between 170-180 votes in favor (a calculation
shared by our UK colleagues),which MMB said was tempting
both Eliasson and Annan to consider moving the matter to a
vote. At the same time, according to MMB, Annan does not
want to leave the U.S. on the outside. MMB said that while
he understood that the U.S. would prefer to put off any
decision on the HRC until it could reopen the text at a later
date, Annan was not keen on that option. Even though Annan
would like to accommodate the U.S., he was not willing to
&kick this down the road and risk getting it lost8 or to
obtain a worse outcome than the current text. (In a later
conversation, UK and French DPRs told Amb. Wolff that this
was also the underlying rationale among those in the EU who
support a vote since they are convinced the current text is
the best that can ever be attained and postponement, in their
view, would be tantamount to killing the HRC.)


3. (C) In view of the above, MMB said he was interested in
learning our absolute bottom lines, noting that he would not
try to sell anything to others on which we could not agree.
Orr asked if there was anything that could be done to get the
U.S. to abstain, perhaps with changes &outside8 the text,
or possibly having the U.S. vote &no8 but leave open the
possibility of eventually participating in the HRC by
leveraging that vote to ensure that regional groups put forth
only acceptable candidates for the new Council.


4. (C) Amb. Wolff responded that the Secretary had conveyed
our position clearly to SecGen Annan. Our assessment, after
consulting with other delegations, was that there was no
likelihood of core U.S. positions being accommodated by a
majority of other governments at this time. Therefore,
trying to reopen the text now would not be productive. We
believed the more constructive option was to put off further
discussion on the text for some months, after which we could
attempt to renegotiate key provisions. Wolff reiterated that
the U.S. would vote &no8 if there was a move to push
through the HRC, regardless of how many votes in favor of the
current text. We were trying to be as constructive as we
could, but would not be able to change our position without
important substantive changes to the text. Wolff noted that
he could not envisage any changes &outside8 the text that
would address our core concerns. As for voting &no8 and
considering participating in the HRC if regional groups did
not nominate human rights violators for election, Wolff said
this would not work since other groups would not be held
hostage to the U.S. position.


5. (C) In a subsequent conversation with PGA Jan Eliasson,
Ambassador Bolton reviewed our position, and the feedback we
were hearing from other delegations since Monday. Eliasson
said that he had heard Secretary Rice very clearly, and that
he still hoped that we could move ahead in a way that was in
our mutual interest. He was getting &coinciding feedback8

from other delegations, namely that was little stomach for
further negotiations, fearing a &Pandora,s Box8
phenomenon. He also said he did not want an &immediate
vote,8 but he nonetheless wanted to find a formula that
would work for all sides before the HRC begins on March 13.
Eliasson suggested that arrangements to include Israel in the
New York WEOG, or strong statements by the USG in connection
with an abstention (which he hoped for instead of a &no8
vote) might provide us with 8what you need.8 Ambassador
Bolton said that he did not believe that considerations
outside the text of the draft resolution, however meritorious
they might be, such as finally getting Israel fully into a UN
regional group, could resolve our problems in the resolution
itself. The two agreed to stay in very close touch in the
coming days.
BOLTON