Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK2260
2006-12-18 17:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 61ST GA

Tags:  PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7994
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUCNDT #2260/01 3521745
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181745Z DEC 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0960
INFO RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1075
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0997
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2426
XMT AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 002260 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 61ST GA

REF: USUN 2853 05

Classified By: Minister-Counselor William Brencick for reasons 1.4 (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 002260

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 61ST GA

REF: USUN 2853 05

Classified By: Minister-Counselor William Brencick for reasons 1.4 (D)

1.(U) Gerald Scott is serving as Senior Area Advisor for
Africa at USUN during the regular session of the General
Assembly for the sixth time. These are his personal
reflections on African participation as the regular session
of the 61st GA draws to a close. (Note that while in the UN
context the African Group includes the states of the North
African littoral, usage of the term in this cable reflects
Ambassador Scott's portfolio which deals only with the
African governments falling within the purview of State's
Bureau of African Affairs.)

SUMMARY


2. (SBU) The General Assembly presents particular challenges
for US interests, not least vis-a-vis the African Group. It
is a part of the UN system in which every state has one vote,
where group dynamics are particularly powerful, and where
what is left of the Non-Aligned Movement/G-77 are energized.
Some African delegations are more committed to such an agenda
than others, but all feel the pressure to conform, knowing
that advancement of their own candidates or issues will be
facilitated or hobbled by their adherence to the party line.
We, on the other hand, mostly argue that issues deserve to
be considered on their own merits, and imply that here is one
forum in which a government can to some degree reciprocate
the favors received from the USG.


3. (SBU) The AF record in the GA up to this point (Dec. 15)
has been a slight improvement on that of last year. We
received solid support from a large number of delegations in
our successful effort to block Venezuela from the Security
Council. While AF delegations voted in slightly larger
numbers this year for "no-action motions" to block
consideration of country-specific human rights texts, when
the drafts themselves came to a vote, there was also a slight
improvement in AF support. AF delegations were also very

slightly less supportive of anti-Israeli resolutions this
year. We failed to gain election of our candidate to the
International Law Commission, but Africans appear NOT to have
been the weak element in this. On the whole, and in the
disappointing context of traditional African performance in
the GA, this has not been a bad record.

THE GENERAL DEBATE

4.(SBU) The first two weeks are occupied by speeches
providing a statement of the general orientation of a
delegation towards GA and world issues. These are generally
delivered by Chiefs of State, Heads of Government or Foreign
Ministers. Most are anodyne restatements of the obvious.
African speeches, with rare exceptions, underline the need
for more efforts towards economic and social development, and
more attention to African crisis points. Some reference is
generally made to other areas of concern, e.g., the Middle
East.

5.(U) Direct criticism of a member state is almost always
avoided, so when it occurs in this context it should not pass
unremarked. We were attacked by name twice. President
Mugabe of Zimbabwe referred to "negative forces... bent on
subverting the democratically expressed will of the majority
of our citizens and to unconstitutionally effect regime
change." In his delivered version, unpublished in the
distributed text, he continued, "No one from Washington or
London has the right to take the key to regime change."
"Those who want regime change are those yesterday we fought
against." The Eritrean representative, the Minister of
Health, blamed the USG almost entirely for Ethiopia's refusal
to demarcate the boundary as determined by the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission.

6.(U) Our policy towards Cuba was criticized by Namibian
President Pohamba, but this year (unlike his speech last
year) he did not mention us by name.

7.(U) On the other hand, we were praised by Burundi (for
access to AGOA),by Cameroon (for support of the
implementation of the ICJ decision on Bakassi),by the CAR
(for our efforts to contain the effects of the conflict in
Sudan),and by Liberia.

BLOCKING VENEZUELA'S ELECTION TO THE UNSC

USUN NEW Y 00002260 002 OF 005



8.(SBU) Our most important objective in this GA was to block
Venezuela's election to the Security Council. We were
therefore happy to support Guatemala through most of the
process which began on Oct. 16th and ended on Nov. 7th after
both Guatemala and Venezuela had withdrawn in favor of
Panama; the latter duly elected on the 48th ballot.

9.(C) Since it was a secret ballot, we cannot be entirely
sure of the African votes -- and, clearly, Guatemala had more
pledges than votes as the totals were announced. (This was
doubtless true for Venezuela as well; we generally discount
the pledges in these contexts by up to 30 per cent.) I
believe that most of the African delegations voted for
Guatemala and thus preserved our blocking position.
(Guatemala was ahead in all the votes, but never by the
requisite two-thirds majority present and voting.) However,
there were some that indications give me to believe supported
Venezuela: The Gambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Zimbabwe; probably Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
Somalia; doubtless a few others whose tracks remained
covered. Strong advocates for Guatemala were Ghana, Uganda,
Sierra Leone. It is doubtful we would have been able to block
Venezuela had President Chavez not directly attacked
President Bush in the General Debate in language that many
not otherwise inclined towards us found unacceptable. His
language and the presumption that such rhetoric would carry
over to the Security Council were our best arguments against
him. The ultimate election of Panama, the compromise
candidate selected by GRULAC when 47 rounds of voting had
exhausted everyone's patience, was an undeserved misfortune
for Guatemala who had inscribed her candidacy long before
Venezuela. But it achieved our immediate aim.

