CHINESE IN NY THREATEN VETO OF BURMA RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002254

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EMBASSY BEIJING FOR KAGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2011
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE IN NY THREATEN VETO OF BURMA RESOLUTION

REF: BEIJING 24497

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor William Brencick for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chinese Political Counselor Li Junhua
told PolCouns and deputy PolCouns December 14 that if the
United States moved forward with its draft resolution on
Burma there would be a "political showdown" in the Security
Council. Speaking without instructions but based on telecons
with his capital, Li reported that upon receiving the U.S.
draft the Chinese had engaged with the Burmese in New York,
Rangoon, and Beijing. The Burmese had claimed the draft
resolution proved there is no benefit for the regime in
responding to international concerns and threatened to cut
off cooperation with the UN Secretary-General's Good Offices
mission if the Security Council adopted a product (i.e., an
UNSCR or Presidential Statement),an outcome Li argued would
undercut our shared interests. Li stated that China believes
the most effective route to effect change in Burma is through
its bilateral relationship. He also said that China would
urge ASEAN to take a more active role in pressing the regime.
Although China had opposed including Burma on the Security
Council agenda, Li said China now accepts the fact of regular
briefings by U/SYG Gambari which he argued is the appropriate
mechanism to demonstrate Council support for the Good Offices
mission. Pressed repeatedly, Li maintained that Beijing is
implacably opposed to an UNSCR, suggesting that even a
discussion of the U.S. draft at an expert level would lead to
conflict between the United States and China. Separately,
the Japanese have indicated they are firmly opposed to UNSC
action in December while they remain a member of the Security
Council. End Summary.

Strong Reaction in Beijing
--------------


2. (C) PolCouns and DeputyPolCouns met December 14 with the
PolCouns of the Chinese Mission, Li Junhua, who earlier in
the month had asked to engage bilaterally with USUN about the
proposed UNSCR on Burma. PolCouns had shared the draft
resolution with Li on December 12. Li characterized the
reaction in Beijing to the U.S. draft as "very negative" and
said it was "stronger than I expected." He said Beijing had
no intention of proposing revisions to the text. He observed
that if the United States tabled the resolution in the
Council and sought a vote there would be a "political
showdown." He also argued against tabling the resolution for
discussion, suggesting the outcome would only lead to
conflict between the United States and China.

China and Burma
--------------


3. (C) Stating that he was not speaking on instructions
although he had spoken by phone with his colleagues in
Beijing, Li reported that upon receiving the draft China had
consulted with the Burmese in New York, Rangoon, and Beijing.
(In Rangoon he said the Chinese had access to the MFA and
the Prime Minister.) The Burmese reportedly said the draft
resolution proved there is no benefit for the regime in
responding to international pressure because the draft
resolution labels the country a "bad state." The Burmese
also reportedly told the Chinese that if the Security Council
adopted a product (i.e., an UNSCR or PRST),the regime would
cut off all cooperation with the UN SYG's Good Offices
mission. Li argued that such action would be
counterproductive.


4. (C) PolCouns explained to Li that the purpose of the
draft was to respond to U/SYG Gambari's request, echoed by
ASSK, for the Council to act in support of the Good Offices
mission. The text also outlined concerns shared by the
international community and the subject of Gambari's dialogue
with the regime. Li said that China had engaged with Burma
after both of Gambari's trips, urging the regime to be
responsive. China will continue such bilateral engagement,
its preferred method of engaging the regime. While admittedly
the regime had not yet acted, China believes the process of
UN engagement is positive and opposes action that would
threaten that cooperation. Li also compared the Burmese
regime to DPRK, especially in terms of its isolation and
resistance to anything considered "outside interference."


5. (C) When pressed repeatedly to suggest a means for the
Council to endorse the Good Offices mission and to make clear
that the international community expected a timely and
concrete response to Gambari's requests, Li noted the Council
had already issued a press statement in support of Gambari
(at his last briefing on November 27). He added that regular

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briefings by Gambari to the Council are the most appropriate
means for the Council to follow this issue, noting that
acceptance of such briefings is a shift in Chinese policy, as
the Chinese had opposed adding Burma to the Council agenda.
Finally, he said that China is ready to ask ASEAN to increase
pressure on the regime; this regional body is the appropriate
forum for pressure, he stated.

Support for Gambari
--------------


6. (C) PolCouns also tried to argue there was a need for
action now in the Council, given the upcoming change in UN
senior leadership. Li dismissed this argument, and reported
that the Africa Group in the UN had advised the new SYG
Ban-ki Moon that Africans supported retaining Gambari in the
position of U/SYG for Political Affairs. Li said China also
supported Gambari, and noted that Gambari enjoyed the trust
of the Burmese regime. This was another reason not to
jeopardize the regime's cooperation with the UN.

Japanese Cold Feet
--------------


7. (C) Separately, in meetings December 13 and 14 with
various members of the Japanese delegation, the Japanese
informally conveyed the message that they now oppose any
action in the Council on Burma in December, their last month
as an elected member of the Council.

Next Step
--------------


8. (C) Noting that both the IO and EAP equivalents of the
Chinese MFA opposed the draft Burma resolution, Li
recommended that Ambassador Ranz engage the assistant Foreign
Minister.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Although he did not use the word "veto," it was clear
that the always understated Li intended the phrase "political
showdown," which he repeated several times, to be a synonym
for a veto.
WOLFF