SE NATIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002233

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: SE NATIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 4 meeting with SYG Kofi
Annan, Presidential Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew
Natsios pushed for quick implementation of the Addis Ababa
principles and highlighted the need for clarity on the
mission's command and control. Annan expressed optimism in
the face of conflicting communications from the Government of
Sudan (GOS) that the Sudanese have accepted the Addis Ababa
consensus agreement as reiterated, more or less, in the Abuja
PSC agreement. Annan emphasized the importance of attaining
a Sudanese commitment to the entire Addis Ababa deployment
package for force generation and funding. Annan described
AMIS commander General Aprezi as ineffective and
uncooperative. Natsios said that January 1 is the effective
deadline for the GOS to show seriousness about accepting the
Addis Ababa consensus. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) USG Participants: SE Natsios, D/SE Andrew Steinfeld,
USUN MSC LTC Murray, Poloff (notetaker). UN Participants:
SYG Kofi Annan, D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown, DPKO Africa
Director Dimiti Titov.

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Annan Remains Optimistic
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3. (C) Annan put an optimistic spin on the discussions with
President Bashir on the margins of the November 30 AU PSC
meeting in Abuja. (NOTE: Annan was not present at the
meeting, but had been briefed by officials from UN DPKO. END
NOTE) Annan argued that the reported Sudanese acceptance of
an AU-UN hybrid force at Abuja supersedes President Bashir's
earlier written rejection of such a force in his letter to
the UN SYG. Furthermore, the UN has received reports from
UNMIS that the GOS cabinet endorsed the Abuja agreement on
December 3. (NOTE: While Annan wanted to focus on the
Abuja text rather than on President Bashir's negative letter
to him, the Embassy of Sudan in Washington released a press
release reiterating the points in President Bashir's letter
to Annan while this meeting was taking place. END NOTE)
Natsios responded that the USG is skeptical, especially given
President Bashir's established strategy of delay and
obfuscation.

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Commitment to the Whole Package
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4. (C) Annan emphasized the importance of attaining a
Sudanese commitment to the entire Addis Ababa deployment
package. The deployment phases are not options, but
integrated steps towards the deployment of a robust
peacekeeping force in Darfur. The UN is loathe to deploy
significant assets to support a failing AMIS mission, without
a guarantee that the transition to full UN capabilities and
force protection is imminent. Annan avowed that the phase 2
(UN heavy assistance package) only makes sense in the context
of rapid move to phase 3, an AU-UN hybrid force.


5. (C) Force generation for phases 1 and 2 could also be
affected as most, if not all, of the technical assistance and
logistical support for the heavy and light assistance
packages for AMIS will have to come from non-AU countries.
D/SE Steinfeld pointed out that non-AU countries would not
contribute such assets without a guarantee that the UN would
be rapidly assuming responsibility for the mission. Annan
concurred and suggested the transition to phase 3 should take
place "as quickly as possible." AMIS will need to be funded
in the interim. UN funding for phase 3 will still take "some
sorting out."

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AMIS Commander is
Ineffective, Uncooperative
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6. (C) Annan used unusually harsh language in his criticism
of AMIS Commander General Aprezi. Annan described Aprezi as
an "uncooperative, ineffective commander" and "somewhat of a
control freak." (NOTE: USYG Guehenno made a similar point in
an earlier meeting. END NOTE.) In a pointed interjection,
DPKO Africa Director Dimiti Titov commented that some of
Aprezi's arguments on force size and UN assistance
&strangely coincide8 with those of the GOS.

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GOS Needs to Show Seriousness
on Addis Ababa Consensus

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7. (C) In regard to conflicting Sudanese statements about
what is meant by AU-UN hybrid command, Natsios commented that
the daily business of commanding troops requires absolute
clarity of command and the question is whether the GOS has
committed to accepting an effective force or remains intent
on hobbling any force with unreasonable demands. Annan
concurred and said it will be important to "test them as
quickly as possible." Natsios replied that the window of
time for the GOS to show a sincere commitment to the Addis
Ababa consensus is not indefinite and the effective deadline,
as far as it concerns relations with the USG, is January 1.

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Comment
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8. (C) Annan's view is much more optimistic than that of
USUN, SE Natsios and even DPKO U/SYG Guehenno who, in a prior
meeting, stated that "Bashir has not made a strategic shift
in his thinking." Annan clearly wants to put a positive spin
on Darfur as he hands off to his successor.


9. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message.

BOLTON