HUMAN RIGHTS TEXTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10.(SBU) The more radical African delegations argue strongly
against country-specific human rights resolutions: the texts
are said to be "unhelpful," do not engage the sinning
countries in "dialogue," and now that the Human Rights
Council is up and running, the Third Committee and the GA are
no longer the place for such debates. Some Africans here
will admit in private that, while they personally agree with
our arguments, their real hesitation is the fear that their
countries are only a coup away from being the object of such
organized opprobrium. But so long as the draft is not aimed
at a fellow African, many will consider themselves free of
any obligation to oppose country-specific resolutions, and
some will even support them -- as was the case in this GA.
There remains the trap of the "no-action motion," a motion to
adjourn debate on an item, which, if it carries, ends any
further discussion or possibility of a vote. Here, many
Africans who might not oppose a country-specific text will
vote for the no-action motion with the specious argument that
it is a "procedural" motion that does not commit them on one
side or the other of the substance of the matter.

11.(SBU) This year there were no country-specific texts aimed
at Sudan or Zimbabwe, so that stimulus to African opposition
was absent. Instead, the US supported five country-specific
resolutions: against Belarus, Uzbekistan, Iran, the DPRK and
Burma. First up, Uzbekistan was defeated by a no-action
motion. But the resolutions on the DPRK, Iran, Burma and
Belarus all passed in Third Committee, having narrowly
survived no-action motions. We then faced a retaliatory
Belarus text, cleverly drafted, on the Situation of Democracy
and H. R. in the United States. -- which was defeated 6 - 114
- 45 (a discomforting number of abstentions). The AF vote
was 0 - 14 - 21 and 13 not participating. Posts will have
received by unclas e-mail a full report on these votes.
However, I note the positive votes on the DPRK text (our
priority) of Comoros, Ghana, G-Bissau and Malawi. Burundi
supported the Iran and Burma texts. Mauritius supported the
Burma text. In reviewing these votes, it is useful to
remember that historically the best one can generally hope
for is an abstention on a country-specific text; it marks a
general vague agreement with the text and a refusal to follow
the AU/NAM line calling for a NO vote. So an abstention (or
an absence) on such texts is a favorable step -- at least, in
the Africa-group context.

ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS

12.(U) Annually we face a plethora of anti-Israeli
resolutions. These pass overwhelmingly, but we try to reduce
the margin by which they are approved. We concentrate our

USUN NEW Y 00002260 003 OF 005


lobbying effort on three of these:

The resolution on The Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People passed in
Plenary 101 - 7 (US) - 62. The AF vote was 30 - 0 - 3 and 15
not participating. The helpful abstentions were Cameroon,
Malawi, and Uganda.

The resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights passed
in Plenary 101 - 7 (US) - 62. The AF vote was 29 - 0 - 4 -

15. The four abstaining were Burundi, Cameroon, Malawi and
Uganda.

The resolution on the Work of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories passed in Fourth Committee 81 - 8(US) - 79. The
AF vote was 25 - 0 - 7 and 16 not participating. The helpful
abstentions were Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR,
Ethiopia, Swaziland, and Uganda.


RESOLUTIONS ON LEBANON

13.(U) Posts were asked to demarche on two resolutions
presented by Cuba in Third Committee on the Situation on
Human Rights and Children in Lebanon. Ultimately, only one
of these came to a vote: Human Rights Situation Arising From
... Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon. This passed 109
- 7(US) - 59. The AF vote was 34 - 0 - 4 and 10 not
participating. The four abstentions were Angola, Cameroon,
Ethiopia and Kenya.

ELECTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

14.(SBU) Posts were asked to solicit support for the election
of Michael Matheson to the International Law Commission. In
a secret ballot on Nov. 16th, Mr Matheson failed, placing
ninth for eight Western seats on the Commission. While it is
impossible to be sure, our best estimate is that the African
pledges held firm and that the weakness was from the
competition in our own regional group.

PERSONAL NOTES ON VARIOUS DELEGATIONS

15.(C) Angola: The PermRep is highly respected, but as first
chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission, his leadership was
weak and too open to Egyptian influence. Their man in 2nd
Committee, Giza Gaspar-Martins, was particularly skillful,
worked hard and effectively and looks like someone with the
potential to rise quickly from Advisor to something much more
significant.

16.(C) Botswana: Ambassador Outlule is one of my better
contacts. When our policies coincide, he is active in support
of common positions. He took the lead on the issue of the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, something
that we both opposed.

17.(C) Burundi: Ambassador Ntakirutimana, new and willing to
step out of the box and support us on human rights votes. I
am not sure that he is a believer in human rights; perhaps
more a believer in being seen to help the United States.

18.(C) Cameroon: Ambassador Belinga-Eboutou remains helpful
and his delegations voting record is among the best.

