AMBASSADOR WOLFF'S FEBRUARY 21 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PHUM KUNR EUN HPKO EAID BE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WOLFF'S FEBRUARY 21 MEETING WITH
BELGIAN AMBASSADOR VERBEKE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: During a February 22, meeting Ambassador
Wolff and Belgian Ambassador Johan Verbeke discussed the
Human Rights Council, Peacebuilding Commission and U.S.-EU
cooperation. Both Ambassadors agreed that the U.S. and EU
needed to cooperate more closely to avoid having our mutual
interests undermined by the G-77 and others. End summary.


Human Rights Council (HRC)
--------------


2. (C) Based on a recent EU meeting with UNGA President
(PGA) Eliasson, Ambassador Verbeke said he expected the PGA
would release a new draft HRC text on February 23. His
understanding was that the text would call for 47 members to
be elected on the basis of an absolute (vice 2/3) majority.
He added that operative paragraph 8 on membership
qualifications would reflect stronger language. Verbeke
agreed with Ambassador Wolff that Singapore's plan for
proposed geographic distribution on the HRC would put WEOG at
a distinct disadvantage and complicate efforts to pass
country-specific resolutions condemning the worst national
violations. Ambassador Wolff noted that country-specific
resolutions often pass by a very slim margin - sometimes by a
single vote. Skewing the geographic distribution toward
non-WEOG countries would disadvantage such important votes.
Verbeke also commented that a Swiss-backed provision in
operative paragraph 8 to exclude HRC members ex post facto -
that is, by a two-thirds vote after they were on board as HRC
members - was unlikely to work in practice. Ambassador Wolff
concurred, adding that a two-thirds vote to exclude current
members needed to show symmetry with a two-thirds vote to
elect members from the GA (rather than election by an
absolute GA majority). Two-thirds was a far stronger number
for election, especially as very few countries would be
no-shows or register abstentions. Otherwise, we risked
designing a HRC in where it would be relatively easy to get
voted on, but practically impossible to get voted off. Both
Ambassadors agreed that such an arrangement would be
particularly unfortunate because the quality of membership
would probably be the most important predictor of a more
effective human rights institution.

Peacebuilding Commission
--------------


3. (C) Demands for equitable geographic distribution were
also impeding efforts to start up the Peacebuilding
Commission, both agreed. The resolutions that established
the PBC did not mandate geographic distribution and their
demands had nothing to do with the substantive work of the
PBC, but that meant little to the blocs that were now
demanding equal regional representation. "This is a
deliberate attack by some developing nations," Verbeke said,
adding that it was "an attempt to impose the tyranny of a few
on the majority" of UN members. In the case of the PBC,
Ambassador Wolff suggested that we needed to do more to get
the Africans to speak up.


4. (C) Verbeke cautioned that the Africans had unrealistic
expectations about the PBC. Many Africans see the PBC as "an
instrument for the mobilization of resources." Instead,
Verbeke clarified that the PBC would provide advisory
guidance on how to address comprehensive issues involved in
the complex transition from post-conflict fragility to a
stable infrastructure, including by strengthening the private
sector, civil society and justice mechanisms.

US-EU Cooperation
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Wolff noted that the EU had not always
been sending clear messages to UNGA President Eliasson. He
said that especially in some UN reform plenaries, such as on
the HRC, loud voices were being heard from Egypt, Pakistan,
South Africa and other G-77 states. Meanwhile, most EU
nations had not spoken at all. In effect, we were leaving
the field to the G-77 as a group and South Africa as head of
it as well as to strong individual G-77 member states. The
U.S. is perceived to be isolated and the EU as a moderate
"bridge-builder", but with no united front from the U.S. and
EU the West was the net loser. Verbeke agreed and said that
in his opinion the EU had gone out of its way to be
responsive to the G-77, noting cases on trade at Doha and
Gleneagles, but had gotten nothing in return. Verbeke
concluded "we in the West need to stand up more for our own
interests." Ambassador Wolff concurred saying that given the
way the G-77 was behaving in exploiting certain issues and


assaulting our common interests, now was not the time for us
to be divided. To the contrary, we needed to maximize
cooperation.


6. (C) Comment: In the meeting, Verbeke noted his background
as a graduate of Yale Law School, followed by private law
practice in New York, and earlier diplomatic service as DCM
at the Belgium Embassy in Washington. He has been a
skillful, articulate co-chair of plenary sessions on ECOSOC
reform and development, navigating divisions between the G77
and developed nations with subtlety and a commitment to
transparent proceedings. Verbeke was clearly signaling his
dissatisfaction with trend of the EU positioning itself at
the UN between the US and the developing world. What remains
to be seen is whether he (and others) will be able to
re-orient the EU in the direction of greater coordination
with us. End Comment.
BOLTON