19.(C) Cape Verde: a moderate and helpful delegation.

20.(C) Comoros: Tiny staff. The two Ambassadors on the
diplomatic list are never here. Charge' Aboud very helpful,
even though his new government requires him to be more
NAM-concious than last year. But when I asked for a special
effort on the DPRK human rights text, he was one of four who
voted with us.

21.(C) Congo: almost entirely absorbed by their Security
Council responsibilities.

22.(C) Cote d'Ivoire: Ambassador Djangone'-Bi tells me he is
likely to be transferred, perhaps to London. Helpful, though
mostly through abstentions and absences.

23.(C) DRC: Ambassador Atoki is helpful, but keeps a low
profile.


USUN NEW Y 00002260 004 OF 005


24.(C) Djibouti: Ambassador Olhaye is accredited to
Washington as well as here (where he is Dean of the African
corps). His delegation is helpful behind the scenes, and
abstains on many key votes, but does not intend to get out in
front in public.

25(C) Eq. Guinea: helpful by not voting.

26.(C) Eritrea: not easy to work with since almost every
conversation includes the duty paragraph about our support
for Ethiopia in the boundary dispute. Even so, some helpful
abstentions from time to time.

27.(C) Ethiopia: A goodish voting record, as before, under a
new Ambassador I do not yet really know.

28.(C) The Gambia: Ambassador Grey-Johnson is personable
enough, but talks a fairly strong NAM line, presumably a
reflection of his government.

29.(C) Ghana: Ambassador Effah-Apenteng, also on the Security
Council, is one of the most influential (and helpful) in the
Africa Group.

30.(C) Kenya: A new Ambassador; a moderate voting record.

31.(C) Lesotho: Ambassador Maema gets perhaps a C plus. I
always think their voting record should be better than it is.

32.(C) Liberia: The new Ambassador Barnes, is very
approachable, but he is not willing at this stage to stick
his head over the trench line. Lots of absences on the
voting sheets. Still, a distinct improvement on his
predecessor -- but then, Monrovia sent the money to turn the
electricity back on.

33.(C) Madagascar: Moderate voting record; lots of
abstentions.

34.(C) Malawi: Helpful votes on the Israeli texts and an Aye
on the DPRK human rights text. The new Ambassador and I
keep making appointments to meet, and then one of us has to
break off.

35.(C) Mauritius: Ambassador Soborun is new, friendly and
helpful. He tells me he would be more helpful if
instructions permitted. I am inclined to believe him.

36.(C) Namibia: Ambassador Mbuende has to be an improvement
on his predecessor, Ambassador Andjaba. But that doesn't say
much. Very much tied to the NAM model of behavior. Joined 3
others in voting NO on the DPRK human rights text. However,
with Botswana, they took leadership on the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

37.(C) Nigeria: Good relations with Ambassador Wali's
Mission. We are told that they are exploring the possibility
of running for the UNSC next year.


38.(C) Sierra Leone: Ambassador Joe Pemagbi is pleasant and
available, but hesitant to act without Freetown's
instructions. The presence of the Foreign Minister for both
Peace-building Commission meetings reinforced this. Deputy
PermRep, Ambassador Allieu Kanu was particularly strong in
the 6th (Legal) Committee. Sierra Leone was very pleased
with the election of their man, Kingston Rhodes, to the Intl.
Civil Service Commission.


39.(C) Senegal: I remain impressed by Ambassador Badji. Their
votes on the Middle East are conditioned by his chairmanship
of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People and by their membership as one of
three on the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices. Badji assures me he exercises a moderating
influence on the Committee on the Exercise, etc., not that
such moderation cuts much ice, since the U.S. objects to the
operation in toto.

40.(C) South Africa: They go on the SC in January.
Ambassador Kumalo is one of the most active and powerful
influences here, generally not to our benefit on NAM/G-77
issues, but his delegation is open to dialogue, even if not
much results. First Secretary Andries Oosthuizen caught our
eye as an especially able negotiator, intelligent and

USUN NEW Y 00002260 005 OF 005


flexible as a lead G-77 representative on economic issues.
Strikingly more balanced than other members of his
delegation. He is returning to the Foreign Ministry.

41.(C) Swaziland: Ambassador Dlamini has been here just over
a year. He is more amenable than his predecessor, so perhaps
over time we will shift some of their votes slightly in our
direction.

42.(C) Tanzania: Ambassador Mahiga goes off the SC at the end
of the year. He is thoughtful and helpful. Deputy PermRep,
Ambassador Tuvako Manongi is also highly respected.

43.(C) Togo: Not a good voting record, but Charge Menan, who
is personally friendly enough, is leaving after nine years.

44.(C) Uganda: Ambassador Butagira is open and helpful.
Personally committed to human rights and constructive
diplomacy, he is one of our best contacts here. His deputy,
Ambassador Ayebare is also impressive and appears well
connected in Kampala. He has also been heavily involved in
the Burundi peace talks.








WOLFF